EMMETT ESCOBAR-SANTANA et al. v. STATE, SC 20772

Judicial District of Hartford

 Torts; Sovereign Immunity; Whether the Plaintiff Alleged a Claim That Falls Within the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Medical Malpractice Claims Against the State Set Forth in General Statutes § 4-160.  The plaintiff, Celine Escobar-Santana, brought this action pursuant to the waiver of sovereign immunity for medical malpractice claims against the state provided in General Statutes § 4-160, as amended by No. 19-1982 of the 2019 Public Acts.  The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, the state of Connecticut, failed to provide her with adequate and proper care during the labor and delivery of her son at the UCONN John Dempsey Hospital.  Specifically, she alleges that, after laboring for over two days and enduring painful procedures, her child was delivered via cesarean section with multiple significant and permanent injuries.  The plaintiff alleges that the labor and delivery were traumatic, terrifying, and painful and that she suffered severe psychological, physiological, and emotional distress caused by the defendant's conduct.  The plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress that might result in illness or bodily harm and that her distress was reasonable in light of the defendant's conduct.  The plaintiff attached to her complaint a certificate of good faith and a physician's opinion letter, which stated that her doctors departed from the standard of care in several ways during her labor and delivery.  The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the ground that it is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because it asserts a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress and not a claim for medical malpractice.  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that, when construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulging every presumption in favor of jurisdiction, the action adequately alleges a claim of medical malpractice.  The trial court found that, although the complaint contains allegations necessary to support a claim for emotional distress damages in the absence of a claim for physical injury, that fact does not convert the medical malpractice claim into a separate claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court further found no authority for the proposition that emotional distress is not a compensable injury in an action for medical malpractice.  The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to itself.  On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because claims for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury are not permitted unless a plaintiff alleges and proves the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which are different from the elements for medical malpractice, and only medical malpractice claims fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in § 4-160.