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VERTEFEUILLE, J., concurring. I agree with and join part II of the majority opinion. With regard to part I, however, I agree with the result, but not with the analysis.

In part I of its opinion, the majority concludes, first, that the manner in which the trial court applied *State v. Porter*, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), to the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, Richard Friedlander, was improper. The majority thereafter concludes that "*Porter* simply does not apply" to Friedlander's testimony.

In my view, the threshold inquiry in the present case is whether *Porter* applies. I think it is important to establish first, and unequivocally, that *Porter* does not apply to expert medical testimony like Friedlander's, which was based on generally accepted medical principles, and not on innovative scientific techniques. Friedlander's opinion was a logical deduction from two generally accepted medical premises. As such, his testimony was admissible without undergoing a *Porter* analysis or being subjected to a *Porter* hearing.

Having concluded that *Porter* does not apply to Friedlander's testimony, I would find it unnecessary to review the manner in which the trial court applied *Porter* to that testimony. If I were to reach that issue, I would agree with the majority that a *Porter* analysis is directed to the methodology, techniques or premises underlying an expert's opinion, and not to the opinion itself.

Accordingly, I concur.
