STATE v. KARIN ZIOLKOWSKI, SC 20801
Judicial District of New Haven
Criminal; Whether Defendant's Amnesia Prevented Her From Receiving a Fair Trial; Whether Evidence Was Sufficient to Support Defendant's Convictions for Murder and Second-Degree Arson; Whether Trial Court Erred in Allowing Into Evidence Tweets Purportedly Sent From Defendant's Twitter Account. On the morning of November 14, 2016, the firefighters carried the defendant and the body of her deceased eight-year-old son (victim) out of their burning home. An autopsy of the victim revealed that his death was not caused by smoke inhalation but rather by asphyxia. In addition, the fire marshal determined that the fires in the home were intentionally set. Based in part on this evidence, the defendant was charged with murder and arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112 (a) (1) (B). Prior to trial, defense counsel requested a competency evaluation pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d, stating that she was concerned that the defendant would not be able to assist in her own defense because she did not have any memories of the events surrounding the charged crimes. During the subsequent competency hearing, Dr. Nadia Gilbo, a forensic psychiatrist appointed by the court to examine the defendant, opined that the defendant "could fully exercise her cognitive ability" and was thus able to assist in her own defense. Thereafter, Dr. David Lovejoy, a neuropsychologist, testified for the defense and opined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial because her memory deficits created an inability to assist in her own defense. Applying the factors set forth in State v. Gilbert, 229 Conn. 228 (1994), for determining whether amnesia renders a defendant incompetent to stand trial, the trial court concluded that the defendant's amnesia did not so impact the fairness of the proceedings as to render her incompetent. At trial, the state sought to introduce into evidence three "tweets" purportedly sent from the defendant's Twitter account with the username "I am not Eliza" through the testimony of her aunt, A.G. A.G. testified, inter alia, that the defendant had told her that "I am not Eliza" was her Twitter account. The defendant objected to the admission of the tweets on the basis of lack of authentication. Specifically, the defendant claimed that "anyone else who had a user ID and password" for the Twitter account could have sent the tweets in question. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding that a "prima facie" showing existed that the tweets were made by the defendant. After the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of the charged crimes. The defendant directly appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). On appeal, the defendant claims that her trial was inherently unfair because her amnesia prevented her from assisting in her own defense. In support thereof, she argues that her memory was crucial to the construction and presentation of a defense, and hence, her amnesia had a significant effect on the outcome of the trial. In addition, the defendant claims that her murder conviction should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) the identity of the victim's killer and (2) that she had the specific intent to cause death. She also claims that her second-degree arson conviction should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) that she was responsible for setting the fires and (2) that she specifically intended to commit arson to conceal the crime of murder. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in overruling her authentication objection to the admission of the tweets purportedly sent from her Twitter account.