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STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*
CHRISTOPHER JENKINS
(SC 18077)

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.*

Argued October 28, 2009—officially released September 7, 2010

James M. Ralls, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were *Scott Murphy*, state's attorney, and *Paul Rotiroti*, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Timothy H. Everett, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was *Christopher Houck*, certified legal intern, for the appellee (defendant).

Jon L. Schoenhorn filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Opinion

NORCOTT, J. In this certified appeal, we consider the limitations, under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution¹ and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,² on police questioning and requests for consent to search automobiles conducted during the course of routine traffic stops. The state appeals, following our grant of its petition for certification,³ from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court's judgment of guilty of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent pursuant to General Statutes § 21a-278 (b),⁴ rendered after a conditional nolo contendere plea following the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence found in the automobile of the defendant, Christopher Jenkins. *State v. Jenkins*, 104 Conn. App. 417, 934 A.2d 281 (2007). Guided by case law following the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in *Arizona v. Johnson*, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009), *Muehler v. Mena*, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299 (2005), and *Ohio v. Robinette*, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996), we agree with the state that, under the federal constitution, the detective validly searched the defendant's automobile because the traffic stop was not measurably prolonged and the defendant voluntarily had consented to the search. We further conclude that the state constitution does not provide the defendant with any increased protection with respect to nontraffic related questioning and requests for consent to search during routine traffic stops. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On the night of May 7, 2004, Michael Morgan, a detective with the Newington police department, was patrolling the Berlin Turnpike (turnpike) in Newington in connection with a special traffic safety detail known as turnpike traffic enforcement. Morgan drove an unmarked police cruiser, but wore a full police uniform, complete with a badge, a sidearm, and a utility belt with handcuffs, pepper spray and a Stinger flashlight. At approximately 11:15 p.m., Morgan observed a Nissan Altima (Altima), operated by the defendant and proceeding northbound on the turnpike, make two abrupt lane changes without signaling. Morgan then activated his cruiser's emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop for making lane changes without signaling in violation of General Statutes § 14-242.

After Morgan stopped the Altima on the shoulder of the turnpike near its intersection with Griswoldville Avenue, a short distance south of the former Krispy Kreme doughnut shop, he radioed the Altima's Pennsylvania license plate number to his dispatcher, who checked it and did not report any matters of concern. Morgan then approached the defendant on the driver's

side of the Altima, informed him of the reason for the stop and requested his driver's license, registration and insurance papers. Morgan also questioned the defendant regarding his travel itinerary; the defendant told Morgan that he was returning from visiting his daughter in New York. The defendant then gave Morgan a New Jersey driver's license and a valid Pennsylvania rental agreement for the Altima. Morgan testified that, during this exchange and the remainder of the traffic stop, the defendant appeared "unusually nervous," gave "quick answers" to his questions and did not make eye contact with him.

Morgan then took the defendant's papers back to his cruiser, where he checked the defendant's personal and vehicular information with his dispatcher, and learned that there were no outstanding warrants, wants or cautions pertaining to the defendant. Morgan also requested a backup officer to respond to the scene of the traffic stop, because he had decided that he was going to ask the defendant for consent to search his vehicle. Morgan then began to write an infraction ticket for the illegal lane changes.

By the time Morgan had finished writing the ticket, the backup officer and shift supervisor, Sergeant Derrick Sutton, had arrived, also wearing a full police uniform. Morgan then approached the defendant and asked him to exit his car in order better to explain the ticket.⁵ Morgan then explained the ticket to the defendant, but did not give it to him at that time. On the basis of the defendant's continued nervous demeanor and account of his travels,⁶ Morgan asked him whether he had anything "illegal" on his person. The defendant replied that he did not have anything illegal on him, and Morgan then patted down the defendant, which did not reveal any contraband.⁷ Morgan then asked whether the defendant had anything "illegal" in the Altima. The defendant replied that all he had in the car was some beer on the floor by the passenger seat, and told Morgan that he could "go ahead and check. You can check if you want."⁸ At this point, Morgan did not inquire further of the defendant, or advise him that he could refuse to allow Morgan to search the car. Morgan then instructed the defendant to stand with Sutton, and Morgan began to search the interior of the Altima. Morgan testified that, during the stop, neither he nor Sutton had drawn their weapons, nor had handcuffed, threatened or otherwise coerced the defendant.

Morgan began his search of the Altima on the driver's side of the vehicle and immediately proceeded to open a closed compartment in its center console, where he found a package wrapped in white tissue paper. The tissue paper concealed a plastic bag that contained a white powder substance that Morgan identified as cocaine. At that point, Morgan stopped the search, handcuffed the defendant and placed him under arrest.

Following the defendant's arrest, a search of the rest of the Altima, including the backseat and trunk area, revealed additional cocaine and a large quantity of heroin.⁹ From the time that Morgan initiated the stop, until he obtained consent to search, only ten to fifteen minutes had elapsed, a period of time that he testified was consistent with an average traffic stop. The entire stop lasted at most twenty minutes, from its inception until the defendant's arrest.

Thereafter, the state charged the defendant with two counts of possession of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of § 21a-278 (a) and (b),¹⁰ and one count each of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of General Statutes § 21a-267 (a), and making an improper turn without a signal in violation of § 14-242. The defendant then moved to suppress all evidence seized from him and his vehicle, claiming that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended without probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion, and also that he had not voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.

The trial court, *Alexander, J.*, following an evidentiary hearing at which Morgan was the only witness, denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court found that the state had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had "freely and voluntarily given consent . . . in the search of his motor vehicle" because "the initial motor vehicle stop was a result of observed traffic violations; the length of the stop was brief (no more than fifteen minutes); the conduct of the officer was professional and not overbearing; the defendant told the officer to check his vehicle for illegal items; [and] the defendant did not withdraw his consent at any time." Noting that it was appropriate for Morgan to ask the defendant to exit his car during the stop; see generally *Pennsylvania v. Mims*, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977); *State v. Dukes*, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10 (1988); the trial court then specifically declined to credit the defendant's claim that "his statement to the police that evening was meant only to have the officer look at the beer in his car," considering the defendant's spontaneous response to Morgan's inquiry about the presence of illegal items to be "unambiguous: go ahead and check." Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere, conditioned on his right to appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a,¹¹ to one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of § 21a-278 (b). The trial court, *Handy, J.*, then sentenced the defendant to twenty years imprisonment, execution suspended after eight years, and five years probation.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of convic-

tion to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence taken from the defendant's car because he "was unlawfully detained . . . his consent to search the vehicle was tainted by that illegal detention and . . . the state failed to purge the taint of the illegal detention." *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 424. The Appellate Court stated that, under *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), "[i]n determining if a seizure has exceeded the scope of a permissible motor vehicle stop, the court must determine whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 427. Emphasizing that the validity of the initial stop was uncontested; *id.*; the Appellate Court then observed that "Morgan did not embark on his inquiry into whether the defendant was engaged in other illegal activity until *after* Morgan had (1) completed a check of the defendant's license and determined that it was valid and that there were no outstanding warrants for him, (2) examined the car rental agreement and determined that it appeared in order and that the time frame for the rental was valid and (3) returned to the defendant's vehicle, had him exit the vehicle and explained the traffic ticket to the defendant. Accordingly, [the Appellate Court concluded that] the record clearly reveal[ed] that Morgan's inquiry into other suspected illegal activity came after Morgan's purpose for effectuating the stop had been achieved."¹² (Emphasis in original.) *Id.*, 428–29.

Having concluded that the stop had been extended beyond the time necessary to effectuate its initial purpose, the Appellate Court then concluded that the state's evidence "did not establish that Morgan had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop into an inquiry of whether the defendant was engaged in illegal activity unrelated to the underlying stop or that Morgan was proceeding on anything more than a mere hunch. Therefore, once Morgan began to question the defendant about unrelated illegal activity, the formerly valid motor vehicle stop morphed into an illegally prolonged seizure of the defendant." *Id.*, 434. Applying the three factor test articulated in *Brown v. Illinois*, 422 U.S. 590, 603–604, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975), to determine whether the taint of police misconduct has been attenuated,¹³ the Appellate Court further determined that the defendant's consent was tainted by the improper detention and that the state had not purged that taint because the consent was given while the defendant was illegally detained, that there were no intervening circumstances such as an admonition that the defendant had the right to refuse the search, and that Morgan's official misconduct was particularly flagrant on the basis of his testimony that he had patted the defendant down without any justifiable basis. *State*

v. *Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 434–36. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress.¹⁴ *Id.*, 437. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal to this court, the state argues that the Appellate Court improperly: (1) relied on an inadequate record and reached out to decide claims not properly raised before the trial court, specifically whether Morgan improperly had patted down the defendant prior to obtaining his consent to search the Altima; and (2) concluded that, under the federal constitution, the scope or length of a traffic stop must be limited to its initial purpose, particularly given that there was probable cause that the defendant had committed two traffic violations in Morgan’s presence. In response, the defendant strongly disagrees, and also argues as alternative grounds for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court that: (1) his consent to search was involuntary; (2) Morgan’s search exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent; and (3) Morgan obtained the defendant’s consent to search in violation of article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, which he posits provides greater specific protections for motorists than does the federal constitution.

“Our standard of review of a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision We undertake a more probing factual review when a constitutional question hangs in the balance.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Burroughs*, 288 Conn. 836, 843, 955 A.2d 43 (2008). The issues presented in this appeal concern the articulation and application of the relevant federal and state constitutional rules governing the conduct of routine traffic stops. Unless specifically noted; see part II B of this opinion; we agree with the defendant that they present questions of law over which our review is plenary.

I

ADEQUACY OF THE RECORD FOR REVIEW OF CLAIMS PERTAINING TO THE PATDOWN SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT

Given the fact sensitive nature of constitutional suppression inquiries, we begin with the state’s claim that the Appellate Court improperly considered the fact of an illegal patdown search in agreeing with the defen-

dant's contention that his consent to search the Altima was tainted by the previously performed illegal search. The state notes that the issue was not raised in the defendant's motion to suppress or litigated during the suppression hearing, and relies on *State v. Brunetti*, 279 Conn. 39, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S. Ct. 1328, 167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007), and *State v. Medina*, 228 Conn. 281, 636 A.2d 351 (1994), to contend that the record is, therefore, inadequate for review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to *State v. Golding*, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly considered evidence in the record of the suppression hearing because the trial court failed to make detailed findings of fact, and emphasizes that he complied with his obligation to ensure a record adequate for appellate review by filing a motion for articulation, the trial court's denial of which was upheld by the Appellate Court. We conclude that the defendant's failure to litigate the validity of the patdown during the suppression hearing rendered the record inadequate for *Golding* review of this issue, and that the Appellate Court improperly considered any impropriety with respect to the patdown in its analysis of the defendant's claims.

The record reveals the following additional relevant facts and procedural history. When the defendant moved the trial court to suppress the narcotics found in the Altima, he claimed that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure, namely, his detention “for an extended period without probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity” In his motion, the defendant contended that, “[a]t no time did [he] voluntarily consent to the search of his vehicle,” any consent obtained “was tainted by the illegal action of [the] officers,” and that he “did not feel free to leave or decline to answer any questions posed by the officer due to the circumstances of the time of day, the number of officers called to the scene, and the fact that [he] was alone.” The defendant did not mention or question the legality of the patdown in his motion to suppress.

Following the suppression hearing, at which Morgan testified briefly about the patdown,¹⁵ the parties briefed and then argued the case orally before the trial court. In his memorandum of law, the defendant mentioned the patdown search in the statement of the facts, and then noted only that “the extended detention of the defendant and the warrantless search of his vehicle were not conducted to promote officer safety or to preserve evidence. . . . Morgan failed to articulate what crime he had reason to suspect the defendant was committing and stated that at the time of the patdown search, he did not suspect that the defendant was carrying a weapon. These factors, which must be considered when determining whether the seizure of the

defendant was reasonable under the circumstances, do not balance in favor of governmental intrusion into the defendant's liberty." The defendant did not mention the patdown in examining the totality of the circumstances and arguing that his consent was not voluntarily given.¹⁶ The state did not mention the patdown in its memorandum in opposition, nor did the trial court discuss the patdown in its memorandum of decision.

After the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, he contended specifically that, "(1) even if his consent to search the vehicle had been voluntary, it was tainted by a *prior, unconstitutional search of his person*, (2) the state failed to establish that he actually consented to the search of the vehicle, (3) any consent to search was not given voluntarily and (4) any consent to search was obtained by a violation of the Connecticut constitution by the police improperly converting a traffic stop into a criminal investigation."¹⁷ (Emphasis added.) *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 423–24; see also id., 427–28 ("the defendant's relevant claim on appeal relates to whether Morgan improperly expanded the scope of the stop by questioning the defendant about whether he was engaged in unrelated illegal activity and then performing a search of the defendant's person and his car, after the initial purpose for effectuating the stop had been achieved"). In connection with seeking *Golding* review of this claim, the defendant moved for an articulation seeking to have the trial court answer, inter alia: "After the defendant was ordered from his car, did . . . Morgan search the defendant's person and, if so, for what purpose? . . . Did the court find that the search of the defendant was reasonable? Did the court consider the search of defendant's person in determining whether the subsequent search of the defendant's car was constitutional?" The state did not take a position on the defendant's motion, but the trial court denied it. Thereafter, the Appellate Court granted the defendant's motion for review of that denial, but denied the relief requested.¹⁸

Subsequently, the Appellate Court agreed with the state's argument that "the issue of whether the defendant's person was illegally searched was not raised in the trial court and that the record is inadequate to establish whether the defendant consented to the search of his person," and noted that, "even if we assume arguendo that an illegal search of the defendant's person occurred, this, in and of itself, does not necessarily invalidate the search of the defendant's car." *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 428 n.11. Nevertheless, after determining that the defendant's consent followed an unlawfully prolonged detention, the Appellate Court, in applying the three factor attenuation test articulated in *Brown v. Illinois*, supra, 422 U.S. 603–604; see footnote 13 of this opinion; the third factor of which considers the "purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct"; *Brown v. Illinois*, supra,

604; stated that: “Morgan testified that he conducted a patdown search of the defendant although he did not believe that the defendant was armed. *While the record is inadequate to determine whether the defendant’s person was illegally searched, it is disconcerting that the officer testified that he conducted such a patdown without any justifiable basis.*” (Emphasis added.) *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 436; see also id., 428 n.11 (“as discussed herein, the fact that the defendant was patted down prior to the search of his car is relevant to whether his consent was tainted”).

Before this court, the defendant renews his argument, accepted by the Appellate Court, that, under *Brown v. Illinois*, supra, 422 U.S. 603–604, the illegal patdown demonstrates that Morgan had engaged in “flagrant” misconduct by extending the stop. The defendant also relies on the patdown in support of his alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, namely, that his consent was involuntary because the “search of [the defendant’s] person signified that he was already being treated as if he were under arrest,” and the patdown violated “a fundamental principle of constitutional law that [the] police may not touch a citizen without justification.”

The defendant’s various claims in this certified appeal are an amalgam of issues both preserved and unpreserved in the trial court. With respect to those issues that are unpreserved, he seeks review pursuant to *State v. Golding*, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40, under which “a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail.” To the extent that the defendant relies on the patdown in support of his constitutional claims, the legality of the frisk itself implicates the *Golding* rule because the defendant did not raise that issue before the trial court.

Our recent case law addressing whether a record is adequate for review under the first prong of *Golding* makes clear that this preservation exception operates in a very restrictive manner, particularly in the fact sensitive context of illegal search and seizure claims. The leading recent decision on this topic is *State v. Brunetti*, supra, 279 Conn. 42, wherein we declined to review the defendant’s claim, made for the first time on appeal, “that he was entitled to a new trial because, even though his father had consented to the search [of

the defendant's home], the search was constitutionally infirm because the defendant's mother, who was present when the police obtained the father's consent, declined to consent to the search." Specifically, before the trial court, the defendant's motion to suppress bloody clothing found in the home where he had lived with his parents, and the confession that followed his arrest, focused solely on the validity of his father's consent to the search, on the ground that his father had been improperly induced to agree to the search. *Id.*, 48–49. The suppression hearing transcript subsequently revealed that the defendant's mother had refused to sign the written consent form proffered by the police, but neither the state nor defense counsel inquired further about the mother's refusal to sign the consent form, despite the fact that she had testified at the hearing. *Id.*, 49–50. The trial court's ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress concluded that "the defendant's father's consent to search was knowing and voluntary, and, therefore, constitutionally valid." *Id.*, 50. After the defendant was convicted of murder and filed an appeal, he moved for articulation of numerous questions, including whether his mother " 'decline[d] to give her consent for a search of the house?' " *Id.*, 52. The trial court denied the motion for an articulation, and we subsequently declined to order it to issue the requested articulation. *Id.*, 53–54.

We thereafter concluded that the record was inadequate for review of the defendant's joint consent claim under the first prong of *Golding*. *Id.*, 56–64. We rejected his argument that the trial court's statement, in ruling on his suppression motion, that "[i]t is clear that at least one of the parties, one of the parents, declined to consent to [the] search," "perfected the record for review because it [constituted] a finding, supported by [the] evidence, that the defendant's mother had declined to consent to the search." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.*, 56. We disagreed with the defendant's reliance on testimony that his mother had declined to *sign* the consent form, and emphasized that, "the act of declining to sign a *consent* to search form is not tantamount to a refusal to consent to the search; rather, it is simply one of several relevant factors that a court considers in determining the validity of a consent to search. . . . Because the refusal to sign a consent to search form is one of several factors to be considered in determining the validity of consent, such refusal does not vitiate consent otherwise found to be valid in light of all of the circumstances." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) *Id.*

Most importantly, we emphasized that, "because the defendant's motions to suppress did not implicate the mother's consent or lack thereof, the state was not on notice that it was required to establish, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant's mother had consented to or acquiesced in the search.

In such circumstances, the state bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the state for this court to reach the merits of the defendant's claim upon a mere *assumption* that the defendant's mother had declined to consent to the search."¹⁹ (Emphasis in original.) *Id.*, 59; see also *id.*, 62 ("because the state had no obligation or incentive to adduce any evidence regarding the mother's consent or lack thereof, no conclusion—*indeed, no inference*—reasonably can be drawn from her failure to sign the form" [emphasis added]). Accordingly, we concluded that "the defendant has failed to satisfy the first prong of *Golding* because the facts revealed by the record are inadequate to establish whether the alleged constitutional violation did, in fact, occur."²⁰ *Id.*, 64.

Our other recent case law is consistent with *Brunetti* and makes clear that we consistently have declined to grant *Golding* review to fourth amendment claims wherein the predicate factual record was not completely developed before the trial court. See *State v. Dalzell*, 282 Conn. 709, 721, 924 A.2d 809 (2007) (This court declined to decide whether pretextual traffic stops violate the state constitution because "the trial court . . . made no findings regarding [the officer's] motivation for stopping the defendant's vehicle. Furthermore, to allow this claim to be presented for the first time on appeal would work a grave injustice on the state as it did not have any opportunity to develop a factual record to dispute the defendant's claim of pretext."); *State v. Canales*, 281 Conn. 572, 582, 916 A.2d 767 (2007) (following *Brunetti* and finding record inadequate for review of claim that defendant's statements were product of illegal arrest "because the defendant did not argue at the suppression hearing that the arrest lacked probable cause, [and] the state did not offer evidence concerning probable cause"); accord *State v. Batts*, 281 Conn. 682, 694, 916 A.2d 788 (defendant could not prove constitutional violation under third prong of *Golding* with respect to claim that state should bear "heightened standard of proof" for justifying stops based on racial profiling because record was "entirely devoid of evidence of racial profiling"), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1047, 128 S. Ct. 667, 169 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2007).

Thus, we agree with the state that the Appellate Court improperly considered *any* illegality attendant to Morgan's patdown of the defendant. Given the fact that the state was not alerted to the need to develop a factual record concerning whether potentially permissible bases, such as consent,²¹ existed for the patdown search, we conclude that it was improper for the Appellate Court to label the patdown negatively or to draw any adverse inferences from it on the basis of Morgan's testimony, which may not have presented a complete picture of what had occurred with respect to the patdown. Thus, we decline to consider the patdown as

anything other than a historical fact, and ascribe to it no legal significance.

II

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Accordingly, we now turn to the federal constitutional issues presented by the present case. First, we must consider whether Morgan's acts of questioning the defendant about topics unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop, as well as asking for consent to search, were themselves constitutionally permissible during a routine traffic stop. If we conclude that they were, we then must address the defendant's alternative grounds for affirmance under the federal constitution, namely that: (1) his consent was not voluntary; and (2) Morgan's search exceeded the scope of the defendant's consent.

A

Permissible Scope of Investigation during Routine Traffic Stops

The state, relying on *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, and *Ohio v. Robinette*, supra, 519 U.S. 33, claims that, under the restrictions of *Terry v. Ohio*, supra, 392 U.S. 1, questioning during a routine traffic stop need not be carefully tailored to the initial purpose of the stop, so long as the stop's overall duration is not "measurably extended" beyond the time necessary to accomplish the tasks attendant to that reason for the stop. In response, the defendant contends that Morgan ordered him from his car at a point when the traffic stop should have ended with the issuance of the traffic ticket and the return of the defendant's papers, thus creating an independent stop for *Terry* purposes that improperly lacked its own separate basis of reasonable suspicion beyond the moving violation. The defendant further argues that, because Morgan had not yet issued the ticket and had retained his documentation, the defendant was not free to leave at the time Morgan asked for consent to search, thereby rendering his consent the fruit of an improper stop not supported by reasonable suspicion. We conclude that Morgan's questions, including his request for consent to search, were permissible because they did not measurably extend the duration of the traffic stop.

Courts considering the constitutionality under the fourth amendment of a police officer's interaction with a motorist during a routine traffic stop apply the principles developed under the line of case law implementing the central holding of *Terry v. Ohio*, supra, 392 U.S. 1.²² See, e.g., *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 786; *Berkemer v. McCarty*, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984); *United States v. Bell*, 555 F.3d 535, 539–40 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2887, 174 L. Ed. 2d 595 (2009); *United States v. Turvin*, 517 F.3d 1097, 1099–1101 (9th Cir. 2008); *Salm-eron v. State*, 280 Ga. 735, 736–37, 632 S.E.2d 645 (2006):

State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1204 (Ind. 2008). Under *Terry*, “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . . . the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions. . . .

“It is well established, however, that [t]he police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous. . . . The authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer is narrowly drawn applying only where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. . . . And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Nash*, 278 Conn. 620, 631–32, 899 A.2d 1 (2006).

A *Terry* stop does not give law enforcement officers carte blanche to stop and detain citizens indefinitely or unreasonably because, “if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on *Terry* stops. While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s [f]ourth [a]mendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion . . . we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *United States v. Sharpe*, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985). Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts to impose “a hard-and-fast time limit” on *Terry* stops, in favor of a reasonableness inquiry where, “[i]n assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary

to detain the defendant. . . . A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.” (Citations omitted.) *Id.*, 686.

Applying this reasoning in the traffic stop context, the United States Supreme Court recently followed *Muehler v. Mena*, *supra*, 544 U.S. 100–101, wherein it had determined that the police did not violate the fourth amendment rights of a woman detained during the execution of a search warrant by questioning her about her immigration status,²³ and concluded that “[a] lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. . . . An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this [c]ourt has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”²⁴ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) *Arizona v. Johnson*, *supra*, 129 S. Ct. 788; see *id.*, 784, 788 (concluding that passenger was seized incident to lawful traffic stop of driver and that police officer properly could frisk passenger with reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous); see also *Illinois v. Caballes*, 543 U.S. 405, 408–409, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005) (use of trained narcotics sniffing dog around exterior of car during lawful traffic stop was permissible because it did not implicate privacy interests and “the duration of the stop . . . was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop”); cf. 4 W. LaFave, *Search and Seizure* (4th Ed. 2004 & 2009–2010 Sup.) § 9.3, p. 91.

Thus, questions permissible under *Terry* during a routine traffic stop include inquiries about whether the car or driver are carrying contraband, as well as concomitant requests for consent to search the vehicle. See 4 W. LaFave, *supra* (4th Ed. 2004), § 9.3 (d), p. 389 and § 9.3 (e), p. 397, and (2009–2010 Sup.), § 9.3, pp. 91, 94 (noting that *Illinois v. Caballes*, *supra*, 543 U.S. 405, supports requests for consent to search that do not extend duration of stop). These inquiries are permissible even if they are irrelevant to the initial purpose of the stop, namely, the traffic violation, so long as they do not “measurably extend” the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the investigation of the traffic violation and issue a citation or warning. Consideration of that time period necessarily includes the completion of tasks attendant to the traffic stop, including “a check of the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and criminal history, and the writing of the citation or warning,” as

well as background questions about the destination and purpose of the driver's trip. *United States v. Olivera-Mendez*, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., *Salmeron v. State*, supra, 280 Ga. 737 (“[i]t does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a valid traffic stop for an officer to prolong the stop to immediately investigate and determine if the driver is entitled to continue to operate the vehicle by checking the status of the driver's license, insurance, and vehicle registration” [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, given that complications with respect to these tasks may well result in an extension of the time of detention without rendering it unreasonable under the fourth amendment, “[w]hether a particular detention is reasonable in length is a fact-intensive question, and there is no per se time limit on all traffic stops.” *United States v. Olivera-Mendez*, supra, 510; see also *Byndloss v. State*, 391 Md. 462, 469–72, 492, 893 A.2d 1119 (2006) (upholding traffic stop wherein motorist was detained for approximately thirty minutes, even after officer already had drafted written warning, because of computer and communication problems that impeded completion of license and warrants checks, which allowed time for narcotics sniffing dog to be brought to scene).

Accordingly, decisions in the wake of *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, hold similarly and, in upholding the conduct of such stops as reasonable, uniformly have emphasized the de minimis nature of the nontraffic related questioning and requests for consent to search within the context of the stop as a whole.²⁵ See, e.g., *United States v. Harrison*, 606 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (extension of traffic stop by five to six minutes to question driver and passengers was reasonable and did not violate fourth amendment); *United States v. Everett*, 601 F.3d 484, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2010) (adopting reasonableness standard for determining whether questioning on unrelated subjects improperly extended duration of routine traffic stop); *United States v. Taylor*, 596 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2010) (officers did not violate fourth amendment during traffic stop for seat belt infraction by questioning defendant briefly about presence of “weapons, drugs, or illegal items on his person or in the vehicle” and then requesting consent to search), cert. denied, U.S. (78 U.S.L.W. 3744, June 21, 2010); *United States v. Dervenger*, 337 Fed. Appx. 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[w]e conclude without any need for further factfinding that the five minutes of questioning [about the defendant's nervous demeanor and contents of his car] did not significantly extend the time [the defendant] was detained” during stop for seat belt violation); *United States v. Rivera*, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013–15 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that trooper's questions about whether defendant “ ‘had guns or anything illegal in the truck’ ” did not “measurably extend” stop because they were asked immediately after questioning during first

four to six minutes of seventeen minute stop, related directly to stop, and delays were caused by waiting for results of background check and confirmation of consent; after defendant withdrew consent, narcotics-sniffing dog alerted presence of narcotics); *United States v. Bell*, supra, 555 F.3d 538, 542–43 (officers did not improperly extend length of stop, despite their lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond initial violation, because K-9 officer was able to respond and effect dog sniff of car approximately twelve minutes into stop while other officer waited for results of license check, wrote speeding warning and discussed it with defendant); *United States v. Cousin*, United States District Court, Docket No. 1:09-CR-90, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3688, *9 (E.D. Tenn. January 19, 2010) (during traffic stop, “[a]n officer may ask a handful of questions, including asking for consent to search the vehicle, and not unreasonably detain an individual”); *United States v. McBride*, United States District Court, Docket No. 1:09-CR-21-TS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113405, *10, 18–20, 22 (N.D. Ind. December 4, 2009) (officer’s question prior to issuing ticket about whether defendant “had any dead bodies or anything in his car,” followed by request for consent to search, did not violate fourth amendment because time to inquire was only approximately two minutes out of twenty-two minute stop, and therefore “negligible” in context of entire stop); *D.A. v. State*, 10 So. 3d 674, 676–78 (Fla. App.) (despite having already decided not to issue summons for expired temporary registration, police officer properly asked driver whether vehicle contained anything illegal), review denied, 20 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2009); *Boyd v. State*, 300 Ga. App. 455, 456, 458 and n.1, 685 S.E.2d 319 (2009) (questions about driver’s methamphetamine use did not violate fourth amendment despite fact that they were unrelated to purpose of stop); *State v. Morlock*, 289 Kan. 980, 993, 218 P.3d 801 (2009) (noting that questioning of passenger did not extend stop because it took place during “concededly legitimate hunt for the [rental] agreement”); *People v. Edwards*, 14 N.Y.3d 741, , N.E.2d , 898 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (2010) (per curiam) (“The initial stop of [the] defendant’s vehicle was permissible and the police officers’ subjective motivation to investigate possible drug activity does not negate the objective reasonableness of the officers’ actions In addition . . . as a matter of law, the officers did not inordinately prolong the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances to address the traffic infraction” [Citations omitted.]).

We emphasize, however, that in evaluating the duration of a traffic stop, the reviewing court still must consider the stop through the lens of the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the traffic stop, and expansions of the stop beyond that time are constitutionally impermissible in the absence of an independent basis of objectively reasonable, arti-

culable suspicion. See, e.g., *United States v. White*, 584 F.3d 935, 949 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1721, 176 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2010); *United States v. Bell*, supra, 555 F.3d 541; see also *United States v. Alix*, 630 F. Sup. 2d 145, 157–58 (D. Mass. 2009) (forty-five minute stop with multiple frisks and no reasonable suspicion to believe that driver or passenger was dangerous was unreasonable, particularly when their actions did not contribute to length of stop); *People v. Burei*, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8–9, 908 N.E.2d 538 (2009) (traffic stop was prolonged beyond time necessary to issue summons for cracked windshield by continuing to question defendant, eventually obtaining consent to search vehicle). Moreover, judicial review of routine traffic stops goes beyond a strict stopwatch test; reasonableness is not measured solely by the temporal duration of the stop alone but, rather, requires scrupulous consideration of the reasonableness of the officers' actions during the time of the stop. See *United States v. Peralez*, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119–21 (8th Cir. 2008) (traffic stop, while lasting only sixteen minutes, was unreasonably extended when questions unrelated to purpose of stop “constituted the bulk of the interaction between the trooper and the van’s occupants” and video recording showed that “off-topic questions more than doubled the time [the defendant] was detained”).

A review of the Appellate Court’s opinion in the present case indicates, then, that it did not apply the correct legal standard, in that it relied on pre-*Muehler* case law,²⁶ and stated that, “[i]n determining if a seizure has exceeded the scope of a permissible motor vehicle stop, the court must determine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. See *State v. Carcare*, 75 Conn. App. 756, 767, 818 A.2d 53 (2003); see also *United States v. Jones*, 234 F.3d 234, 240–41 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that although initial stop of defendants’ vehicle for speeding was valid, continued detention, after completing computer check on drivers’ licenses and rental papers revealed clean records, was unreasonable and violated fourth amendment).²⁷ With respect to whether the results of the initial stop aroused further suspicion warranting a prolonged inquiry, [t]he police officer’s decision . . . must be based on more than a hunch or speculation. . . . In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”²⁸ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 427; see also *id.*, 427–28 (“the defendant’s relevant claim on appeal relates to whether Morgan improperly expanded the scope of the stop by questioning the defendant about whether he was engaged in unrelated illegal activity and then performing a search of the defendant’s person

and his car, after the initial purpose for effectuating the stop had been achieved”).

Applying the proper legal standard to the facts of the present case, we conclude that Morgan did not measurably or unreasonably prolong his traffic stop of the defendant. In so concluding, we note that it is undisputed that the traffic stop for unsignaled lane changes was valid at its inception, and also that, under *Pennsylvania v. Mimms*, supra, 434 U.S. 111 and n.6, Morgan properly ordered the defendant to step out of the car for purposes of explaining the ticket. The total relevant duration of the stop, namely, from the time that the defendant was pulled over until the time that he gave his consent to the search of the Altima, was at most fifteen minutes; indeed, the defendant was under arrest twenty minutes from the inception of the stop. See *United States v. Rivera*, supra, 570 F.3d 1013–14 (“when a motorist gives consent to search his vehicle, he necessarily consents to an extension of the traffic stop while the search is conducted”). Moreover, during that fifteen minute time period prior to searching the defendant’s Altima, Morgan engaged only in activities that themselves related directly to the traffic stop, namely, questioning the defendant about his travels, checking the defendant’s license and rental agreement, performing a warrants check and then writing the ticket. Morgan asked only two brief off-topic questions concerning the presence of illegalities in the vehicle or on the defendant’s person near the end of the stop, after explaining the ticket to the defendant, but before giving it to him.²⁹ Unlike the protracted questioning in *United States v. Peralez*, supra, 526 F.3d 1120–21, which dominated the encounter in that case, these two questions in the present case did not create more than a de minimis extension of the overall stop, and therefore were permissible under *Muehler* and *Johnson*. Moreover, Morgan did not need to delay the stop in order to conduct the search, as Sutton, his backup officer, arrived while he was still in the process of writing the ticket. Accordingly, we conclude that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged and was not an illegal detention that violated the fourth amendment.

B

Whether the Defendant’s Consent Was Voluntary

Having determined that the traffic stop itself was not conducted in a manner that violated the fourth amendment, we now must consider whether the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.³⁰ This is because the lawfulness of the defendant’s seizure is a question different from whether the consent to search was voluntary. See, e.g., *United States v. Valenzuela*, 494 F.3d 886, 891 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1032, 128 S. Ct. 636, 169 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2007); *Salmeron v. State*, supra, 280 Ga. 739. Raising this claim as an alternate ground upon which we may affirm the

judgment of the Appellate Court; see Practice Book § 84-11 (a);³¹ the defendant contends that his consent to the search of his car was not free and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances; see *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); because: (1) Morgan and Sutton behaved in a “subtly coercive” manner since they were armed, the defendant was a minority from out of state who was alone in his car, and the traffic stop took place on a dark area of the turnpike; (2) Morgan already had escalated the encounter by patting down the defendant without justification; (3) neither officer informed the defendant of his right to refuse to consent to the search; and (4) the defendant was not free to leave because Morgan had not yet returned his license, rental agreement and ticket. In response, the state contends that the trial court’s findings of fact on this issue are not clearly erroneous—namely, that the police officers did not act in a coercive or deceptive manner—and further relies on the spontaneous nature of the defendant’s invitation to Morgan to search his car in response to Morgan’s question about the presence of any illegalities therein. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the defendant’s consent was free and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

“A warrantless search is not unreasonable under either the fourth amendment to the constitution of the United States or article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut if a person with authority to do so has freely consented to the search. . . . The state bears the burden of proving that the consent was free and voluntary³² The state must affirmatively establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to meet the state’s burden. . . . The question whether consent to a search has in fact been freely and voluntarily given, or was the product of coercion, express or implied . . . is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. . . . As a question of fact, it is normally to be decided by the trial court upon the evidence before that court together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. . . . We may reverse [the trial court’s factual] findings on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Azukas*, 278 Conn. 267, 275, 897 A.2d 554 (2006). Thus, “[w]hether there was valid consent to a search is a factual question that will not be lightly overturned on appeal.”³³ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Nowell*, 262 Conn. 686, 699, 817 A.2d 76 (2003).

“In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the [c]ourt has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account

have included the youth of the accused . . . his lack of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights . . . the length of detention . . . the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning . . . and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep . . .” (Citations omitted.) *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, supra, 412 U.S. 226. In analyzing these factors, the Supreme Court noted that it had “determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted.” *Id.*

In evaluating the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent, we note that, “while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” *Id.*, 249. The Supreme Court has emphasized that this rule remains applicable to requests for consent to search during traffic stops, calling it “unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.” *Ohio v. Robinette*, supra, 519 U.S. 40 (following *Schneckloth*); see also, e.g., *People v. Reddersen*, 992 P.2d 1176, 1182–83 (Colo. 2000) (consent to search given during ongoing traffic stop was voluntary, despite officer’s failure to advise motorist of his right to refuse or to give warning pursuant to *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 [1966]).

Moreover, that consent to search is given while a defendant is being detained does not render it involuntary per se, as “the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search.” *United States v. Watson*, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976); see also *id.*, 424–25 (The court noted that consent was given on public street, “not in the confines of the police station,” and that “[t]here was no overt act or threat of force against [the defendant] proved or claimed. There were no promises made to him and no indication of more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw his judgment.”); *State v. Winot*, 95 Conn. App. 332, 349, 897 A.2d 115 (2006) (The defendant’s consent, given while under arrest in the back of a police cruiser, was voluntary because he “does not claim to have been threatened in any way by anyone at the scene. He has not alleged that improper promises were made to him or that he was subjected to any other more subtle forms of coercion that might improperly have impaired his judgment.”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 753, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). Thus, it is significant that the defendant’s consent was obtained during a routine traffic stop that, while not itself consensual in nature, also was not unreasonable by fourth amendment standards;

see part II A of this opinion; which accords with the trial court's factual findings that "[t]here is no evidence that the length of the stop was excessive or overbearing" and that "[t]he defendant was never threatened or restrained."

With respect to the remainder of the defendant's claims,³⁴ although the officers did not inform him of his right to refuse to consent to the search, this factor is mitigated by the spontaneity of the defendant's invitation to Morgan to check his vehicle, in response to Morgan's question limited to the presence of "anything illegal" in the car. The spontaneous nature of that invitation, which was not given in response to a specific request for consent to search, renders "inapposite" the officers' failure to advise the defendant of his right to refuse to consent to the search. *United States v. Brown*, 563 F.3d 410, 416 (9th Cir. 2009); see also *id.* ("[a]lthough [the agent] admittedly did not notify [the co-occupant of the house] that she had a right not to consent to search, this factor is not an absolute requirement for a finding of voluntariness . . . and also seems inapposite given that [the co-occupant] volunteered consent without any prompting whatsoever" [citation omitted]); *United States v. Pedroza*, 269 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that consent was involuntary because "[the defendant] volunteered permission for the agents to search his home and the [vehicle] even before the agents asked for it"). Indeed, numerous federal and state courts have considered the spontaneity of consent, or an invitation to search without a prior request, as a "strong indication of [its] voluntariness."³⁵ *State v. Kennedy*, 290 Or. 493, 504, 624 P.2d 99 (1981). Thus, the trial court properly found significant that "it was the defendant who told the detective to check his vehicle upon the mere inquiry as to whether or not there was anything illegal in his car."

We further disagree with the defendant's claim that Morgan and Sutton behaved in a "subtly coercive" manner because they were armed, the defendant was a minority from out of state who was alone in his car, and the traffic stop took place on a dark area of the turnpike. The defendant has not proffered any evidence to contradict, or demonstrated a void of supporting evidence, with respect to the trial court's finding that "there was no untoward conduct on the part of either . . . Morgan or . . . Sutton" and that "there was no threatening, coercive or overpowering behavior exhibited at any time during this incident." The fact that the police officers were armed with their duty sidearms does not render the atmosphere coercive, particularly as there is no evidence that the officers ever drew or unholstered their weapons. See *State v. Reynolds*, 264 Conn. 1, 45, 836 A.2d 224 (2003) ("[a]lthough the presence of *drawn* weapons is certainly a factor in determining voluntariness . . . it is not dispositive" [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied,

541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004); see also *id.*, 45–46 (noting that coercive effect of displayed weapons was mitigated by manner of interaction, which did not involve threatening language or intrusion into subject’s home late at night or early in morning); *State v. Boyd*, 57 Conn. App. 176, 181, 749 A.2d 637 (The presence of drawn weapons was not dispositive of the defendant’s coercion claim because “[t]he defendant was not greeted with a phalanx of weapons when he opened his apartment door for the police. Rather, one officer had his weapon drawn at the defendant’s door while another with his weapon drawn remained at the bottom of the apartment stairs.”), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912, 754 A.2d 162 (2000). Thus, viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s consent was voluntary was not clearly erroneous.

C

Scope of the Defendant’s Consent

The defendant next proffers a second ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, namely, that the state did not prove that he actually had consented to a complete search of the Altima’s passenger compartment. Relying on *Florida v. Jimeno*, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991), the defendant contends that, by extensively searching his car, Morgan exceeded the scope of his consent, which he claims was limited only to an invitation to check for beer on floor by the passenger seat. In response, the state also relies on *Jimeno* and argues that it was objectively reasonable for Morgan to construe the defendant’s invitation as an actual consent to a search. We agree with the state and conclude that it was objectively reasonable for Morgan to interpret the defendant’s consent as extending to a search of the Altima’s passenger compartment and unlocked storage areas therein.

“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the [f]ourth [a]mendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” *Id.*, 251. “The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object.” *Id.* “Although objective reasonableness is a question of law [over which our review is plenary], the factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what a reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given.”³⁶ *United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez*, 318 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1049, 123 S. Ct. 2114, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1091 (2003); see also, e.g., *United States v. Rich*, 992 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir.) (“[o]bjective reasonableness is a question of law that is reviewed de novo”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 933, 114 S. Ct. 348, 126 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1993).

In *Jimeno*, the Supreme Court concluded that it was “reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect’s general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car.” *Florida v. Jimeno*, supra, 500 U.S. 251. The court noted that “the terms of the search’s authorization were simple” because the defendant had granted the officer “permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search,” after the officer “had informed [the defendant] that he believed [the defendant] was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search [the defendant’s] car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container.” *Id.*

Post-*Jimeno* case law makes clear that, on the basis of the exchange between Morgan and the defendant, Morgan reasonably could have understood the defendant’s invitation to “check” the Altima as an invitation to search the interior of the car and unlocked compartments therein, including its center console. First, Morgan’s question about the presence of “anything illegal” in the car reasonably is understood as directing the defendant’s attention to contraband such as narcotics or weapons, despite the fact that he did not mention those items specifically.³⁷ See *United States v. Canipe*, 569 F.3d 597, 606 (6th Cir.) (“[w]hen [the investigator] asked [the defendant] whether he had anything in his vehicle that might be unlawful or about which he should know, his questioning placed [the defendant] on notice that any unlawful item would be the subject of his search”), cert. denied, U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 655, 175 L. Ed. 2d 499 (2009); *United States v. Snow*, 44 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[i]t is self-evident that a police officer seeking general permission to search a vehicle is looking for evidence of illegal activity”); cf. *State v. McConnelee*, 690 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Iowa 2004) (“[c]onsidering their conversation was limited to the nature of the leafy substance that was in plain view, we think it unlikely that the defendant would respond to the officer’s comments with an unsolicited invitation to the officer to ‘search the whole car’ ”). Moreover, a general consent to search a vehicle “reasonably include[s] permission to search any container that might have held illegal objects.” *United States v. Canipe*, supra, 606; see also *United States v. Snow*, supra, 135 (“[i]t is just as obvious that such evidence [of illegal activity] might be hidden in closed containers”); *United States v. Harris*, 928 F.2d 1113, 1118 (11th Cir. 1991) (“the defendant knew the officer was looking for drugs; therefore, both [the] defendant and the officer would reasonably interpret the consent as constituting consent to search in places where narcotics would reasonably be hidden”);

cf. *United States v. Neely*, 564 F.3d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (containers “physically part of” area to be searched are included within scope of consent, but consent limited to trunk does not “physically encompass the interior of [a] vehicle”).

We further disagree with the defendant’s reliance on the fact that Morgan “never used the word ‘search,’” in support of his argument that “it is not linguistically and constitutionally reasonable to find that the defendant actually consented to the search of his car” Case law, none of which is contradicted by the defendant in his brief, establishes that Morgan reasonably understood the defendant’s invitation to “check” the car—made presumably in the hopes that Morgan would see only the beer on the floor by the passenger seat and then go on his way—as an invitation to search the vehicle.³⁸ See *United States v. Neely*, supra, 564 F.3d 350 (“[b]y asking whether [the officer] would like to ‘check’ the trunk, [the defendant] consented to a search of his trunk”); *United States v. Walker*, 922 F. Sup. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that defendant “first gave permission to conduct a search when he told [the trooper] ‘you can check the car’ while pointing at the vehicle”); *State v. Stephens*, 946 P.2d 734, 735, 737 (Utah App. 1997) (“we conclude that [the police officer] could have reasonably believed that [the] defendant’s general consent to ‘look’ or ‘check’ under the front seat for weapons or drugs extended to the contents of the leather case” found under front seat). Accordingly, we conclude that Morgan did not exceed the scope of the defendant’s consent by searching the interior of the defendant’s Altima, including its unlocked center console compartment.

III

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

As his final proffered alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, the defendant provides an analysis under *State v. Geisler*, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), and contends that we should adopt a rule, pursuant to article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution;³⁹ see footnote 2 of this opinion; providing that, to validate a request for consent to search made during a routine traffic stop, a police officer must: (1) have “reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity” prior to asking for consent; and (2) inform the motorist that he or she is free to leave and to refuse consent.⁴⁰ The defendant, supported by the amicus curiae Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, contends that we should adopt this new constitutional rule in order to address the psychological pressures experienced by Connecticut citizens stopped by the police and to provide them with heightened protection from the specter of racial profiling, pretextual stops and other arbitrary police actions based on non-criminal factors. In response, the state contends that

the defendant's proposed constitutional rules are unworkable, would vitiate the purpose of consent searches and that existing federal constitutional protections are sufficient. The state also contends that, because the record lacks evidence of racial profiling or other bias, the defendant and the amicus "[ask] this court to presume a serious impropriety" in devising a new constitutional rule. We agree with the state and conclude that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution does not provide criminal defendants with greater protections than does the federal constitution in the context of unrelated questioning, including requests for consent to search, made during routine traffic stops.

"It is well established that federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights. . . . Furthermore, although we often rely on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the amendments to the constitution of the United States to delineate the boundaries of the protections provided by the constitution of Connecticut, we have also recognized that, in some instances, our state constitution provides protections beyond those provided by the federal constitution, as that document has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. . . . The analytical framework by which we determine whether, in any given instance, our state constitution affords broader protection to our citizens than the federal constitutional minimum is well settled. In *State v. Geisler*, [supra, 222 Conn. 684–86], we enumerated the following six factors to be considered in determining that issue: (1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) the text of the operative constitutional provisions; (3) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other state courts; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or as otherwise described, relevant public policies." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. McKenzie-Adams*, 281 Conn. 486, 509–10, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007).

"The *Geisler* factors serve a dual purpose: they encourage the raising of state constitutional issues in a manner to which the opposing party—the state or the defendant—can respond; and they encourage a principled development of our state constitutional jurisprudence. Although in *Geisler* we compartmentalized the factors that should be considered in order to stress that a systematic analysis is required, we recognize that they may be inextricably interwoven. . . . [N]ot every *Geisler* factor is relevant in all cases." (Citation omitted.) *State v. Morales*, 232 Conn. 707, 716 n.10, 657 A.2d 585 (1995). Moreover, a proper *Geisler* analysis does not require us simply to tally and follow the decisions

favoring one party's state constitutional claim; a deeper review of those decisions' underpinnings is required because we follow only "persuasive" decisions. See *Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health*, 289 Conn. 135, 240–41, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ("the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like the federal cases described in this part of the opinion, employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority").

A

Operative Constitutional Text

With respect to the first *Geisler* factor, namely, the operative constitutional text, we agree with the state that the language of article first, § 7, does not support the defendant's claim of greater protections than are provided under the fourth amendment. See footnotes 1 and 2 of this opinion. The state provision "closely resembles" the fourth amendment; *State v. Barton*, 219 Conn. 529, 540, 594 A.2d 917 (1991); particularly as "both proscribe only unreasonable searches and seizures." *State v. Dukes*, supra, 209 Conn. 121; see also, e.g., *Washington v. Meachum*, 238 Conn. 692, 719, 680 A.2d 262 (1996) (describing provisions as "virtually identical"). Although the "linguistic similarity undermines the defendant's contention that the state constitution provides a greater opportunity to challenge the legality of a search than the federal constitution"; *State v. Davis*, 283 Conn. 280, 306, 929 A.2d 278 (2007); our inquiry does not end here, because "this court has never considered itself bound to adopt the federal interpretation in interpreting the Connecticut constitution. Our system of federalism requires no less. But of even weightier concern is the authority of our state constitution, the fundamental charter of our state, and it is this court's duty to interpret and enforce our constitution. Here we note that the United States Supreme Court or its individual members have often called the attention of state courts to their independent responsibility for the constitutional laws of their states. Thus, in a proper case, 'the law of the land' may not, in state constitutional context, also be 'the law of the state of Connecticut.'" *State v. Dukes*, supra, 113–14.

B

Connecticut and Federal Case Law

We also agree with the state that contemporary federal case law governing the police conduct during routine traffic stops; see parts II A and B of this opinion; similarly does not support the defendant's interpretation of the state constitution.⁴¹ With respect to Connecticut case law, although we have in the past interpreted article first, § 7, to "[afford] protections to the citizens of this state beyond those provided by the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, as that provision has

been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court”;⁴² *State v. Wilkins*, 240 Conn. 489, 505, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997); we also have concluded that “[a]pplications of *Terry* principles in the context of motor vehicle stops are already embodied in our state constitution.” *Id.*, 508–509. Thus, in *Wilkins*, we determined, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment in *Michigan v. Long*, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983), that the state constitution permitted police officers, with reasonable and articulable suspicion that a suspect is potentially dangerous, to conduct a limited protective search of a motor vehicle for weapons during a routine traffic stop. *State v. Wilkins*, supra, 509–11; see also *id.*, 501, 504 (officer acted reasonably under state constitution by separating vehicle occupants and detaining suspect in cruiser until backup arrived to allow patdowns to be conducted safely); *State v. Dukes*, supra, 209 Conn. 122 (following *Pennsylvania v. Mimms*, supra, 434 U.S. 106, and concluding that state constitution permits police officer to require motorist to exit vehicle during routine traffic stop); accord *State v. Mikolinski*, 256 Conn. 543, 554, 775 A.2d 274 (2001) (“sobriety checkpoints operated pursuant to neutral criteria are permissible under article first, § 7”); *State v. Lamme*, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) (concluding that article first, § 9, is due process provision that does not preclude *Terry* stops or other detentions not founded upon probable cause).

Moreover, the defendant has not identified any on point Connecticut case law interpreting the federal constitution that conflicts with the federal constitutional principles recently articulated in *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, and *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 93.⁴³ Cf. *State v. Oquendo*, 223 Conn. 635, 647–52, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (rejecting *California v. Hodari D.*, 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 [1991], and instead adhering to Connecticut precedents defining seizure as whether reasonable person would have felt free to leave due to restraint of movement by physical force or show of authority). We therefore agree with the state that Connecticut case law does not support the defendant’s arguments in support of a more comprehensive state constitutional rule.⁴⁴

C

Constitutional History

With respect to the relevant constitutional history, we agree with the defendant that the “original 1818 state constitution predates the automobile age,” and that article first, § 7, “was adopted in the automobile age and should be interpreted to include protection of individual citizens while in cars from the abuse of governmental power.” With respect, however, to whether the historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of article first, § 7, support the defendant’s

claim to *greater* protections under that provision than are afforded by the federal constitution, we have stated that “[t]he declaration of rights adopted in 1818 appears to have its antecedents in the Mississippi constitution of 1817, which in turn derived from the federal bill of rights and the Virginia declaration of rights of 1776. . . . The search and seizure provision in our 1818 constitution, then article first, § 8, closely resembles the fourth amendment to the United States constitution. Although its enumeration was changed to article first, § 7, when the 1965 constitution incorporated article first, § 4, into article seventh, its language has not been altered since its original adoption. . . . The language of article first, § 7, which was based upon the fourth amendment, was adopted with little debate. . . . Thus, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of article first, § 7, lend weight to the view that, in most cases, a practice permitted under the fourth amendment is permissible under article first, § 7.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Mikolinski*, supra, 256 Conn. 548–49; see also *State v. Davis*, supra, 283 Conn. 316 (“it reasonably may be argued that the lack of any evidence indicating that article first, § 7, was intended to be more broadly protective of privacy rights than the fourth amendment gives rise to a contrary inference”).

D

Sister State Case Law

The defendant relies specifically on state constitutional case law from ten states, Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming in support of his argument that we should interpret article first, § 7, to preclude, in the context of a routine traffic stop, requests for consent to search and other questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop.⁴⁵ Only those cases from Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Wyoming warrant any significant discussion.⁴⁶

In our view, the most comprehensive and persuasive of these cited decisions is *State v. Carty*, 170 N.J. 632, 635, 790 A.2d 903, modified, 174 N.J. 351, 806 A.2d 798 (2002), wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, under that state’s constitution, that “in order for a consent to search a motor vehicle and its occupants to be valid, law enforcement personnel must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to seeking consent to search a lawfully stopped motor vehicle.” The court emphasized its long history of elevating state constitutional protections beyond those provided by the fourth amendment in the area of consent searches, including its separate requirement, in contravention of *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, supra, 412 U.S. 248–49, that individuals give knowing and voluntary consent to searches. *State v.*

Carty, supra, 639, discussing *State v. Johnson*, 68 N.J. 349, 354, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). Most significantly, the New Jersey court also relied upon an extensive record demonstrating that state police officers frequently had utilized coercive tactics that had violated both a federal consent decree and state police policy.⁴⁷ *State v. Carty*, supra, 644–45; see also id., 647 (reasonable suspicion rule “serves the prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning a routine traffic stop into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop”). We decline to follow *Carty* because the record in the present case lacks the evidence of specific instances of law enforcement abuses by police officers in our jurisdiction similar to that which prompted the New Jersey court to interpret its state constitution to provide enhanced protections to motorists on that state’s highways. See *State v. Snell*, 323 Mont. 157, 161, 99 P.3d 191 (2004) (declining to follow *Carty* because defendant “does not argue—much less establish—that Montana law enforcement officers are abusing their authority”).

Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted its state constitution to require that officers have “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of criminal activity prior to asking for consent to search during a routine traffic stop. *State v. Fort*, 660 N.W.2d 415, 416 (Minn. 2003). *Fort*, however, is *legally* inapposite, because in that case, the Minnesota court was constrained to follow its then recent precedent in a dog sniff case that had interpreted both the fourth amendment, pre-*Illinois v. Caballes*, supra, 543 U.S. 408–409, and the state constitution, to limit “the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation . . . to the justification for the stop.”⁴⁸ *State v. Fort*, supra, 418; see id., 418–19, discussing *State v. Wiegand*, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135–37 (Minn. 2002) (requiring reasonable and articulable suspicion of narcotics related activity to justify exterior dog sniff of car).

Case law from the high courts of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania is similarly restrictive, as both states also do not permit police to inquire beyond the purpose of a traffic stop in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The case law from these states, however, is not persuasive because of the cursory state constitutional analyses contained in those opinions. See *Commonwealth v. Torres*, 424 Mass. 153, 158, 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997) (“police inquiry in a routine traffic stop must end on the production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring that either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime . . . or engaged in other suspicious conduct” [internal quotation marks omitted]);⁴⁹ *Commonwealth v. Strickler*, 563 Pa. 47, 69, 757 A.2d 884 (2000) (“[o]ur jurisprudence under [the Pennsylvania constitution], however, would not sustain a consent search conducted in the context of, but which is wholly unrelated in its scope to, an ongoing detention,

since there can be no constitutionally-valid detention independently or following a traffic or similar stop absent reasonable suspicion . . . and the scope of a detention is circumscribed by the reasons that justify it” [citation omitted]; *id.*, 70 n.20 (“[a]s noted, [*Terry v. Ohio*, supra, 392 U.S. 1] and its progeny strongly suggest that a traffic stop [viewed as the equivalent of a *Terry* stop] is not an appropriate vehicle within which to make inquiries about potential unlawful conduct unrelated to the stop not supported by reasonable suspicion”).⁵⁰ Indeed, we agree with a Pennsylvania appellate court’s characterization of this point in *Strickler* as dicta. See *Commonwealth v. Acosta*, 815 A.2d 1078, 1087 n.8 (Pa. Super.) (concluding on record that defendant’s consent to search during traffic stop was product of coercion and citing *Strickler* in dicta for proposition that “there is some question regarding the constitutionality of [the police officer’s] attempt to secure [the defendant’s] consent during the investigative detention”), appeal denied, 576 Pa. 710, 839 A.2d 350 (2003).

In *O’Boyle v. State*, 117 P.3d 401, 411 (Wyo. 2005), the Wyoming Supreme Court did not adopt a specific rule such as that followed in *State v. Carty*, supra, 170 N.J. 632, but emphasized a reasonableness inquiry influenced by local factors, specifically, the fact that Wyoming’s “location along a nationally recognized drug trafficking corridor likely results in a disproportionately large percentage of Wyoming’s disproportionately small population being subjected to what have become routine requests to relinquish their privacy rights by detention, invasive questioning and searches—all without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the offense giving rise to the stop.”⁵¹ Given the fact that the defendant had not yet been placed under arrest and there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the court then concluded that the scope of the traffic stop had been improperly expanded because he had been detained in the cruiser during the stop and questioned extensively about his family, travel plans and profession. *O’Boyle v. State*, supra, 410. Aside from *O’Boyle*’s lack of a specific legal standard beyond reasonableness,⁵² it is factually inapposite given the brief and limited questioning that took place in this case prior to the defendant volunteering permission for Morgan to search the Altima.⁵³

With respect to state constitutional decisions issued after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 93, the Kansas decision relied upon by both Justice Katz in her dissent and the defendant, *State v. Smith*, 286 Kan. 402, 184 P.3d 890, cert. denied, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 628, 172 L. Ed. 2d 639 (2008), is facially on-point but, upon closer review, ultimately lacking in persuasive value. In *Smith*, the court concluded that *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 100–101, does not “[allow] law enforcement officers to expand the scope of a traffic stop to include a search not related

to the purpose of the stop, even if a detainee has given permission for the search. Rather, we continue to adhere to our longstanding rule that consensual searches during the period of a detention for a traffic stop are invalid under the [f]ourth [a]mendment . . . and [the state constitution].”⁵⁴ *State v. Smith*, supra, 419. *Smith* is unpersuasive because it lacks an independent state constitutional analysis. Moreover, as noted previously, the Kansas Supreme Court’s more recent decision in *State v. Morlock*, supra, 289 Kan. 988, makes clear that, to the extent *Smith* is analyzing the federal constitution, it no longer is good law because *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 787–88, “eliminated any doubt that the *Muehler* rationale applied to traffic stops.”⁵⁵ See also footnote 28 of this opinion.

Finally, we find the Alaska Court of Appeals decision in *Brown v. State*, 182 P.3d 624 (Alaska App. 2008), to lack persuasive value because of a significant internal inconsistency in the opinion. The Alaska court relied on a comprehensive survey of academic literature and existing case law; id., 630–32; in support of its determination that “federal law does not afford sufficient protection to motorists who are asked to consent to a search of their person, their vehicle, or their belongings during a traffic stop.”⁵⁶ Id., 629. The court observed that, “because most people need to travel by car, and because of the near-inevitability that people will commit traffic infractions, the ‘routine’ traffic stop has become the doorway to widespread and probing searches of persons, vehicles, and luggage.” Id., 631–32. The Alaska court then stated that “[t]he facts of this case present an example of an apparently ongoing and unjustified infringement of the privacy rights of Alaska citizens. And, as we have explained here, it is uncertain whether the [fourth amendment] offers any remedy. We therefore conclude that [the Alaska state constitution] must be interpreted to grant broader protections than its federal counterpart in situations like this.” Id., 633–34. Curiously, however, the Alaska court then backpedaled somewhat, and stated that, “we need not decide whether [the state constitution] should be interpreted to completely preclude requests for searches during a routine traffic stop unless the search is related to the ground for the stop or is otherwise supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminality. We leave that question for another day.” Id., 634. The court then held simply that the record in *Brown* “present[ed] a particularly egregious example of this police practice” because of the trooper’s failure to inform the defendant of the reason for the stop or its disposition prior to requesting consent to search. Id. Justice Katz’ attempts to salvage *Brown* notwithstanding, this limitation necessarily diminishes the persuasive value of the case in support of the defendant’s request for a specific state constitutional rule in Connecticut. See also *Murphy v. Anchorage*, Alaska Court of Appeals, Docket No. A-10345, No.

5576, 2010 Alaska App. LEXIS 28, *11 (March 17, 2010) (memorandum opinion) (noting that defendant “misinterprets *Brown* by asserting that we *did* adopt this general restriction on police authority during traffic stops” [emphasis in original]); *Bostwick v. State*, Alaska Court of Appeals, Docket No. A-10224, No. 5569, 2010 Alaska App. LEXIS 21, *5, 7–8 (February 24, 2010) (memorandum opinion) (describing *Brown* as “limited to its facts” and stating that this case, which involved “far from a routine traffic stop,” also “does not require us to resolve” issue of whether consent searches during routine traffic stops require reasonable suspicion).

E

Economic and Sociological Factors

With respect to the relevant economic and sociological factors, the defendant first contends that, as a practical matter, many citizens do not feel free to refuse consent to a search during a routine traffic stop. Numerous commentators, in articles revealed by our independent research, support this assertion.⁵⁷ See, e.g., S. Chanenson, “Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches,” 71 *Tenn. L. Rev.* 399, 451–52 (2004) (discussing study that showed that 89.3 percent of 9028 people studied granted consent to search during traffic stops in Maryland and Ohio); W. LaFave, “The ‘Routine Traffic Stop’ from Start to Finish: Too Much ‘Routine,’ Not Enough Fourth Amendment,” 102 *Mich. L. Rev.* 1843, 1891 (2004) (“[g]uilty or innocent, most motorists stopped and asked by police for consent to search their vehicles will expressly give permission to search their vehicles, resulting in thousands upon thousands of motor vehicle searches of innocent travelers each year” [internal quotation marks omitted]). With respect to the defendant’s request for a state constitutional prophylactic rule requiring law enforcement officers to inform motorists of their right to refuse, endorsed by Justice Palmer in his dissent, even those commentators supporting that position have acknowledged, however, that warnings do not significantly reduce the rate of consent. See S. Chanenson, *supra*, 466 (likening warnings to “‘chicken soup’” in that they cannot hurt, could help); M. Phillips, note, “Effective Warnings Before Consent Searches: Practical, Necessary, and Desirable,” 45 *Am. Crim. L. Rev.* 1185, 1206–1208 (2008) (observing that “warnings would appear to be futile, as one of the features that make them practical—their negligible effect on the rate of consent—also make them ineffective,” but arguing that their administration might reduce coercive or racially discriminatory atmosphere in consent stops). We note specifically that the defendant’s request for a rule requiring reasonable suspicion prior to seeking consent to search is supported by noted Professor Wayne R. LaFave.⁵⁸ See W. LaFave, *supra*, 102 *Mich. L. Rev.* 1893, citing *State v. Fort*, *supra*, 660 N.W.2d 415;

see also 4 W. LaFare, *supra*, (4th Ed. 2004) § 9.3 (e), p. 397 (same).

The defendant and the amicus also emphasize the “national concern” regarding racial profiling and pretextual stops. The defendant cites General Statutes § 54-11 et seq., the Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act, which, *inter alia*, prohibits law enforcement officers from “engag[ing] in racial profiling” and provides in relevant part that “[t]he detention of an individual based on any noncriminal factor or combination of non-criminal factors is inconsistent with this policy.”⁵⁹ In response, the state argues that, beyond evidence limited to the race of the participants—specifically, that Morgan is white, and that the defendant and Sutton, the backup officer, are African-American—there is no evidence in the record that Morgan’s actions were racially motivated. We agree with the state and emphasize that the record does not contain *any* evidence whatsoever that Morgan’s actions were racially motivated, or that the “insidious” practice of racial profiling or other abusive conduct by the police; *State v. Donohue*, 251 Conn. 636, 648 and n.11, 742 A.2d 775 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 924, 121 S. Ct. 299, 148 L. Ed. 2d 240 (2000); is present, in Newington or statewide, let alone to the extent that it must be remedied by the pronouncement of a new state constitutional rule. See *State v. Batts*, *supra*, 281 Conn. 694 (“[T]he record is entirely devoid of evidence of racial profiling. At best, the facts in the record and reasonable inferences therefrom establish that the defendant is African-American and [the police officer] knew the defendant’s race before approaching him because of his previous surveillance of the defendant.”).

F

Conclusion

Having performed a complete *Geisler* analysis of the defendant’s state constitutional claims in this appeal, we conclude that article first, § 7, does not provide greater protection than does the federal constitution with respect to consent searches during routine traffic stops, and we decline to adopt the rules proposed by the defendant. Our own constitutional language, precedents and history do not support a ready departure from the federal case law in this area, particularly because the recent United States Supreme Court decisions do not represent a sea change from prior Connecticut precedent. See *State v. Oquendo*, *supra*, 223 Conn. 647–49. Moreover, the only relevant sister state constitutional decision that provides greater protection than the fourth amendment in this context, but is written persuasively, is *State v. Carty*, *supra*, 170 N.J. 632. That decision, however, is founded upon a factual predicate of local law enforcement abuses that simply does not exist on this record, disinclining us to follow it. See *State v. Snell*, *supra*, 323 Mont. 161 (declining to follow

Carty because defendant “does not argue—much less establish—that Montana law enforcement officers are abusing their authority”); *Commonwealth v. Strickler*, supra, 563 Pa. 80–81 n.28 (declining to “take judicial notice that police employ tactics such as consent searches on a selective, discriminatory basis against members of protected classes, primarily on Pennsylvania interstate highways used as conduits by traffickers of illegal drugs” and noting that “the assertion of such discriminatory conduct finds no support in the record of any of the consolidated cases”); cf. *O’Boyle v. State*, supra, 117 P.3d 411–12 (adopting state constitutional reasonableness inquiry influenced by local factors). Lastly, although the defendant’s proposal finds some support in the academic community, those studies do not indicate that adoption of the defendant’s proposal is likely to have any significant effect on protecting motorists’ rights beyond that of a scrupulous application of the governing federal principles. We therefore decline to adopt a new state constitutional standard at this time.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js., concurred.

* The listing of the justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

¹ “The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ The fourth amendment has been made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.” *State v. Gonzalez*, 278 Conn. 341, 344 n.4, 898 A.2d 149 (2006).

² The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 7, provides: “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”

³ We granted the state’s petition for certification limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court correctly determine that the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress?” *State v. Jenkins*, 285 Conn. 909, 940 A.2d 809 (2008).

⁴ General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) provides: “Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any narcotic substance, hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana, amphetamine-type substance, or one kilogram or more of a cannabis-type substance, except as authorized in this chapter, and who is not, at the time of such action, a drug-dependent person, for a first offense shall be imprisoned not less than five years or more than twenty years; and for each subsequent offense shall be imprisoned not less than ten years or more than twenty-five years. The execution of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the provisions of this subsection shall not be suspended, except the court may suspend the execution of such mandatory minimum sentence if at the time of the commission of the offense (1) such person was under the age of eighteen years, or (2) such person’s mental capacity was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”

Although § 21a-278 (b) was the subject of technical amendments in 2007; see Public Acts 2007, No. 07-217, § 97; those amendments have no bearing

on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision.

⁵ Morgan testified that, when working traffic enforcement on the turnpike, his regular practice is to ask the driver to exit his or her car for an explanation of the ticket, because that enables Morgan to show the driver the amount of traffic on the turnpike, as well as to have the driver's full attention away from distractions such as radios or cellular telephones. Morgan also testified that he created a lane of safety for himself and the defendant to move around in by parking his cruiser half in the right travel lane, and half on the shoulder, and offsetting it from the Altima, which was parked entirely on the shoulder.

⁶ Morgan did not, however, consider it unusual that the rental vehicle was registered in a different state than its driver was licensed.

⁷ Morgan testified that he did not believe that the defendant was armed at the time of the stop.

⁸ For additional discussion with respect to the phrasing of the defendant's consent, see footnote 38 of this opinion and the accompanying text.

⁹ We note that the defendant does not contest the propriety of this subsequent search of the Altima.

¹⁰ We note that § 21a-278 (b) proscribes, inter alia, both the possession and sale of narcotics. The substitute information in the present case charged the defendant with violations of § 21a-278 (a) and (b) on the basis of the defendant's alleged "[s]ale of certain illegal drugs." This statement appears to be a scrivener's error. At no point in the proceedings before the trial court did the state claim that the defendant had participated in the actual sale of drugs. Additionally, we note that the judgment file in the present case notes that the § 21a-278 (b) violation to which the defendant pleaded nolo contendere was "[p]ossession of [n]arcotics with [i]ntent to [s]ell." Accordingly, we refer to the crimes with which the defendant was charged under § 21a-278 (a) and (b) as possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent.

¹¹ General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: "When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a trial court has determined that a ruling on such motion to suppress or motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. . . ."

¹² The Appellate Court also rejected the state's claim that the record was inadequate for appellate review with respect to whether Morgan had returned the defendant's ticket and paperwork to him. The court noted that the record indicated that Morgan had not given the defendant the ticket, and that any inadequacy on this point should be charged to the state because it bore the burden of proof to establish the voluntariness of the defendant's consent at the suppression hearing. *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 430.

¹³ In *Brown v. Illinois*, supra, 422 U.S. 603, in considering whether a confession was the fruit of the poisonous tree, or the "exploitation of an illegal arrest," the Supreme Court concluded that the "voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement." *Id.*, 604. The Supreme Court then concluded that, once the confession was determined to be voluntary, the reviewing court then must consider other "relevant" factors to determine whether taint of the police misconduct has been attenuated, including specifically: (1) "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession"; (2) "the presence of intervening circumstances"; and (3) "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct . . ." *Id.*, 603-604. The *Brown* analysis is applicable to consents as well as statements. See *State v. Cates*, 202 Conn. 615, 621, 522 A.2d 788 (1987).

¹⁴ In his dissent, Judge Schaller concluded that the defendant had failed to provide an adequate record for review of his claim that he had been detained unlawfully because the purpose of the traffic stop already had been effectuated. *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 437. Specifically, Judge Schaller noted that "[t]he record in the present case is similarly devoid of certain important factors" with respect to "critical matters that courts use to determine whether the purpose of a traffic stop has been completed," namely, whether Morgan had returned the defendant's license and registration, and had issued and explained the traffic citation to him. *Id.*, 441. Noting that the issue of when the purpose of a traffic stop has been achieved and

the stop completed is an unsettled question of law in Connecticut, and that other jurisdictions have taken varying approaches to the legality of police officers questioning motorists about issues unrelated to the initial stop, Judge Schaller also determined that the defendant had inadequately briefed the issue of whether Morgan unconstitutionally had extended the traffic stop by not explaining in detail whether the purpose of the traffic stop had been effectuated. *Id.*, 441–49. Judge Schaller then rejected the defendant’s other claims on appeal, namely, that: “(1) [E]ven if his consent had been voluntary, it was tainted by a prior unconstitutional search of his person, (2) the state failed to establish that he actually consented to the search of the vehicle, (3) any consent to search was not given voluntarily and (4) any consent to search was obtained by a violation of the Connecticut constitution by the police improperly converting a traffic stop into a criminal investigation.” *Id.*, 450.

¹⁵ As noted previously, Morgan was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. On cross-examination, while exploring the circumstances of the defendant’s consent to search the Altima, the defendant asked Morgan whether he had searched the defendant. Morgan replied in the affirmative, and further testified that he did not find anything illegal on the defendant’s person. After further testimony about the search of the Altima, Morgan testified during recross-examination, in response to a question from the defendant asking why Morgan had searched his person: “I asked him if he had anything illegal on him and he said no, and I checked.” Morgan then testified that he had not believed that the defendant was armed at the time. This was the only testimony about the patdown adduced during the suppression hearing.

¹⁶ At oral argument before the trial court, the defendant mentioned the patdown in an effort to distinguish this case from *State v. Story*, 53 Conn. App. 733, 741, 732 A.2d 785, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1093 (1999), by noting, for purposes of whether the defendant was free to leave at the conclusion of the stop, that the present case had a patdown, whereas *Story* did not.

¹⁷ Having reviewed the defendant’s briefs to the Appellate Court, we deem the Appellate Court’s description of his arguments an accurate representation of the claims that he made therein.

¹⁸ For its part, upon receipt of the defendant’s brief, the state moved for permission to file a late motion for rectification, seeking to include in the record Morgan’s police report, which was mentioned, but not admitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing. The state claimed that the report indicated that the patdown was proper because it had been invited by the defendant himself. The Appellate Court denied the state’s motion for permission to file a late motion for rectification, and subsequently denied the state’s motion for reconsideration en banc of that denial.

¹⁹ We noted that, other than the testimony that the defendant’s mother had refused to sign the consent form, the defendant had “presented no other evidence on the issue. *Because the mother’s actions relating to the consent to search were not at issue at the suppression hearing*—the defendant had claimed only that his father had not given valid consent to search and, in fact, expressly had indicated that the mother’s consent was *not* necessary—the state had no reason to present any evidence regarding the mother’s consent or lack thereof, and, consequently, it did not do so. As a result, we simply do not know any of the other circumstances surrounding the mother’s refusal to sign the consent to search form.” (Emphasis altered.) *State v. Brunetti*, supra, 279 Conn. 57–58.

²⁰ In so concluding, we relied on *State v. Medina*, supra, 228 Conn. 300–302, wherein this court “declined to review an unpreserved constitutional claim regarding the alleged involuntariness of the confession of the defendant . . . because the record was inadequate for review.” *State v. Brunetti*, supra, 279 Conn. 60. We emphasized that in *Medina* the defendant’s claim in the trial court, namely, that his confession was not knowing and voluntary because he had not received *Miranda* warnings, arose from a different factual predicate than his state constitutional claims on appeal, “namely, that his confession was involuntary due to his impaired mental state.” *Id.* We further emphasized that the defendant’s failure in *Medina* to raise that claim deprived the state of the opportunity to litigate against it, and left us without the “‘benefit of a complete factual inquiry into [the defendant’s] mental condition at the time his statements were made.’” *Id.*, quoting *State v. Medina*, supra, 300.

²¹ See, e.g., *United States v. Jahkur*, 409 F. Sup. 2d 28, 31–32 (D. Mass. 2005); *State v. Caraveo*, 222 Ariz. 228, 233, 213 P.3d 377 (App. 2009).

²² We note that the state contends, in its brief, that *Terry* restrictions are inapplicable to the routine traffic stop in the present case because Morgan had probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a traffic violation. Indeed, the state notes that, the provisions of General Statutes § 51-164o (b) notwithstanding, the defendant constitutionally could have been subjected to custodial arrest for the minor traffic offense; *Atwater v. Lago Vista*, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001); and, because he was not placed under arrest, Morgan was not required to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent. At oral argument before this court, the state cited *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, and acknowledged, however, that in the absence of an arrest, the police cannot detain a stopped motorist indefinitely. This is consistent with the well established general proposition that an automobile stop occasioned by a traffic violation is more akin to a *Terry* stop than a custodial arrest, and is, therefore, governed by *Terry* principles, even when the police officer has probable cause to believe that the motorist has violated a traffic law. See, e.g., id., 786; *United States v. Bell*, 555 F.3d 535, 539–40 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2887, 174 L. Ed. 2d 595 (2009). But see *United States v. Childs*, 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (“[A]lthough traffic stops usually proceed like *Terry* stops, the [c]onstitution does not require this equation. Probable cause makes all the difference” [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829, 123 S. Ct. 126, 154 L. Ed. 2d 43 (2002); D. Moran, “Traffic Stops, Littering Tickets, and Police Warnings: The Case for a Fourth Amendment Non-Custodial Arrest Doctrine,” 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1143, 1149–50 (2000) (arguing that traffic stops do not fit into three delineated fourth amendment categories of investigative stops, custodial arrests or consensual encounters, and that “[t]his tripartite categorization has resulted in strained, and ultimately erroneous, efforts in both the federal and state courts to categorize traffic violation stops as *Terry* stops”).

²³ In *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 95, 100, an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wherein the plaintiff had alleged that the police violated her fourth amendment rights by handcuffing her for several hours during the execution of a search warrant on her home, the Supreme Court concluded that the police had not violated the fourth amendment “by questioning her about her immigration status during the detention.” The court emphasized that the questioning was not a “discrete [f]ourth [a]mendment event,” and stated that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 101. The court further concluded that, because the detention was not “prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the [f]ourth [a]mendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask [the plaintiff] for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.” Id. Relying on *Illinois v. Caballes*, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005), which had upheld the use of a narcotics-sniffing dog during a routine traffic stop, the court further emphasized that the key constitutional inquiry remained the duration of the detention; so long as the questioning did not extend the time of detention, it did not require an independent fourth amendment justification. *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 101.

²⁴ Although the majority opinion in *Ohio v. Robinette*, supra, 519 U.S. 35, 39–40, was cast in terms of voluntariness, and concluded that a “lawfully seized” defendant need not be informed that he is “free to go” before a consent to search during a routine traffic stop will be deemed voluntary, it necessarily must be read, given its statement that the defendant was subject to a seizure at the time of being questioned; id., 35; as permitting such brief, incidental questioning during the course of a routine traffic stop. We note, however, that in his dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the underlying predicate of the majority’s determination, namely, that the defendant was “lawfully seized.” Id., 49. Specifically, Justice Stevens concluded that the defendant had been detained because he would not have felt free to leave at the time that the officer asked him for consent to search, primarily because the “question itself sought an answer ‘before you get gone.’” (Emphasis added.) Id., 47. Justice Stevens also determined that, “by the time [the defendant] was asked for consent to search his automobile, the lawful traffic stop had come to an end; [he] had been given his warning, and the speeding violation provided no further justification for detention. The continued detention was therefore only justifiable, if at all, on some other grounds.” Id., 50. Justice Stevens then concluded that, because there was no reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention, “[the officer’s] continued detention of [the defendant] constituted an illegal seizure.” Id., 50–51.

²⁵ Cases on point released subsequent to *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S.

93, but prior to *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, are similarly illustrative. See *United States v. Turvin*, supra, 517 F.3d 1101–1102 (noting that fourteen minute period from commencement of stop until consent was obtained was “no longer than an ordinary traffic stop could reasonably take,” and that “brief pauses to ask questions during traffic stops, even if those questions are unrelated to the purpose of the stop, may be permissible under *Muehler*”); *United States v. Valenzuela*, 494 F.3d 886, 890 (10th Cir.) (officer properly asked defendant about presence of “‘weapons or other illegal items,’” as well as for permission to search, because questioning was simple and “did not appreciably lengthen the duration of the stop”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1032, 128 S. Ct. 636, 169 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2007); *United States v. Hernandez*, 418 F.3d 1206, 1209 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (“it is unreasonable extensions of the duration—not the scope of conversation—that could render an otherwise justified detention unreasonable for [f]ourth [a]mendment purposes”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 889, 127 S. Ct. 303, 166 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2006); *United States v. Bowers*, 490 F. Sup. 2d 285, 291–92 (D. Conn. 2007) (police officer reasonably asked about presence of illegalities and for consent to search in seat belt violation stop that lasted less than ten minutes); *Salmeron v. State*, supra, 280 Ga. 736 (following *Muehler* and concluding that request for consent to search during valid traffic stop does not violate fourth amendment so long as stop is not unreasonably prolonged); *State v. Washington*, supra, 898 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (with no claim of excessive delay, police officer properly questioned moped driver about whether he had drugs on him, and then asked him for permission to search after he admitted having “dime bags”); *Ellis v. Commonwealth*, 52 Va. App. 220, 228, 662 S.E.2d 640 (2008) (“[t]he brief, incremental delay caused by the officer’s questions regarding drugs did not violate the [f]ourth [a]mendment and, a fortiori, did not constitute an exploitive basis for securing [the defendant’s] consent”); accord *People v. Harris*, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 237, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008) (“a warrant check on the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle does not violate fourth amendment rights, so long as the duration of the stop is not unnecessarily prolonged for the purpose of conducting the check and the stop is otherwise executed in a reasonable manner” [internal quotation marks omitted]). But see *State v. Smith*, 286 Kan. 402, 419, 184 P.3d 890 (concluding that *Muehler* did not alter “the rules regarding the limited scope of a *Terry* stop” or permit “law enforcement officers to expand the scope of a traffic stop to include a search not related to the purpose of the stop”), cert. denied, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 628, 172 L. Ed. 2d 639 (2008); *State v. Duran*, 138 N.M. 414, 424, 120 P.3d 836 (2005) (concluding that travel plan questions are permissible under fourth amendment rule that “all questions asked by police officers during a traffic stop must be . . . reasonably related to the initial justification for the stop or are supported by reasonable suspicion”); *State v. Rivera*, 384 S.C. 356, 362, 682 S.E.2d 307 (App. 2009) (The court concluded that, once the officer had decided that he would issue a warning citation, the purpose of the traffic stop had ended, and “continued questioning concerning the transport of drugs on the interstate exceeded the scope of the stop. This amounted to a second and illegal detention unless [the officer] entertained a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to warrant that detention.”); see also footnotes 28 and 54 of this opinion and the accompanying text.

Other jurisdictions had concluded similarly under the fourth amendment even prior to the publication of *Muehler*. See *United States v. Childs*, 277 F.3d 947, 953–54 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (“[b]y asking one question about marijuana, [the] officer . . . did not make the custody of [the defendant passenger during a traffic stop] an ‘unreasonable’ seizure,” particularly given existence of probable cause to suspect traffic violation, which meant that “neither the driver nor [the defendant] had a right to be released the instant the steps to check license, registration, and outstanding warrants, and to write a ticket, had been completed”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 829, 123 S. Ct. 126, 154 L. Ed. 2d 43 (2002); *United States v. Shabazz*, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993) (The court rejected a challenge to police questioning and a request for consent to search that “occurred while the officers were waiting for the results of the computer check. Therefore, the questioning did nothing to extend the duration of the initial, valid seizure.”); *State v. Kremen*, 754 A.2d 964, 967–68 (Me. 2000) (reasonable suspicion was not required to justify questioning and request to search vehicle during lawful traffic stop), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1079, 121 S. Ct. 777, 148 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2001); *State v. Snell*, 323 Mont. 157, 161, 99 P.3d 191 (2004) (same); *State v. Akuba*, 686 N.W.2d 406, 415 (S.D. 2004) (“[a]n officer does not impermissibly expand the scope of a traffic stop merely by asking the driver questions, even if the subject

of the questioning is unrelated to the original purpose of the stop, as long as the questioning does not unduly extend the duration of the initial, valid seizure”); *State v. Gaulrapp*, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 609, 558 N.W.2d 696 (App. 1996) (police officer did not impermissibly lengthen duration of traffic stop by asking one question about presence of drugs or weapons and then requesting consent to search); accord *Kothe v. State*, 152 S.W.3d 54, 65–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that fourth amendment does not prescribe “particular order” for conducting traffic stop and it was not unreasonable for officer to wait for results of warrant check, despite fact that he had dispelled original basis for stop by determining that defendant was not intoxicated).

²⁶ Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 100–101, some federal and state jurisdictions had interpreted *Terry* to mean that questioning must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop, and could not be extended beyond that purpose without either consent or an independent basis of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, which might well have been yielded by permissible and reasonable inquiries about travel plans. In so concluding, these courts relied on the United States Supreme Court’s statement in *Terry v. Ohio*, supra, 392 U.S. 19–20, that the determination of whether a seizure and search pursuant to a *Terry* stop were reasonable “is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” See *United States v. Holt*, 264 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); *Caldwell v. State*, 780 A.2d 1037, 1045–46 (Del. 2001) (decision based on federal constitution); *People v. Gonzalez*, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 235–36, 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003) (adopting reasonableness analysis under federal and state constitutions to determine whether police conduct altered fundamental nature of stop), overruled by *People v. Harris*, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 240, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008); *State v. McKinnon-Andrews*, 151 N.H. 19, 25–27, 846 A.2d 1198 (2004) (concluding accordingly under both federal and state constitutions); *People v. Banks*, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562–63, 650 N.E.2d 833, 626 N.Y.S.2d 986 (unclear whether holding is based on federal or state constitution), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868, 116 S. Ct. 187, 133 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1995); *Commonwealth v. Strickler*, 563 Pa. 47, 70–71 n.20, 757 A.2d 884 (2000) (“*Terry* . . . and its progeny strongly suggest that a traffic stop [viewed as the equivalent of a *Terry* stop] is not an appropriate vehicle within which to make inquiries about potential unlawful conduct unrelated to the stop not supported by reasonable suspicion”); *State v. Hansen*, 63 P.3d 650, 660 (Utah 2002) (federal constitution); *O’Boyle v. State*, 117 P.3d 401, 415–16 (Wyo. 2005) (federal constitution). We note that a post-*Muehler* case relied on extensively by the defendant holds similarly. See *State v. Smith*, 286 Kan. 402, 419, 184 P.3d 890 (concluding that *Muehler* did not alter “the rules regarding the limited scope of a *Terry* stop” or “[allow] law enforcement officers to expand the scope of a traffic stop to include a search not related to the purpose of the stop”), cert. denied, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 628, 172 L. Ed. 2d 639 (2008). Finally, other jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Wyoming, also had held similarly under their state constitutions. See part III D of this opinion.

Particularly in light of *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 787–88, we agree with the Illinois Supreme Court’s observation that this more restrictive type of fourth amendment analysis has, with respect to the federal constitution, been “unequivocally overruled by” the holding of *Muehler*. See *People v. Harris*, supra, 228 Ill. 2d 240; see also *United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano*, 441 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[a]lthough *Holt* held that further questioning is justifiable only if it is reasonable in relation to the initial purpose of the traffic stop . . . the scope of this holding has been limited by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Muehler*” [citation omitted]); *United States v. Turvin*, supra, 517 F.3d 1099–1100 (noting that *Muehler* had “overruled” Ninth Circuit case law “that required police officers to have reasonable suspicion to ask questions beyond the scope of a traffic stop”); *People v. Harris*, supra, 244 (emphasizing that duration remains the “sole focus of the scope inquiry” and “overrul[ing] *Gonzalez* to the extent that it holds that the reasonableness of a traffic stop must be judged not only by its duration, but by the additional criterion of whether the actions of the officer alter the fundamental nature of the stop”); *State v. Morlock*, supra, 218 P.3d 807–808 (explaining, in contradiction to *State v. Smith*, supra, 286 Kan. 419, that “*Johnson* therefore also confirmed that an officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the stop did not necessarily require reasonable suspicion” and “eliminated any doubt that the *Muehler* rationale

applied to traffic stops”).

²⁷ Indeed, the cited portions of *United States v. Jones*, supra, 234 F.3d 234, the Fifth Circuit decision that was relied upon by the Appellate Court and also cited by the defendant in his brief in this certified appeal, appear to be inconsistent with that court’s subsequent en banc opinion in *United States v. Brigham*, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2004). In *Jones*, after receiving word that the computer checks revealed that the defendants had clean records, the officer spent three minutes reiterating previously asked questions prior to asking for consent to search, despite the fact that the warning citation had been prepared and needed only the driver’s signature for the stop to be complete. *United States v. Jones*, supra, 240–41. The court concluded that “the basis for the stop was essentially completed when the dispatcher notified the officers about the defendants’ clean records, three minutes before the officers sought consent to search the vehicle.” *Id.*, 241. The court concluded that the failure to issue the citation and allow the defendants to leave violated the fourth amendment. *Id.*

In *Brigham*, the en banc Fifth Circuit noted, however, that police officers could question a motorist on any subject during a traffic stop; *United States v. Brigham*, supra, 382 F.3d 508; emphasized that “there is . . . no constitutional stopwatch on traffic stops”; *id.*, 511; and, noting the fourth amendment touchstone of reasonableness, declined to impose a particular sequence or constitutionally mandated protocol on questioning and computer checks during traffic stops. *Id.*; see also *Kothe v. State*, 152 S.W.3d 54, 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (rejecting challenge to traffic stop based on officer’s running of warrant check after already having determined that driver was not intoxicated, because fourth amendment reasonableness does not “require rigid adherence to ‘the least intrusive means’ of investigation defined by Monday-morning reviewing courts”).

²⁸ The Appellate Court also noted that, in *State v. Story*, 53 Conn. App. 733, 741, 732 A.2d 785, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1093 (1999), it had “concluded that a police officer’s request for consent to search on the basis of nothing more than a hunch was not improper because the officer did not request the consent to search until *after* the stop had concluded and the defendant was free to leave at the time of the request. Mindful of *Story*, if we now sanction arbitrary requests for consent searches by the police *prior* to the conclusion of a stop, we effectively close the door on a criminal defendant’s ability ever to contest the validity of a consent to search during a motor vehicle stop.” (Emphasis in original.) *State v. Jenkins*, supra, 104 Conn. App. 431–32. We disagree with the Appellate Court’s prediction, in that, post-*Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 787–88, a defendant still may challenge the overall duration of a traffic stop as unreasonable under the circumstances, as well as make an analytically separate claim with respect to the voluntariness of his consent to search.

²⁹ We note that several courts have held the timing of the questioning or requests for consent to have independent constitutional significance, and have emphasized that questioning *after* discrete events such as the issuance of a ticket or warning, or the return of a driver’s paperwork, may create a detention distinct from the initial stop, which then would require independent justification such as consent or reasonable suspicion. Put differently, these courts conclude that the return of the paperwork marks the end of the initial traffic stop, and determining the consensual nature of the subsequent interaction requires analysis of whether the driver reasonably would have felt free to leave under *United States v. Mendenhall*, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). See *State v. Ferris*, 355 Md. 356, 364, 378–79, 735 A.2d 491 (1999) (concluding that officer improperly subjected motorist to second seizure when, after handing him ticket and returning his license, he asked him to step out of car at night on shoulder of highway to answer questions about use and possession of narcotics without first advising him that he was free to depart); accord *State v. Story*, 53 Conn. App. 733, 745–47, 732 A.2d 785 (*Hennessy, J.*, dissenting) (concluding that traffic stop had ended after trooper returned defendant’s identification and issued ticket, and that request for defendant and passenger to exit car, answer questions and consent to car search amounted to separate seizure not justified by reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1093 (1999); see also *People v. Banks*, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562, 650 N.E.2d 833, 626 N.Y.S.2d 986 (“once [the trooper’s] license and stolen vehicle radio check came back negative and he prepared the traffic tickets for the seat belt violations, the initial justification for seizing and detaining [the] defendant and [the driver] was exhausted,” and retention of their licenses pending arrival of backup officer was illegal seizure without independent justification), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 868, 116 S. Ct. 187, 133 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1995); *People v. Rainey*, 49 App. Div. 3d 1337, 1339, 853 N.Y.S.2d 807 (The court

held that *Banks* was not controlling “because, in [*Banks*], the driver of the vehicle had been detained after he was issued traffic tickets. Here, the [t]rooper testified that he had not given the driver a traffic ticket before backup arrived, and there was no evidence to the contrary.”), appeal denied, 10 N.Y.3d 963, 893 N.E.2d 453, 863 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2008). We need not, however, determine in this appeal whether any of these events, alone or in some combination, terminate a traffic stop as a matter of law because there is no evidence that Morgan returned the license, rental papers and infraction ticket to the defendant; thus, the factual predicate of this appeal is an ongoing traffic stop, and the relevant legal inquiry is whether it was measurably or unreasonably extended.

³⁰ Because we conclude that the defendant was not subjected to an illegal seizure, we need not consider whether the evidence taken from the consent search was the fruit of the poisonous tree subject to the attenuation analysis of *Brown v. Illinois*, supra, 422 U.S. 603–604. See, e.g., *State v. Nowell*, 262 Conn. 686, 700, 817 A.2d 76 (2003). We consider only whether the defendant’s consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

³¹ Practice Book § 84-11 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the granting of certification, the appellee may present for review alternative grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed provided those grounds were raised and briefed in the appellate court. . . . If such alternative grounds for affirmation or adverse rulings or decisions to be considered in the event of a new trial were not raised in the appellate court, the party seeking to raise them in the supreme court must move for special permission to do so prior to the filing of that party’s brief. Such permission will be granted only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice so require.” The state acknowledges that the defendant raised these claims properly before the Appellate Court, and we may, therefore, review them without special permission.

³² We note that the state had the burden of proving the voluntariness of the consent to the search by a preponderance of the evidence. See *United States v. Isiofia*, 370 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2004); *State v. Ortiz*, 17 Conn. App. 102, 103, 550 A.2d 22 (per curiam), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 828, 552 A.2d 1216 (1988); accord *State v. Lawrence*, 282 Conn. 141, 177, 920 A.2d 236 (2007) (state and federal constitutions require “the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).

³³ Relying on *Ornelas v. United States*, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996), the defendant contends that we should engage in de novo review of the trial court’s determination about the voluntariness of his consent. In *Ornelas*, the Supreme Court concluded that, “as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id., 699. The *Ornelas* decision is, however, limited only to appellate review of determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion and, inasmuch as the defendant has not cited any cases extending that decision to the more subjective voluntariness determination; see *Schneekloth v. Bustamonte*, supra, 412 U.S. 229 (“account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents”); we continue to apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to trial courts’ determinations with respect to the voluntariness of consents to search.

³⁴ As noted previously, we decline to consider the defendant’s second proffered ground for finding his consent involuntary, namely, that Morgan already had escalated the encounter by patting down the defendant without justification. See part I of this opinion.

³⁵ See also, e.g., *United States v. Walker*, 922 F. Sup. 724, 727 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that defendant’s “original consent to search the vehicle was spontaneous, unsolicited, and without any indication that it was produced by coercion”); *State v. Sullivan*, 49 S.W.3d 800, 812 and n.8 (Mo. App. 2001) (consent was voluntary when defendant responded to question of her knowledge of narcotics investigation by stating that police officer could search her car); *State v. Lowe*, 135 N.M. 520, 525, 90 P.3d 539 (App.) (taint attenuated from illegal detention when defendant volunteered spontaneously to permit officer to search her car), cert. quashed, 103 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2004).

³⁶ But see *United States v. Canipe*, 569 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir.) (applying

clearly erroneous standard of review to District Court's determination that search did not exceed scope of consent), cert. denied, U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 655, 175 L. Ed. 2d 499 (2009); *United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos*, 965 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 932, 113 S. Ct. 1315, 122 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1993).

³⁷ We disagree with the defendant's reliance on *United States v. Isiofia*, 370 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2004), in support of his argument that Morgan exceeded the scope of the consent by not elaborating about the nature of the contraband that he inquired about. *Isiofia* is inapposite, because the issue in that case was voluntariness and the court concluded on appeal that the District Court, in conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether the defendant had voluntarily given his consent, properly considered as a factor the agents' failure to inform the defendant of the type of evidence they expected to seize or the crime they expected to charge. See *id.*, 233–34. *Isiofia* does not involve a claim that the officers had exceeded the scope of consent that was given.

³⁸ Relying on Morgan's testimony during cross-examination that he did not record in his report the specific words used by the defendant, the defendant argues that the trial court committed clear error when it found that the exact words of his consent were "go ahead and check. You can check if you want." We disagree. Morgan's testimony on cross-examination, while acknowledging that he did not quote the defendant verbatim in his report, nevertheless does not contradict Morgan's earlier statements that the defendant had invited him to "check" the car.

In any event, we note that courts have concluded that other words synonymous with "check" also have the legal effect of a request to "search." See *United States v. Canipe*, *supra*, 569 F.3d 604 (defendant's "consent to let the officers 'look in' his truck 'would be understood by most people to involve a search' of the vehicle, not merely permission to peer through its windows"); *United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez*, *supra*, 318 F.3d 667–68 (rejecting defendant's argument that "a reasonable person would have assumed he had consented to only a quick look inside of the trailer, rather than a search of the containers within, because this is what [the border patrol agent] had . . . literally requested," because "it is established law . . . that a request to 'look in' a vehicle is the equivalent of a request for general consent to search"); *United States v. Rich*, *supra*, 992 F.2d 506 (officer's request to "'have a look in'" vehicle is proper request for permission to search because "any words, when viewed in context, that objectively communicate to a reasonable individual that the officer is requesting permission to examine the vehicle and its contents constitute a valid search request"); *State v. Stephens*, 946 P.2d 734, 735, 737 (Utah App. 1997) ("we conclude that [the police officer] could have reasonably believed that [the] defendant's general consent to 'look' or 'check' under the front seat for weapons or drugs extended to the contents of the leather case" found under front seat).

³⁹ The defendant also relies upon article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution, which provides: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law." We agree with the state that the defendant's reliance on this section is, in essence, superfluous, because, in the search and seizure context, article first, § 9, is our criminal due process provision that does not provide protections greater than those afforded by either the fourth amendment or its coordinate specific state constitutional provision, article first, § 7. See *State v. Lamme*, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) (article first, § 9, does not preclude *Terry* stops or other detentions not founded upon probable cause); see also *State v. Oquendo*, 223 Conn. 635, 669 n.1, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (*Borden, J.*, dissenting) ("Article first, § 7, is, of course, our state counterpart to the federal fourth amendment. Article first, § 9 . . . is our criminal due process clause, and has not generally been regarded as adding significantly to search and seizure analysis." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

⁴⁰ The defendant also asks for a requirement that the state prove, at a subsequent suppression hearing, the voluntariness of the consent by a heightened standard of proof. The defendant's analysis of this particular request is, however, limited to a sentence supported by a footnote citing three cases, *State v. Hight*, 146 N.H. 746, 781 A.2d 11 (2001), *State v. Johnson*, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975), and *State v. Ibarra*, 953 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Of these three cases, only *Ibarra* mentions the standard of proof applicable at a suppression hearing. The paucity of analysis with respect to this element of the defendant's proposed rule renders it inadequately briefed, and we decline to consider further this portion of the defendant's

claim because the evidentiary standard applicable in a suppression hearing to determine the voluntariness of consent is a question deserving of its own analysis under *State v. Geisler*, supra, 222 Conn. 684–86. Compare *State v. Akuba*, 686 N.W.2d 406, 412 (S.D. 2004) (“[M]ost courts no longer require clear and convincing evidence. Today we conform our burden of proof to that used by the United States Supreme Court and the [United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit]. They hold that ‘in deciding whether a consent was voluntary, courts should require the prosecution to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.’”), with *State v. Ibarra*, supra, 243–45 (rejecting state’s claim that state constitutional standard should be changed from clear and convincing evidence to conform with federal preponderance of evidence standard). See also *State v. Lawrence*, 282 Conn. 141, 177, 920 A.2d 236 (2007) (state constitution requires “the state to prove the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).

⁴¹ In their dissents, neither Justice Katz nor Justice Palmer disputes our conclusion under *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, and *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 93, “that recent federal precedent suggests that the permissibility of a consent search following a routine traffic stop is dictated by the duration of the stop.” Justice Katz does, however, posit that this “holding constitutes a substantive departure from settled fourth amendment jurisprudence,” which requires the scope of the investigation during a *Terry* stop to be “carefully tailored to its underlying justification” *Florida v. Royer*, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). Justice Katz’ critique of this recent body of federal case law is not without support. See, e.g., 4 W. LaFave, supra, (4th Ed. 2004) § 9.3 (d), p. 391 (“[t]he correct rule is that . . . in strict accordance with *Terry* and its progeny, questioning during a traffic stop must be limited to the purpose of the traffic stop and thus may not be extended to the subject of drugs”). Nevertheless, until the United States Supreme Court concludes otherwise, we deem the body of case law discussed in part II B of this opinion to be dispositive of both the defendant’s federal constitutional claims and the federal factor of the *Geisler* analysis.

⁴² See, e.g., *State v. Miller*, 227 Conn. 363, 386–87, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993) (“a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause, but conducted after the automobile has been impounded at the police station, violates article first, § 7”); *State v. Oquendo*, 223 Conn. 635, 647–53, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (rejecting *California v. Hodari D.*, 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 [1991], and instead adhering to Connecticut precedents defining seizure as whether reasonable person would have felt free to leave due to restraint of movement by physical force or show of authority); *State v. Geisler*, supra, 222 Conn. 676, 690 (rejecting *New York v. Harris*, 495 U.S. 14, 21, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13 [1990], and concluding that “the exclusionary rule under article first, § 7 requires that evidence derived from an unlawful warrantless entry into the home be excluded unless the taint of the illegal entry is attenuated by the passage of time or intervening circumstances”); *State v. Marsala*, 216 Conn. 150, 171, 579 A.2d 58 (1990) (rejecting *United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897, 920, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 [1984], and concluding that article first, § 7, does not have good faith exception for invalid warrants); accord *State v. Joyce*, 229 Conn. 10, 15, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994) (concluding that warrantless chemical analysis of defendant’s clothing left at fire scene violated article first, § 7). But see *State v. Johnson*, 286 Conn. 427, 443–50, 944 A.2d 297 (rejecting claim that article first, § 7, requires stricter standard than totality of circumstances for assessing probable cause for warrantless arrests based on informant’s tips), cert. denied, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 236, 172 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2008); *State v. Davis*, supra, 283 Conn. 323–24 (following federal “‘reasonable expectation of privacy’” standard and declining to adopt automatic standing rule under article first, § 7); *State v. Trine*, 236 Conn. 216, 234, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996) (following federal “plain feel” doctrine and concluding that “article first, § 7 does not categorically bar a police officer from seizing, without a warrant, nonthreatening contraband that the officer feels during a lawful patdown search”); *State v. DeFusco*, 224 Conn. 627, 639, 620 A.2d 746 (1993) (warrantless police searches of curbside garbage containers are permissible under article first, § 7, because defendant lacks reasonable expectation of privacy therein); *State v. Barton*, supra, 219 Conn. 543–45 (overruling *State v. Kimbro*, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 [1985], which had adopted former federal *Aguilar-Spinelli* test; see *Aguilar v. Texas*, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), *Spinelli v. United States*, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969); for scrutiny of search warrant applications

based on confidential informants' tips pursuant to article first, § 7, in favor of current federal "totality of the circumstances" standard under *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 [1983]).

⁴³ Justice Katz cites to several of this court's decisions, namely, *State v. Wilkins*, supra, 240 Conn. 508, *State v. Lamme*, supra, 216 Conn. 184, *State v. Edwards*, 214 Conn. 57, 72, 570 A.2d 193 (1990), and *State v. Carter*, 189 Conn. 611, 618, 458 A.2d 369 (1983), in support of the unremarkable proposition that, "under our state constitution, a *Terry* stop must be both justified at inception *and reasonably circumscribed*." (Emphasis added.) The dissent does not, however, point to any Connecticut case law definitively indicating that brief off-the-topic questioning, which does not measurably extend the length of the *Terry* detention, is per se unreasonable under our state constitution. Cf. *State v. Edwards*, supra, 73 (declining to "[extend] a *Terry* stop to include transporting a suspect to a police station for open ended questioning").

⁴⁴ The defendant cites *State v. Conger*, 183 Conn. 386, 439 A.2d 381 (1981), in support of the proposition that the present case differs from *State v. Wilkins*, supra, 240 Conn. 509–11, and *State v. Dukes*, supra, 209 Conn. 104–106, because in the present case, officer safety was not an issue, and the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the request for consent to search. In *State v. Conger*, supra, 387, 391, this court concluded that the defendant, who sought to contest the legality of his stop while driving a stolen truck, had standing to raise a fourth amendment claim, because "[t]he defendant, as an occupant of the truck, has an interest in continuing his travels without government intrusion. Thus his fourth amendment rights could have been violated by the stopping of the truck even though the truck was stolen." In our view, *Conger* does not support the defendant's argument because it does not consider the propriety of the traffic stop itself under either the federal or state constitutions.

⁴⁵ The defendant also relies on sister state case law interpreting the federal constitution, as well as some decisions applying state statutes restricting the scope of traffic stops. To the extent that the case law interprets the federal constitution, it, like those federal decisions preceding *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 93, and *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, lacks current persuasive value for purposes of this *Geisler* analysis. See *Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health*, supra, 289 Conn. 240–41.

⁴⁶ The defendant's reliance on case law from Montana, Vermont and Washington is misplaced because the cited cases do not stand for the proposition that those states have implemented increased state constitutional protections in the area of consent searches. With respect to Montana, the defendant cites *State v. Hill*, 322 Mont. 165, 94 P.3d 752 (2004). Putting aside the distinction that consent was sought after the trooper had acted to end the stop by returning the defendant's paperwork and telling him that "'we're done'"; id., 168; *Hill* does not hold that Montana's constitution provides motorists in that state with enhanced state constitutional protections. Id., 170; see also id., 174 (defendant lacks reasonable expectation of privacy in unlawfully possessed rental vehicle). Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court issued a decision subsequent to *Hill* holding to the contrary. See *State v. Snell*, 323 Mont. 157, 161, 99 P.3d 191 (2004) ("It is undisputed that [the officer] had particularized suspicion to stop [the defendant's] vehicle. Montana law does not require additional justification for requesting consent.").

Similarly, *State v. Cunningham*, 183 Vt. 401, 954 A.2d 1290 (2008), also does not stand for the proposition that the Vermont constitution provides greater protection to motorists during routine traffic stops than does the fourth amendment with respect to the scope of questioning or requests for consent to search. In *Cunningham*, the court merely held unreasonable under the state constitution the detention, not supported by reasonable suspicion, of a motorist for forty-six minutes pending the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog, after the motorist had refused to give officers consent to search his car. Id., 405, 415–16; see also id., 415 n.6 (emphasizing that court did not adopt "bright-line canine-response timing rule," and also that it did not need to consider vitality of *Illinois v. Caballes*, supra, 543 U.S. 409–10, under state constitution because, unlike in *Caballes*, arrival of drug-sniffing dog in *Cunningham* measurably prolonged duration of stop).

Finally, the defendant relies on *State v. Glossbrener*, 146 Wash. 2d 670, 49 P.3d 128 (2002), in support of the proposition that Washington has a state constitutional rule restricting the scope and duration of routine traffic stops to the initial purpose of the stop, in the absence of an independent basis of reasonable suspicion to justify further investigation. The defendant's reliance on *Glossbrener* is, however, misplaced; Washington does in fact

have such a rule, but it is statutory, and not constitutional. *Id.*, 676–77; see Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.021 (2) (West 2005) (“[w]henver any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person’s license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle’s registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction”). Second, *Glossbrenner* was not a consent search case but, rather, implicated the limitations of a safety-based protective frisk of a stopped motor vehicle’s passenger compartment. *State v. Glossbrenner*, *supra*, 679–81.

⁴⁷ The court further emphasized that 95 percent of detained motorists from whom consent was sought had agreed to searches of their vehicles, but that only 20 percent of those searches yielded any contraband, which “undermined” the court’s confidence in the “effectiveness of roadside consents as a law enforcement technique” *State v. Carty*, *supra*, 170 N.J. 645.

⁴⁸ Contrary to Justice Katz’ assertion, we do not suggest that *State v. Fort*, *supra*, 660 N.W.2d 416, is in any way “undermined” by *Illinois v. Caballes*, *supra*, 543 U.S. 408–409, at least not as a matter of Minnesota state constitutional law. Rather, we view *Fort* as having limited persuasive value with respect to our Connecticut state constitutional inquiry because, in *Fort*, the Minnesota Supreme Court was constrained to follow relevant recent precedent under its state constitution, namely, *State v. Wiegand*, *supra*, 645 N.W.2d 135–37. In contrast, our state constitutional jurisprudential landscape lacks an analytically dispositive precedent like *Wiegand*. See part III B of this opinion.

⁴⁹ The lack of an independent state constitutional analysis makes *Commonwealth v. Torres*, *supra*, 424 Mass. 153, particularly difficult to rely upon, especially given the fact that the motions to suppress at issue were founded upon both the fourth amendment and the Massachusetts constitution. *Id.*, 154. But see *Commonwealth v. Gonsalves*, 429 Mass. 658, 662–63, 711 N.E.2d 108 (1999) (characterizing *Torres* as state constitutional decision and relying on it in rejecting *Pennsylvania v. Mims*, *supra*, 434 U.S. 111, and precluding police officers from requiring motorists to exit their vehicles without “reasonable belief” of danger to officer or others).

⁵⁰ In *Commonwealth v. Strickler*, *supra*, 563 Pa. 47, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sought to apply the United States Supreme Court’s then recent decision in *Ohio v. Robinette*, *supra*, 519 U.S. 33. In *Strickler*, the court concluded that the encounter in that case, which had occurred after the officer had returned the defendant’s license to him, thanked him for his cooperation, and decided not to cite him for public urination on the side of the road; *Commonwealth v. Strickler*, *supra*, 53; was not itself a subsequent seizure despite the officer’s failure to inform the defendant specifically that he was free to leave because, inter alia, the officer did not act coercively and had informed the defendant that he was not required to consent to the search. *Id.*, 76–78. The court then applied a similar analysis to determine that the defendant’s consent to the search was voluntary. *Id.*, 79–80. Prior to performing these analyses, the court emphasized its adoption of “an interpretation of [*Robinette*] which allows for the possibility of a mere encounter following a traffic stop or similar detention” *Id.*, 72. The court noted, in dicta, that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Robinette* reasonably could be read “as deeming all circumstances connected with the overall encounter [therein] to reflect a single, albeit constitutionally-permissible detention,” thus validating the request for consent to search in the Supreme Court case, which had been decided solely on voluntariness grounds. *Id.*, 69. The Pennsylvania court noted, however, that this view of the detention would not comport with its understanding of *Terry* stops under the state constitution. *Id.*, 69–70.

⁵¹ We find misplaced the defendant’s reliance on another Wyoming case, *Garvin v. State*, 172 P.3d 725 (Wyo. 2007). *Garvin* does not establish an elevated state constitutional standard or develop the analysis of *O’Boyle v. State*, *supra*, 117 P.3d 411–12. Indeed, any such discussion would be superfluous because the analysis in *Garvin* focused solely on the court’s record based legal determination that a state trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain a motorist pending the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog. See *Garvin v. State*, *supra*, 729–30.

⁵² Our independent research has revealed three other states, Indiana, New Hampshire and Tennessee, that utilize, in essence, reasonableness standards under their state constitutions in this context. For example, in *State v. Washington*, *supra*, 898 N.E.2d 1202–1203, the defendant claimed that a

police officer had violated the fourth amendment and the Indiana constitution by questioning the defendant during a routine traffic stop about whether he had weapons or drugs on his person. After rejecting the defendant's federal constitutional claims; see *id.*, 1205; the Indiana Supreme Court noted that "[t]he determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Indiana [c]onstitution turns 'on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.'" *Id.*, 1206, quoting *Litchfield v. State*, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). The court then applied those factors to conclude that the initial stop of the defendant was appropriate because the officer had observed the defendant commit multiple traffic violations, "the degree of police intrusion was slight" because the "officer merely asked the defendant a brief question, one that not only asked if he had drugs, but also if he had weapons or other items that may harm the officer," and the "question to the defendant was consistent with the officer's concern for his own safety and law enforcement's responsibilities to deter crime, to intercept criminal activity, and to apprehend its perpetrators." *State v. Washington*, *supra*, 1206. Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he officer's question whether the defendant held contraband on his person, notwithstanding the absence of reasonable suspicion, was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate . . . the Indiana [c]onstitution." *Id.*, 1208.

Similarly, in *State v. McKinnon-Andrews*, 151 N.H. 19, 25, 846 A.2d 1198 (2004), the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted a tripartite test to determine whether the *Terry* scope requirement has been exceeded in the context of a traffic stop, and evaluated "whether: (1) the question is reasonably related to the initial justification for the stop; (2) the law enforcement officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that would justify the question; and (3) in light of all the circumstances, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed its fundamental nature." The court noted that, "[i]f the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, no [constitutional] violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no [constitutional] violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.* Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically has declined to adopt the rule of *State v. Carty*, *supra*, 170 N.J. 632, requiring requests for consent to search to be justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See *State v. Carbo*, 151 N.H. 550, 552, 864 A.2d 344 (2004).

Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in *State v. Cox*, 171 S.W.3d 174 (Tenn. 2005), concluded that a detective properly obtained consent to search a motorist's vehicle and her nearby motel room during a traffic stop, emphasizing that the duration and scope of traffic stops are measured by the time reasonably necessary to accomplish the traffic enforcement purpose of the stop. *Id.*, 179–80, 186. The court concluded that the totality of the circumstances test for determining the voluntariness of consent; see *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, *supra*, 412 U.S. 243; provided motorists with adequate protection under the state constitution, and rejected the defendant's request, founded on *State v. Carty*, *supra*, 170 N.J. 632, seeking state constitutional rules requiring the police to: (1) have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to seek a motorist's consent to search; and (2) inform motorists of their right to decline to consent to a search. See *State v. Cox*, *supra*, 181–84; see also *State v. Brown*, 294 S.W.3d 553, 562 (Tenn. 2009) (concluding that "[the] time, manner, and scope of [the trooper's] investigation did not exceed the proper parameters of a traffic stop" when request for consent to search was made "less than ten minutes" from start of stop and occurred while waiting for license and vehicular information).

⁵³ In relying on state constitutional case law from Arkansas and Washington requiring law enforcement officers to give warnings prior to seeking consent to search a home in the "knock and talk" context; see, e.g., *State v. Brown*, 356 Ark. 460, 466, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004); *State v. Ferrier*, 136 Wash. 2d 103, 118–19, 960 P.2d 927 (1998); Justice Palmer quotes *O'Boyle v. State*, *supra*, 117 P.3d 412, for the proposition that the "the standards [that have been] . . . applied in [cases involving] premises searches—where the

individual is on his or her own premises and likely feels freer to turn law enforcement away—[are] even more applicable in the context of roadside vehicle searches—where the traveler has been stopped for a traffic offense and is not free to leave.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This observation by the Wyoming Supreme Court is, however, inconsistent with the well established proposition that, “[i]n contrast to an individual’s expectation of privacy in his own home, a diminished expectation inheres with automobiles.” *United States v. Cantu*, 405 F.3d 1173, 1179 (10th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., *State v. Pittman*, 209 Conn. 596, 602, 553 A.2d 155 (1989) (“there is a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile”).

⁵⁴ The court stated that, under Kansas law, during a routine traffic stop, “a law enforcement officer may request the motorist’s driver’s license, car registration, and proof of insurance; conduct a computer check; issue a citation; and take those steps reasonably necessary to protect officer safety. The stop can last only as long as necessary to complete those tasks, and those tasks must be diligently pursued. . . . If no information raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity is found during the time period necessary to perform the computer check and other tasks incident to a traffic stop, the motorist must be allowed to leave without further delay.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Smith*, supra, 286 Kan. 410–11.

⁵⁵ We note also that the federal constitutional analysis in *State v. Smith*, supra, 286 Kan. 412, also is unpersuasive to the extent that it criticized the state’s intermediate appellate court for relying on a “contemporary line of [decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit] in holding that the scope restrictions previously enforced in Kansas were altered by *Mena*,” and cited three cases in support of the proposition that “some panels of the Tenth Circuit have recognized a distinction between the permissibility of asking questions on any topic and of conducting a search based upon a question like ‘may I search?’ In these cases, even though the Tenth Circuit panels allowed questions outside the purpose of a traffic stop, they held the searches were *not* constitutionally permissible.” (Emphasis added.) See also *id.*, 419 (criticizing Tenth Circuit panels for failing to explain why rule requiring return of license and completion of stop remains in effect).

We respectfully disagree with the Kansas court’s reading of the cases upon which it relied in support of its conclusion that the Tenth Circuit’s bright line rule requiring the return of a driver’s documents and the completion of the stop in order for a consent to be valid, could not be squared with the more expansive view of questioning and requests for consent to search followed subsequent to *Mena*. First, in *United States v. Valenzuela*, supra, 494 F.3d 890–91 and n.2, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the District Court properly had denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because a detective did not violate the defendant’s fourth amendment rights by asking him about the presence of weapons “‘or other illegal items’” in his vehicle, and then “[asking] for consent to search,” since that questioning “did not appreciably lengthen the duration of the stop.” The court rejected the defendant’s reliance on the bright-line rule, noting that it pertained only to voluntariness and that “the validity of [the] [d]efendant’s consent to search is not at issue in this case.” *Id.*, 891. Second, in *United States v. Yeomans*, 211 Fed. Appx. 753, 758 (10th Cir.) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 948, 127 S. Ct. 2282, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1115 (2007), the Tenth Circuit noted that the failure to return the driver’s documents meant only that the officer’s interaction with the driver and the defendant, his passenger, “never became consensual” and “when the questioning about drugs occurred, and [the defendant and the driver] consented to a search of their car, the traffic stop continued to be a detention, not a consensual encounter.” The court then concluded that the District Court had properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, because it determined that “questioning about drugs did not unreasonably extend the detention, and therefore did not violate the [f]ourth [a]mendment.” *Id.*, 759. Finally, in *United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza*, 462 F.3d 1302, 1308 n.6 (10th Cir. 2006), which appears to be *sui generis* because of its facts, the court emphasized that *Mena* did not apply because the trooper already had ended the traffic stop by returning the driver’s documents and speeding warning to him while they sat in the cruiser away from the defendant, a passenger in the stopped car. The court then concluded that, because the defendant was not aware that the stop was over since those events had taken place out of his presence, he would not have felt free to leave, thus rendering his consent involuntary. *Id.*, 1309–10.

⁵⁶ The decision in *Brown* describes the state’s defense of the consent

search during the routine traffic stop in that case as “eminently defensible under federal law,” including *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 100–101. *Brown v. State*, supra, 182 P.3d 628–29; see also id., 632 (“the [f]ourth [a]mendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, and as applied by various federal circuit courts and state courts, offers little protection to motorists in this situation”).

⁵⁷ It also has been argued that requests for consent searches in the context of routine traffic stops should be deemed a practice that is impermissible per se, particularly given the perceived ineffectiveness of warnings. See C. Lassiter, “Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations,” 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 79, 133–34 (1998) (discussing ineffectiveness of warnings in preventing involuntary consent, particularly by uncounseled motorists, and stating that “voluntary uncounseled consent to search and seizure which would lead to the discovery of self-incriminating evidence strains faith in the law”). But see B. Lawrence, note, “The Scope of Police Questioning During a Routine Traffic Stop: Do Questions Outside the Scope of the Original Justification for the Stop Create Impermissible Seizures if they do not Prolong the Stop?,” 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1919, 1948 (2003) (supporting constitutionality of questioning and requests for consent to search that do not prolong traffic stops because “the state interest in drug interdiction outweighs the minimal privacy interest” implicated by questioning).

⁵⁸ We note that Professor LaFave has been highly critical of the United States Supreme Court’s recent *Terry* and traffic stop jurisprudence, in particular criticizing the drug dog case, *Illinois v. Caballes*, supra, 543 U.S. 405, upon which the subsequent decisions in *Muehler v. Mena*, supra, 544 U.S. 93, and *Arizona v. Johnson*, supra, 129 S. Ct. 781, are founded, as “ill-considered”; 4 W. LaFave, supra, (2009–2010 Sup.) § 9.3, p. 94; see also, e.g., id., pp. 77–78 (describing *Caballes* as significant departure from prior *Terry* precedents limiting scope of stop).

⁵⁹ General Statutes § 54-1l provides: “(a) This section and section 54-1m shall be known as the ‘Alvin W. Penn Racial Profiling Prohibition Act’.

“(b) For the purposes of this section, ‘racial profiling’ means the detention, interdiction or other disparate treatment of an individual solely on the basis of the racial or ethnic status of such individual.

“(c) No member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, a municipal police department or any other law enforcement agency shall engage in racial profiling. The detention of an individual based on any noncriminal factor or combination of noncriminal factors is inconsistent with this policy.

“(d) The race or ethnicity of an individual shall not be the sole factor in determining the existence of probable cause to place in custody or arrest an individual or in constituting a reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense has been or is being committed so as to justify the detention of an individual or the investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.”