STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVIS ROMAN VILLANUEVA, SC 20869

Judicial District of New Haven

      Criminal; Whether Evidence Was Sufficient to Merit Jury Instruction on Adequacy of Police Investigation; Whether Threat of Prosecution and Incomplete Instruction on Photo Lineup Procedure Rendered Identification Unreliable. The defendant was convicted of murder and firearm offenses in connection with the killing of Casey Schoonover outside a nightclub in Meriden in 2020. On the night of the shooting, the state's only eyewitness, Diana Baez, had been consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana for hours before going to the nightclub, where she continued to drink and smoke. While there, Baez briefly interacted with a man whom she did not know. At some point, an acquaintance, Ramphis Pacheco, joined the group. The group decided to leave the club at around 4 a.m. after Pacheco, who was intoxicated, became belligerent. As they exited the building, the stranger tagged along and began conversing with Pacheco. While walking to the parking lot, Pacheco accosted the victim, whereupon the stranger threw his beer can at the victim, punched him, and shot him with a gun. The victim then ran off, and the stranger fled in his vehicle. Within moments, a police officer stationed nearby arrived on the scene. After inquiring as to the source of the gunshots, the officer, Zack Golebiewski, drove away in pursuit of the stranger without interviewing or taking the names of any of the eight witnesses present. After failing to apprehend the shooter, Golebiewski returned to the scene with other officers, made a cursory search of the area, and then left without securing the scene. The victim was found several hours later, lying dead next to his car. Four days after the shooting, Detective David Visconti interviewed Baez and suggested that she could be charged with murder if she did not help identify the shooter. Six days later, Visconti met with Baez again, accompanied by another officer, who administered a photo lineup. Baez identified the defendant as the man who most resembled the shooter but was not completely confident. A man from the defendant's hometown later came forward and identified the defendant as the shooter from surveillance footage. The police also recovered the defendant's DNA from a beer can found at the scene. Before his jury trial, the defendant moved to suppress Baez' identification on the ground that the police's threat of prosecution and failure to fully instruct her regarding the lineup as required by General Statutes § 54-1p rendered the identification unreliable and violative of his right to due process and a fair trial. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Visconti's threat was irrelevant because it was not made at the time the lineup was administered, the failure to instruct Baez in accordance with § 54-1p did not render the identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive, and her identification was reliable. At trial, the state presented the testimony of a medical examiner regarding the victim's wounds. The defendant objected to the testimony on the ground that the medical examiner had not conducted the victim's autopsy and had based her opinions on the report of another examiner, thereby violating his sixth amendment right of confrontation. The trial court determined that the testifying examiner's opinions were admissible, despite being based on hearsay information, because they represented her own independent conclusions and not merely a recitation of another examiner's conclusions. Following the presentation of evidence, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation. The trial court denied the request, concluding that there was insufficient evidence of investigative failures to warrant it. From his conviction, the defendant now appeals directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3), claiming that the trial court erred in (1) denying his request to charge, (2) denying his motion to preclude Baez' identification, and (3) overruling his objection to the medical examiner's testimony.