STATE v. JAROD HAMILTON, SC 20806
Judicial District of Bridgeport
Criminal; Whether
Trial Court Improperly Admitted Statements Made by Uncooperative State's Key
Witness under State v. Whelan; Whether Trial Court Improperly
Admitted Statements Made by Father of State's Key Witness During Witness' Interview
under Whelan Because Witness Adopted Statements; Whether Trial Court
Improperly Admitted Photographs and Video of Defendant Posted on Social Media. On December 23, 2017, a man wearing
"Jordan 13" sneakers shot and killed the victim, Khali Davis, outside
a deli in Bridgeport. After the shooter fled, he entered the passenger side of
a vehicle owned by Daequan Carr. Carr subsequently gave two recorded statements
to the police that inculpated the defendant in the murder of the victim. Carr appeared alone for the first interview,
but his second interview was conducted in the presence of his father, Dennis Cobia.
The defendant was subsequently charged with murder. At trial, when the state asked Carr if he
"picked up" the defendant on the morning of the murder, Carr
responded that he could not remember.
The state then asked Carr several times whether he remembered giving
statements to the police about whom he picked up that morning. In response,
Carr repeatedly testified that he did not "want to be here" and that
he did not "want to speak." Thereafter, upon the state's motion, the
trial court admitted Carr's statements into evidence pursuant to the prior
inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule adopted in State v.
Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (1986). Subsequently, defense counsel objected to
several disparaging comments regarding the defendant made by Cobia that could
be heard in the recording of Carr's second interview on the ground that they
constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court overruled the objection, ruling
that, to the extent Carr "adopted" Cobia's statements either by
verbally agreeing with them or by nodding affirmatively, the statements were
admissible as Carr's statements under Whelan. After the trial, the jury
found the defendant guilty of murder. The defendant now appeals directly to the
Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). On appeal, the defendant claims that the
trial court improperly admitted Carr's statements under Whelan because,
although Carr was uncooperative, his trial testimony was not inconsistent with
his statements. Next, the defendant
claims that the trial court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial
comments by Cobia in Carr's second Whelan statement under the adoptive
admissions exception to the hearsay rule. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (1) (B).
He asks that the Supreme Court hold that Whelan statements may not
include adoptive admissions by a witness because a witness, as opposed to a
defendant, has no natural incentive to contradict incorrect statements that
inculpate a third party. Alternatively, he argues that Cobia's statements did
not constitute adoptive admissions by Carr because there was no definite proof
that the Carr intended to adopt Cobia's comments. He also argues that the
Cobia's statements should have been excluded because they were irrelevant and
more prejudicial than probative. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence (1) a Facebook photograph of the
defendant wearing "Jordan 13" sneakers and (2) photographs and video
from the defendant's Snapchat account showing him holding a firearm on the
ground that the evidence was probative of the defendant's identity as the
shooter. He argues that the prejudicial effect of this evidence far outweighed
its probative value.