STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTON CHARLES MITCHELL, SC 20989

Judicial District of Hartford

Criminal; Jury Instructions; Due Process; Double Jeopardy; Whether Instruction to Jury on Section of Criminal Statute Not Explicitly Charged in Information Is Reversible Error; Whether Convictions for Both Home Invasion and Its Predicate Offense of Assault Violated Constitutional Prohibition against Double Jeopardy. The defendant was arrested and charged with various offenses after unlawfully entering a dwelling in West Hartford and shooting his ex-girlfriend's boyfriend in the face with a firearm. In charging the defendant with assault in the first degree, the state specifically alleged in the criminal information a violation of subsection (a) (5) of General Statutes § 53a-59, which provides that a person is guilty of such offense when he intentionally injures another person by means of the discharge of a firearm. The state also alleged a violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa, which provides in relevant part that "(a) [a] person is guilty of home invasion when such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a participant in the crime is actually present in such dwelling, with intent to commit a crime therein, and, in the course of committing the offense: (1) . . . such person . . . commits or attempts to commit a felony against [said other person] . . . or (2) such person is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." The state did not specify which subsection of the home invasion statute the defendant was alleged to have violated or whether he was purported to have violated both, although it did specifically allege that the defendant had "unlawfully entered the home of another person, while four other persons were present, and herein did commit a felony against the person of another who was present in the home, to wit: the defendant committed the crime of [a]ssault in the [f]irst [d]egree . . . ." During voir dire, the trial court provided the parties with an initial draft of its proposed jury instructions, which defined the crime of home invasion exclusively in terms of subsection (a) (2) of § 53a-100aa. During a charge conference with the court after the conclusion of evidence, defense counsel denied having any concerns regarding the proposed instructions. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of both offenses. Following sentencing, the defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court under General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). He first claims that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a section of the home invasion statute not specifically charged in the information. He argues that the information implicitly charged him with violating only subsection (a) (1) and that, therefore, the trial court's instruction solely on subsection (a) (2) violated his right to notice of the specific charges brought against him as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. The defendant acknowledges that this claim was not preserved but contends that the Supreme Court should reverse his conviction under the plain error doctrine because the trial court's jury instruction was obviously erroneous and was so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice. Alternatively, the defendant argues that, if he cannot prevail on a constitutional claim under the plain error doctrine, the Supreme Court should nevertheless reverse the home invasion conviction pursuant to its supervisory authority due to the exceptional circumstances presented by this case. The defendant also claims that his conviction for both assault and home invasion violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. He argues that the two offenses effectively constitute the same crime, such that punishment for both would violate the double jeopardy clause, because the home invasion charge, as alleged in the information, was predicated on his commission of first degree assault, which offense does not require proof of an element beyond those necessary to convict him under the home invasion count.