L.L. et al. v. NEWELL BRANDS INC., et al., SC 21005

On Certification from United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

Torts; Loss of Consortium; Whether Derivative Cause of Action for Loss of Filial Consortium by Parent Should Be Recognized. The minor child plaintiff L.L. (child) was severely burned after the car seat in which she was strapped, which had been placed next to an electric range stove, caught fire. As a result, the child suffered permanent injuries, including the devitalization of tissue in her arm that eventually required amputation of several fingers. The child's parents, the plaintiffs Justin and Mary Lapointe (parents), subsequently brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the sellers of the car seat, the defendants Newell Brands Inc. and Target Stores, Inc., as well as the seller of the stove, Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc. The parents asserted product defect claims against the defendants on behalf of the child. On their own behalf, the parents alleged claims of loss of filial consortium. The defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the consortium claims as not cognizable under Connecticut law. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, relying on our Supreme Court's decision in Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36 (2015), in which it recognized a cause of action for loss of parental consortium by a minor child. In Campos, the Supreme Court determined that the relevant public policy factors favored recognition, specifically, "the unique emotional attachment between parents and children, the importance of ensuring the continuity of the critically important services that parents provide to their children, society's interest in the continued development of children as contributing members of society, and the public policies in favor of compensating innocent parties and deterring wrongdoing." Id., 43. In dismissing concerns about countervailing policy considerations, the Supreme Court determined that recognizing a claim for parental consortium would not require imposing arbitrary limitations on said claim, would not impose undue societal costs without yielding significant social benefits, and would not create a significant risk of double recovery, and it noted that the weight of authority from other jurisdictions favored recognition. Id., 44–57. The District Court in the present case declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' filial consortium claim. In light of the lack of Connecticut appellate authority on the issue, however, it certified the following question of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b, and the Supreme Court accepted the following question: "Does Connecticut law recognize a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium in his or her child, who allegedly suffered severe, but non-fatal, injuries because of the defendants' tortious conduct?" In urging that the certified question be answered in the affirmative, the plaintiffs argue that the same factors and reasoning relied upon by the Supreme Court in recognizing a cause of action for parental consortium in Campos apply with equal, if not greater, force in the context of claims for filial consortium, which arise from the same parent-child relationship. The defendants disagree that the balancing of factors favors recognition of such causes of action and argue that it should be left to the legislature to decide whether to expand Campos to claims of loss of filial consortium.