DOCKET NO. HHD-CV-22-6152314-S	:	SUPERIOR COURT
SHARON GREEN	:	JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD
V.	:	
OCEAN STATE JOBBERS INC. AND OCEAN STATE JOB LOT STORES OF CT, INC.	:	APRIL 29, 2024

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In February, 2022, the plaintiff, Sharon Green, brought this premises liability action against the defendants, Ocean State Jobbers Inc. and Ocean State Job Lot Stores of CT, Inc., to recover damages sustained when she slipped and fell at an Ocean State Job Lot store in Windsor, Connecticut, on March 5, 2021. The defendants denied the allegations of negligence and asserted special defenses, which the plaintiff denied. A trial to the court took place on January 11, 2024. The plaintiff called two witnesses to testify in her case: the plaintiff herself, and Vanessa Torres, a store supervisor who was working at the store when the plaintiff fell. Exhibits were submitted without objection, including a video recording of the plaintiff's fall.

After the plaintiff produced her evidence and rested, the defendants' counsel stated that the defendants had no evidence to present. He then moved for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-8 on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to offer evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect, an essential element of a premises liability claim. The plaintiff's counsel conceded there was no evidence of actual notice but argued that the court could infer from the defendants' alleged "spoliation" of video evidence

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

that the defendants had constructive notice of the defect. The court afforded the parties the opportunity to submit posttrial briefs addressing the spoliation issue and any other arguments they wished to make. The plaintiff's posttrial brief was filed on January 25, 2024, and the defendants' posttrial brief was filed on February 8, 2024. Both parties addressed the spoliation issue and each also made additional arguments on the merits of the case as a whole.

The court has now carefully considered the pleadings, all of the evidence that was submitted, and the arguments of counsel, in light of the governing principles of law. The court concludes that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to make a prima facie case for premises liability because there is insufficient evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the specific defect at issue. Accordingly, the court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to § 15-8.

Applicable Legal Standards

Practice Book § 15-8 provides in pertinent part: "If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested, a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case." To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff "must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove. . . . [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the

plaintiff's] favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Rosenthal* v. *Bloomfield*, 178 Conn. App. 258, 262-63, 174 A.3d 839 (2017).

As in any negligence case, a plaintiff in a premises liability case must prove the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, injury caused by the breach, and resulting damages. In this case, the existence of a duty is undisputed, as a business owner owes its invitees a duty to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn invitees of dangers that they could not reasonably be expected to discover. *Hill* v. *OSJ of Bloomfield, LLC*, 200 Conn. App. 149, 154, 239 A.3d 345 (2020). In a premises liability action, proof of the breach of that duty requires the plaintiff to prove "(1) the existence of a defect, (2) that the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known about the defect and (3) that such defect had existed for such a length of time that the [defendant] should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered it in time to remedy it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 154-55. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff in a premises liability case "to allege[1] and prove that the defendant either had actual notice of the presence of the specific unsafe condition which caused [her injury] or constructive

[1] The defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to allege either actual or constructive notice in her complaint. This pleading defect might have justified the granting of a motion to strike, but no motion to strike was filed. In a similar case, where a defendant had argued at the close of a plaintiff's case that the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege an essential element of its claim, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had waived the pleading insufficiency by failing to raise it in a motion to strike. See *Service Road Corp.* v. *Quinn*, 241 Conn. 630, 636-37, 698 A.2d 258 (1997); see also *Moutinho* v. *500 North Avenue, LLC*, 191 Conn. App. 608, 622-23, 216 A.3d 667, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 928, 218 A.3d 68 (2019). It is the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the complaint, that is at issue in a § 15-8 motion.

notice of it. . . . [T]he notice, whether actual or constructive, must be notice of the very defect which occasioned the injury and not merely of conditions naturally productive of that defect even though subsequently in fact producing it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 154. If the plaintiff is relying on constructive notice, "[t]he controlling question in deciding whether the defendant had constructive notice of the defective condition is whether the condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered it in time to remedy it. . . . What constitutes a reasonable length of time is largely a question of fact to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of a case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Diaz* v. *Manchester Memorial Hospital*, 161 Conn. App. 787, 792, 130 A.3d 868 (2015). "Evidence which goes no farther than to show the presence of a slippery foreign substance does not warrant an inference of constructive notice to the defendant." *Morris* v. *King Cole Stores, Inc.*, 132 Conn. 489, 494, 45 A.2d 710 (1946).

Analysis of the Plaintiff's Evidence

The plaintiff presented evidence that, at about 5:10 p.m. on March 5, 2021, she was shopping in the defendant's store when she slipped and fell on a small spill of a slippery white substance, possibly liquid soap, in the store's health and beauty aid (HBA) aisle. A video of her fall shows that she fell hard and fast, landing in a seated position. She presented evidence of the injuries she sustained as a result of the fall, of the medical treatment and expenses incurred, and the continuing effects of those injuries at the time of trial. It is undisputed that the presence of

the slippery substance on the floor constituted a defective condition in the premises. The plaintiff conceded that there was no evidence that the defendants had actual notice of the defective condition before the plaintiff fell. The critical question is whether the spill had existed for such a period of time that the defendants, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered and remedied it.

There was no direct evidence as to how or when the slippery substance was spilled on the floor. The plaintiff did not know how long the slippery substance had been on the floor. In the video showing the plaintiff's fall, the HBA aisle appears generally clean; indeed, the court could not see the slippery substance but could only infer the presence of something slippery by the nature of the plaintiff's abrupt fall. Photographs of the floor taken at close range after the plaintiff's fall show a skid mark through a light-colored substance, consistent with the plaintiff's foot crossing through the substance.

To show that the defendants had constructive notice of the slippery substance, the plaintiff attempted to prove that the store had not inspected the aisle as frequently as required by its safety policy. The store's policy for "safety walks and awareness," introduced as an exhibit, requires store leadership and all associates to identify safety hazards and to correct a hazard immediately after its discovery. The policy provides a nonexclusive list of potential safety hazards, including spills. Under the policy, a safety review of the sales floor must be performed before the store's opening each day and at least every other hour throughout the day. It provides

that "[t]here should not be a gap of more than two hours between each safety walk." The safety review is performed by walking up and down each aisle of the entire store, and the observations of each walk are to be documented on the store safety walk log. Safety walk logs must be completed accurately "to assist in protecting the company in the event of an accident if there is litigation." Logs must be maintained for three years. In bold print, the safety walk policy directs as follows: "If a safety walk is missed, leave the line on the Safety Walk Log for the missed time(s) blank. Write in 'missed' on the comment section of the Safety Walk Log and initials. Falsification of the Store Safety Walk Log is subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination." There was no evidence as to how long it generally took to complete a safety walk of the entire store.

The safety walk log for March 5, 2021, introduced as an exhibit, has a line for each hour between 8 a.m. and 11 p.m. A prominent notice at the bottom right side of the form states: "Falsification of this document will result in termination. If an inspection period is missed, leave the line blank." Initials or signatures on the safety walk log indicate that safety walks were completed at 8 a.m., 9:30 a.m., 10:42 a.m., 11:12 a.m., 12:33 p.m., 1:10 p.m., 2:45 p.m., 3:57 p.m., 5:14 p.m., and 6:09 p.m. The line for the 4 p.m. period is blank, but an unsigned note at the bottom of the page states: "did a walk at 4 something didn't sign the log." For all times before 5:14 p.m., the column for the observations of the leader on duty notes "no issues." At 5:14 p.m., the comment is "soap all around floor hba cleaning it up." At 6:09 p.m., the comment is "soap

cleaned up."

The plaintiff called Vanessa Torres, an area supervisor in the store on the day of the plaintiff's fall, to testify about the store's safety policy and practices. She testified that the manager on duty or, if the manager on duty was dealing with a customer, another manager or area team leader would complete a safety walk "every hour" or "every hour or so," going up and down each aisle to look for safety issues. She personally completed the safety walks logged at 12:33 p.m., 3:57 p.m., and 5:14 p.m. She testified that she also completed a safety walk at "four something" but did not log it on the 4 p.m. line on the safety walk log, probably because she was distracted by a customer before doing so. She added the note at the bottom of the safety log to show that she had done a walk during the 4 o'clock hour. She denied that anyone had told her to write that on the log. She admitted that this was the only time she had not written the time in on the line for the hour of the walk, but she was certain she did a safety walk during that hour. She said that Sandra Wright, the "area head" for the HBA department, was working in the HBA aisle when Torres did the safety walk during the 4 o'clock hour. She stated that if Wright had seen a slippery substance on the floor, she would have been responsible for reporting it to a manager immediately. As far as Torres was aware, there were no reports of a slippery substance in the HBA aisle before the plaintiff fell.

There were no witnesses to the plaintiff's fall. Torres testified that Wright notified her that a customer had fallen, and Torres responded to the area immediately. Torres had been

working at the store for about two years at that time and had never previously had a customer fall. She first attended to the plaintiff, who was standing up when she arrived in the aisle, and then attended to getting the spill cleaned up.

Although the plaintiff initially declined medical assistance, she asked for a written report of her accident. At that point, someone called for emergency assistance. An ambulance and police came to the store. After an initial examination by the emergency medical personnel, the plaintiff again declined any treatment. The police interviewed the plaintiff and store personnel. The police report of the incident was submitted into evidence. In it, the responding officer noted that he had "asked about video surveillance footage but was told that there were no camera angles on that particular aisle." He did not note who gave him that information, and there is no other evidence in the record to identify the source of the officer's information. Torres testified that she spoke only briefly to the police officer and that she did not say anything about video recordings to him.

The store's manager, Chris Behrens, created an incident report on the day of the plaintiff's fall. In the first section of the report, captioned "Case Detail," the report indicates that there is "partial" video evidence. In the "Incident Description" section, however, the report states that "[t]here were no witnesses to the fall and it was not caught on camera."

Both the police report and the incident report were shown to be mistaken because, as it turned out, there was a video recording of the plaintiff's fall. A copy of the video was produced

to the plaintiff during discovery and subsequently viewed and submitted into evidence at trial.

Considering all the evidence presented in the plaintiff's case, there is no evidence as to how or when the spill occurred or how long the slippery substance had been on the floor before the plaintiff fell. It was not there, according to the evidence presented, when Torres did the safety walk that she completed at 3:57 p.m. It was not there during her safety walk during the 4 o'clock hour, when the area head of the HBA aisle was working in the aisle, and she was unaware of any reports of a slippery substance before the plaintiff fell at about 5:10 p.m.

Effectively conceding the lack of evidence of the time of the spill and how long it remained on the floor before the plaintiff fell, the plaintiff's counsel argues that the court can draw an adverse inference from the "spoliation" of video recordings of the aisle before the plaintiff fell. He argues that the court can infer that the defendants intentionally destroyed video recordings of the aisle prior to the plaintiff's fall because such evidence would hurt their case. He further argues that the court can rely on this adverse inference to find that the defendants had constructive notice of the specific defect. There are two flaws in this argument.

First, the argument fails to recognize the limits of adverse inferences. An adverse inference does not "supply the place of evidence of material facts and does not shift the burden of proof so as to relieve the party upon whom it rests of the necessity of establishing a prima facie case, although it may turn the scale when the evidence is closely balanced." *Beers* v. *Bayliner Marine Corp.*, 236 Conn. 769, 779, 675 A.2d 829 (1996).

Second, even if an adverse inference could supply the place of evidence of an essential element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff has not satisfied the prerequisites for an adverse inference based on spoliation. "[A]n adverse inference may be drawn against a party who has destroyed evidence only if the trier of fact is satisfied that the party who seeks the adverse inference has proven the following. First, the spoliation must have been intentional." *Beers* v. *Bayliner Marine Corp.*, supra, 236 Conn. 777. Second, "the destroyed evidence must be relevant to the issue or matter for which the party seeks the inference." Id., 778. Third, "the party who seeks the inference must have acted with due diligence with respect to the spoliated evidence." Id.

In this case, the plaintiff did not call any witness with knowledge of how the store's video camera system was set up, operated, or maintained. The plaintiff's counsel appeared to assume that the camera that captured the plaintiff's fall was in a fixed position and recorded the same aisle continuously, but there is no evidence to support that assumption. The camera could have been set to pan to different aisles at different times. Even if the court assumes, for the purpose of argument, that a video of the aisle was recorded during the period before the plaintiff fell, there is only speculation as to what such a video might have shown. In addition, the plaintiff has not established that destruction of any video was intentional or that the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain such a video. An adverse inference based on spoliation is "not appropriate when destruction is not intentional or is merely a matter of routine procedure." *Beers*

v. *Bayliner Marine Corp.*, supra, 236 Conn. 778. Without any evidence about the operation of the camera system, the court has no way of knowing whether a relevant video recording ever existed, and if such a video recording once existed, whether destruction of the recording was intentional or the result of inadvertence or a matter of routine procedure. In the absence of such evidence, an adverse inference is unwarranted. See *Paylan* v. *St. Mary's Hospital Corp.*, 118 Conn. App. 258, 264-66, 983 A.2d 56 (2009).

As to the diligence requirement, the plaintiff's counsel argues that the plaintiff was misled by the police and incident reports, which indicated that no camera footage was available. However, the incident report was ambiguous; in one section it indicated that "partial" video evidence was available, and in another it said that the fall was not caught on camera. Chris Behrens, the store manager who created the incident report, was not called as a witness. The plaintiff assumes that the incident report contained deliberate misinformation, intended to prevent the plaintiff from discovering the existence of video. That assumption is unwarranted in light of the reference to "partial" video evidence at the top of the report. Due diligence would require the plaintiff to explore the contradictory information in the report at an early stage of the case, and to request, pending discovery, that all video recordings made of the aisle that day be preserved.

The plaintiff's counsel was on notice, early in the case, that video recordings did exist. During oral argument on the § 15-8 motion, the plaintiff's counsel admitted that in August, 2022,

he received discovery responses from the defendants that identified sixteen video clips related to the incident. He first argued that the discovery responses had said only "video to be provided," but later acknowledged that the videos were sent to him. He said that he did not receive them, however, perhaps because of the size of the electronic file. He asserted that he never saw the video of the plaintiff's fall until the time of her deposition, a few weeks before trial. He acknowledged that when he informed the defendants' counsel that he did not have the videos, the defendants' counsel promptly sent them to him again. It is therefore undisputed that, as of August, 2022, the plaintiff's counsel was aware that video recordings *did* exist, but he did not immediately try to obtain them or to put the defendants on notice that they should preserve all videos that showed the aisle where the fall occurred that were recorded on March 5, 2021.

The plaintiff quotes *Rizzuto* v. *Davidson Ladders, Inc.*, 280 Conn. 225, 245, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006), in support of her spoliation argument, claiming that our Supreme Court has recognized that "there would be an inequity in preventing a plaintiff from recovering because of his inability, allegedly caused by the defendant, to prove his underlying case. [T]he most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created." In *Rizzuto*, however, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished cases in which an adverse inference may be drawn based on spoliation – which is what the plaintiff seeks here – and cases in which an independent tort for spoliation of evidence is alleged. In cases in which an adverse inference based on spoliation is permitted, the

party seeking the adverse inference still has the burden to produce "concrete evidence to support his underlying claim." Id., 242.

It is only in cases alleging the tort of intentional spoliation that spoliation may substitute for proof of a prima facie case. "[T]he tort of intentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following essential elements: (1) the defendant's knowledge of a pending or impending civil action involving the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's destruction of evidence; (3) in bad faith, that is, with intent to deprive the plaintiff of his cause of action; (4) the plaintiff's inability to establish a prima facie case without the spoliated evidence; and (5) damages." Id., 244-45. In this case, the plaintiff has not alleged the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence and did not offer evidence tending to prove that the defendant destroyed evidence in bad faith.

The plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that negligence is established by the store's failure to comply with its own practice regarding safety walks. Torres testified that the store's practice was to do safety walks "every hour" or "every hour or so." The plaintiff argues that hourly walks were required and that Torres's testimony that she did a safety walk during the 4 o'clock hour was untruthful. This argument has several flaws. First, for the purposes of a § 15-8 motion, the court is required to take the evidence presented in the plaintiff's case as true, without making credibility determinations. The plaintiff's counsel cited no authority for the proposition that a court can deny a § 15-8 motion because it *disbelieves* evidence presented in the plaintiff's case. As a general rule, disbelief of a witness's testimony is not proof of the opposite of that testimony.

See, e.g., *Novak* v. *Anderson*, 178 Conn. 506, 508, 423 A.2d 147 (1979) ("[w]hile it is true that it is within the province of the jury to accept or reject a defendant's testimony, a jury in rejecting such testimony cannot conclude that the opposite is true"); *Masse* v. *Perez*, 139 Conn. App. 794, 801, 58 A.3d 273 (2012), cert denied, 308 Conn. 905, 61 A. 3d 1098 (2013) ("a trier of fact cannot, from a disbelief of a defendant's testimony, infer that a plaintiff's allegation is correct" [internal quotation marks omitted]); *Hill* v. *OSJ of Bloomfield, LLC*, supra, 200 Conn. App. 164 (court was free to disbelieve witness's testimony but not permitted to draw contrary inference based on that disbelief).

The evidence of the safety walk log is consistent with Torres's testimony that safety walks were done "every hour or so." The log shows that safety walks were completed at varying intervals throughout the day. The shortest interval, between the third and fourth walks of the day at 10:42 a.m. and 11:12 a.m., was thirty minutes; the longest interval, between the sixth and seventh walks of the day at 1:10 p.m. and 2:45 p.m., was ninety-five minutes. Even if the court disbelieved Torres's testimony that she did a safety walk at "four something," the log indicates that she completed safety walks at 3:57 p.m. and 5:14 p.m., an interval of seventy-seven minutes. All of the intervals shown on the log – even omitting Torres's notation at the bottom of the log that she did a walk at "4 something" – were well within the two-hour window prescribed by the safety walk policy.

There was no evidence to suggest that safety walks were needed more often than every

other hour. The plaintiff did not offer evidence as to the frequency of spills or other hazards in the HBA aisle or more generally in the store. The plaintiff did not present expert testimony about retail safety practices. Torres testified that she had worked at the store for two years and had never had anyone fall before.

The plaintiff also argues that the defendants operate the store as a self-service enterprise, where it is to be expected that customers may cause spills or other hazards in the aisles, and that the defendants therefore had a heightened duty to guard against such spills. She argues, in effect, that this court should apply the "mode of operation" rule adopted by the Supreme Court in *Kelly* v. *Stop & Shop, Inc.*, 281 Conn. 768, 791-92, 918 A.2d 249 (2007). The mode of operation rule "provides an exception to the notice requirement of traditional premises liability doctrine." *Fisher* v. *Big Y Foods, Inc.*, 298 Conn. 414, 419, 3 A.3d 919 (2010). Under the mode of operation rule, "a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence upon presentation of evidence that the mode of operation of the defendant's business gives rise to a foreseeable risk of injury to customers and that the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by an accident within the zone of risk." *Kelly* v. *Stop & Shop, Inc.*, supra, 281 Conn. 791. In *Kelly*, the plaintiff had slipped and fallen on a piece of lettuce on the floor near the defendant's self-service salad bar, which the store manager characterized as a "precarious" area requiring special attention because of the frequency with which food fell to the floor. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court have clarified that the mode of operation rule does not apply merely because

a store operates in a self-service manner; it applies to specific practices within an establishment that create a regularly occurring risk in a specific area. Many of the cases in which the rule has been applied involve salad bars and produce aisles, where customers may frequently drop naturally slippery substances such as lettuce leaves and grapes. See *Fisher* v. *Big Y Foods, Inc.*, supra, 298 Conn. 431-33. As the *Fisher* court observed, the mode of operation exception to the usual premises liability rule "is meant to be a narrow one, and applies only to those areas where risk of injury is continuous or foreseeably inherent in the nature of the business or mode of operation. . . . Thus a plaintiff who slips and falls in a grocery store cannot survive summary judgment by merely raising the inference that the substance causing her fall came from within the store; rather, the plaintiff must show that such spills were *foreseeable in the specific area where she fell.*" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 437.

The Appellate Court has distilled the requirements for a mode of operation claim as follows: "(1) the defendant must have a particular mode of operation distinct from the ordinary operation of a related business; (2) that mode of operation must create a regularly occurring or inherently foreseeable hazard; and (3) the injury must happen within a limited zone of risk." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Hill* v. *OSJ of Bloomfield, LLC*, supra, 200 Conn. App. 157. "[W]hen a plaintiff injured by a transitory hazardous condition on the premises of a self-service retail establishment fails to show that a particular mode of operation made the condition occur regularly or rendered it inherently foreseeable, the plaintiff must proceed under traditional

premises liability doctrine, i.e., he must show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the particular hazard at issue." *Fisher* v. *Big Y Foods, Inc.*, supra, 439. In this case, the plaintiff neither pleaded a mode of operation theory nor offered evidence tending to prove any of the three requirements for a mode of operation case. That is, she offered no evidence that the store's mode of operation of the HBA aisle was distinct from related businesses, that slippery spills in the HBA were a regularly occurring or inherently foreseeable hazard, or that the HBA aisle was a limited zone of risk.

Without such evidence, the plaintiff was required to proceed under the traditional premises liability doctrine, with proof that the defendants had either actual or constructive notice of the specific defect in question and that the defect had existed for such a period of time that in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendants should have discovered and corrected it. The evidence presented by the plaintiff tends to prove that the slippery substance was not in the aisle at 3:57 p.m. or "four something." It could have been spilled at any time before 5:10 p.m., when the plaintiff slipped on it. It could have been on the floor for one minute, or five minutes, or half an hour, or longer. The court is left to speculate, and speculation cannot substitute for proof.

As required by Practice Book § 15-8 and decisions construing it, the court has taken all the evidence presented by the plaintiff as true, without making credibility determinations. It has drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. It has concluded that an adverse inference based on spoliation is not warranted by the evidence presented and, even if it were,

could not supply the place of an essential element of the plaintiff's case. Considered under the applicable standard, the plaintiff's evidence fails to make a prima facie case under the premises liability doctrine because there is insufficient evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the specific defect, the spilled substance on which the plaintiff slipped. For this reason, the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to make a prima facie case is granted.

BY THE COURT,

Sheila A. Huddleston
Judge Trial Referee

Checklist for Clerk

Docket Number: HHD-CV22-6152314-S

Case Name: Sharon Green v. Ocean State Jobbers Inc. Et Al

Memorandum of Decision dated: 4/29/24

File Sealed: **Yes** **No** X

Memo Sealed: **Yes** **No** X

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Comments

HHD-CV22-6152314-S **GREEN, SHARON v. OCEAN STATE JOBBERS INC. Et Al**

Prefix: HD3 **Case Type:** T03 **File Date:** 02/17/2022 **Return Date:** 03/08/2022

Information Updated as of: 04/29/2024

Case Information

Case Type: T03 - Torts - Defective Premises - Private - Other
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Trial List Claim: 08/23/2022
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Disposition Information

Disposition Date:
Disposition:
Judge or Magistrate:

Party & Appearance Information

Party		No Fee Party	Category
P-01	**SHARON GREEN** **Attorney:** BUTLER NORRIS & GOLD (007660) File Date: 02/17/2022 254 PROSPECT AVENUE HARTFORD , CT 061062041		Plaintiff
D-01	**OCEAN STATE JOBBERS INC.** **Attorney:** NICHOLAS WARD FRANCIS (400732) File Date: 07/13/2022 75 HOOD PARK DRIVE BOSTON , MA 02129		Defendant
D-02	**OCEAN STATE JOB LOT STORES OF CT, INC.** **Attorney:** NICHOLAS WARD FRANCIS (400732) File Date: 07/13/2022 75 HOOD PARK DRIVE BOSTON , MA 02129		Defendant

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