

DOCKET NO. HHD-CV-22-6150602-S : SUPERIOR COURT  
MIGUEL MORALES : JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
OF HARTFORD  
V. :  
SHARON GOODE : JUNE 10, 2024

**MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AFTER TRIAL**

The plaintiff, Miguel Morales, brought this action against the defendant, Sharon Goode, to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of a dog bite. The case was tried to the court on January 3, 2024. The plaintiff was represented by counsel; the defendant represented herself.

Four witnesses testified<sup>1</sup> and three exhibits were admitted. In reaching its conclusions, the court has carefully and fully considered and weighed all of the evidence received at trial. There were substantial internal inconsistencies in the testimony of the three principal witnesses, and each witness contradicted other witnesses on many points. In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the court has considered the contradictions and inconsistencies and the extent to which each witness's testimony was corroborated or refuted by other testimony or the three exhibits. It has analyzed and weighed the evidence in accordance with the applicable statutes and standards of law and has considered the parties' arguments in light of the evidence.<sup>2</sup> Based on a fair

<sup>1</sup> The three principal witnesses were the plaintiff, the defendant, and the defendant's brother-in-law. The defendant's daughter also testified very briefly.

<sup>2</sup> At trial on January 3, 2024, the court advised the parties that it deemed a transcript of the morning's testimony necessary to allow it to compare the plaintiff's claims in closing argument with the testimony on which the claims relied. The transcript was delivered on February 21, 2024, thereby completing the record for the court's review.

*Susan Luciano*

FILED  
JUN 10 P 2:30  
CLERK OF THE CLERK  
SUPERIOR COURT  
HARTFORD, CT

114.00 (28)

*6/10/24 - cc to Sharon Goode, 1837 Mapleton Ave, Suffield CT 06078*

preponderance of the credible evidence, the court finds for the plaintiff on the first count of his complaint, based in General Statutes § 22-357, and for the defendant on the second count, based in negligence.

### Factual Background

The plaintiff has lived in Florida for several years. Before moving to Florida, he was an automotive mechanic in Massachusetts. At some time in the past, the plaintiff worked for the family of Ed Gaunt,<sup>3</sup> the defendant's brother-in-law. Gaunt owns an auto body shop in Massachusetts and has known the plaintiff for decades. In the fall of 2019, Gaunt contacted the plaintiff in Florida to ask if he would come to Massachusetts to work on a vehicle that Gaunt had started to restore. The plaintiff agreed.

When the plaintiff first arrived to work with Gaunt in the fall of 2019, he stayed with a friend or relative who lived at a significant distance from Gaunt's shop. In late November or early December, the plaintiff wanted to find a place to stay that was closer to Gaunt's shop. The defendant was asked if she would be able to rent a room to him at her property in Suffield, Connecticut, near the Massachusetts border.

The defendant owns a flower farm in Suffield, where she lives with her two daughters. In 2019, her nephew also lived on the premises, renting a room in a carriage house attached to the defendant's house. The defendant described herself as a retired naval intelligence officer and

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<sup>3</sup> Both the plaintiff and the defendant referred to Mr. Gaunt as Ed or Eddie. When Ed Gaunt was called as a witness, he gave his name as Gary Gaunt.

engineer who suffers from severe anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of a rape experienced while she was in the military service. She owns a Weimeraner dog named Aiden.

The defendant declined to rent the plaintiff a room in her house because of her anxiety condition. She was then asked whether the plaintiff could rent space from the defendant's nephew in the carriage house attached to the defendant's home. The defendant permitted that arrangement. When the plaintiff arranged to live on the defendant's property, Gaunt cautioned him that the defendant had a dog that had been known to "nip" at people and that the defendant should avoid provoking the dog.

Although all the witnesses were somewhat hazy about dates, it appears that the plaintiff resided on the defendant's premises for approximately four to five weeks in December, 2019, and possibly into early January, 2020. The defendant was uncomfortable with the plaintiff's presence on her property throughout his time there and soon asked Gaunt's wife to find another place for him to stay. At some point the plaintiff did move to another location. The plaintiff testified that at about that time he was hospitalized as a result of a heart attack. The plaintiff returned home to Florida a few days after the end of his hospitalization for cardiac treatment.

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Aiden attacked him on one occasion, on or about December 11, 2019, biting him repeatedly and causing wounds to his left arm and left leg. In the first count of the complaint, he alleged that the defendant was liable for his injuries pursuant to General Statutes § 22-357. In the second count, he alleged that the defendant was

liable in negligence because she knew or should have known her dog to have a vicious or ferocious propensity and, among other things, she allowed him to run loose or failed to take reasonable steps to restrain him or keep him under control.

As to both counts, the plaintiff alleged that he incurred medical expenses for stitches, hospital care, medical care and treatment, prescriptions, and follow up visits with his doctor.

In her answer, and at trial, the defendant denied that her dog had bitten the plaintiff. She believed that the plaintiff was making the claim about Aiden to retaliate against her for rejecting his unwanted sexual advances and for seeking to have him vacate her property soon after he moved in.

First Count: Strict Liability Under General Statutes § 22-357

General Statutes § 22-357 (b) provides in relevant part: “If any dog does any damage to either the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper . . . shall be liable for the amount of such damage, except when such damage has been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or abusing such dog.” To prove his claim under § 22-357, the plaintiff had to establish that the defendant was the owner or keeper of a dog, that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s dog, that the plaintiff was not trespassing or committing a tort, and that the plaintiff was not teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog when he sustained the damage. Because § 22-357 is a strict liability statute, the plaintiff did not have to prove that the defendant was

negligent to prevail on the first count.

If credited by the court, the plaintiff's testimony, taken together with the medical records and photographs he introduced, provide support for his claim under § 22-357 as to an injury from a bite to his left lower leg. That is, he testified that the defendant owned a dog named Aiden. He testified that he did not know what breed Aiden was, but he was a "full breed dog . . . a good-looking dog . . .". The plaintiff testified that Aiden bit him on several different days in December, 2019, but the focus of his testimony concerned a bite to his lower left leg, which caused two puncture wounds and other lesions. He testified that the bite to his leg occurred around noon on a Saturday or Sunday when he was moving furniture outside on the defendant's property. He was staying at the defendant's property with her permission at the time, as the defendant admitted in her testimony. He testified that he did not see the dog before the dog attacked him from behind. It is reasonable to infer that he did not know the dog was nearby and therefore that he was not teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog at the time.

The question is to what extent the plaintiff's testimony is credible. No other witness testified to having observed the defendant's dog attack the plaintiff at any time. The plaintiff originally testified that "we were outside . . . we were cleaning, throwing stuff away" when Aiden bit his leg from behind, but he did not identify what other persons were present. Later he claimed that the defendant's nephew was with him and witnessed the attack. Still later he claimed that the defendant was present and saw the attack. The defendant denied that she ever saw her dog

attack the plaintiff, and neither party called the defendant's nephew to testify.

The plaintiff testified that all of the alleged bites occurred in December of 2019. In support of his testimony, the plaintiff introduced two medical records and several photographs of the wounds that he said were caused by Aiden. The first medical record documented his visit to an urgent care center<sup>4</sup> in Massachusetts on December 12, 2019. The plaintiff told the urgent care provider that his landlord's dog had bitten him three times in three weeks. He said that the first bite was a bite to his left arm that occurred about three weeks before his urgent care visit. A date three weeks earlier than December 12 would have been around November 21, before the plaintiff claimed to be living at the defendant's property. The plaintiff told the medical provider that the bite to his left leg occurred about ten days before his urgent care visit. A date ten days earlier than the urgent care visit would have been around December 2. He said that the third bite, again to his left arm, occurred the day before his visit, December 11.<sup>5</sup> The provider noted the presence of two puncture wounds with a semicircular pattern of lesions on the plaintiff's left lower leg, as

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<sup>4</sup> The medical record does not give the name or address of the urgent care center. Even the patient's name appears to be redacted on the first page. The second page does refer to the patient as Miguel Morales, the plaintiff's name.

<sup>5</sup> The medical record of the December 12, 2019, urgent care visit states as follows: "The patient reports he has been bitten by his landlord's dog 3 times in the past 3 weeks. He has been bitten twice on the LUE [left upper extremity] and LLE [left lower extremity]. Most recently he was bitten yesterday, on his LUE for the second time. The first bite to his LUE occurred about 3 weeks ago and the bite to his LLE occurred about 10 days ago. All the lesions are healing well."

well as other lesions on his left arm.<sup>6</sup> He noted that all the lesions were healing well.

At trial, the plaintiff focused on the bite to his lower leg, the only injury that he claimed was still causing pain. With respect to the bite to the leg, there were inconsistencies both within the plaintiff's testimony and between the plaintiff's testimony and the medical records he introduced. Some of the inconsistencies concern whether the plaintiff sought medical care the day after he was bitten on the leg. The earliest recorded report of the dog bite to the plaintiff's leg is found in the urgent care record of December 12, 2019, when the plaintiff reportedly told the urgent care provider that he had been bitten on the leg by his landlord's dog about ten days earlier. His initial testimony was fairly consistent with that record; he testified that he did not go to the urgent care center for "a couple of days, a week or so" after the bite to his lower leg. He explained that "I went to see my lawyer first and he told me . . . you gotta go to court, then he referred you to me." His trial counsel asked him a second time if he sought medical attention the day after the bite to his lower leg. He again said, "No, I didn't cause I was disappointed. . . . I had no place to move or nothing, so I was trying to be playing my cards right." His counsel appeared to be dissatisfied with that testimony and continued to question him about the timing of the medical visit in relation to the bite to his leg. Under this repeated questioning, the plaintiff finally changed his testimony and agreed with his counsel that the bite to his lower leg occurred on December 11, 2019, the day before he went to the urgent care center. Nevertheless, he later

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<sup>6</sup> A "lesion" is simply "a wound or injury." Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 26th ed., Williams & Wilkins 1995, p. 955.

testified with apparent confidence that the bite to his leg occurred on a Saturday or Sunday. In 2019, however, December 11 was a Wednesday. His testimony that the bite to his leg occurred on December 11 was not consistent with the medical record or his own spontaneous recollection. The fact that he was led by his counsel to testify contrary to his own recollection on this issue raises questions about the general reliability of his testimony.

The second medical record, dated January 8, 2021, contained two significant inconsistencies with both the plaintiff's testimony and the 2019 urgent care record. The plaintiff told his medical provider in Florida that he had been bitten on his lower leg by a "pit bull mix" in Massachusetts about a year earlier. At trial, however, the plaintiff denied knowing Aiden's breed, except that he was a "full breed dog," and he claimed that the bite occurred on the defendant's property, which is in Connecticut.

In addition to statements to the medical providers, the plaintiff talked with Gaunt about the bite to his leg. Gaunt testified that the plaintiff told him that the defendant's dog had bitten him. According to Gaunt, the plaintiff said it was "no big deal." He said he planned to go to a MedExpress office and tell them that it happened somewhere at a random address in Chicopee, Massachusetts. Despite what the plaintiff reportedly told Gaunt about his intention,<sup>7</sup> the plaintiff

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<sup>7</sup> Gaunt's testimony about when the plaintiff told him about the alleged bite was internally inconsistent. He first said that he learned about the alleged bite some time after the plaintiff took time from work to go to the urgent care center, but then later testified that the plaintiff told him about the bite before he went to the urgent care center. He did admit that the plaintiff told him that the defendant's dog had bitten him.



told the urgent care provider in Massachusetts that he was bitten by his landlord's dog. More than a year later, however, the plaintiff told his medical provider in Florida that he had been bitten on the leg by a dog in Massachusetts.

Considering all of the evidence in light of the applicable standard of proof, and taking into account the various inconsistencies in testimony, the court finds that a fair preponderance of the evidence establishes that the defendant's dog bit the plaintiff on the lower part of the plaintiff's left leg on a Saturday or Sunday early in December, 2019.<sup>8</sup> The plaintiff's initial trial testimony in 2024 was consistent with his statement at the urgent care center on December 12, 2019, the earliest recorded report of the incident. The urgent care provider there noted healing puncture wounds on his lower leg. His observation was consistent with the plaintiff's statement that it had happened about ten days earlier. Some of the photographs submitted into evidence also depict what appear to be healing puncture wounds on the plaintiff's lower leg. Although the

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<sup>8</sup> The complaint alleges that a single attack by Aiden occurred on or about December 11, 2019, but the weight of the credible evidence indicates that the bite to the plaintiff's leg occurred on December 2 or 3, a Saturday or Sunday about ten days before the plaintiff's urgent care visit on December 12, 2019. "[A] plaintiff's recovery is limited to the allegations made in the complaint." *A.V. Giordano Co., Inc. v. American Diamond Exchange, Inc.*, 31 Conn. App. 163, 166, 623 A.2d 1048 (1993). The court has considered whether the difference in the dates is a material variance between pleading and proof. "A variance is a departure of the proof from the facts as alleged. Not every variance, however, is a fatal one since immaterial variances are disregarded under our practice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.*, 166-67. A variance is material if the defendant is prejudiced in maintaining a defense. *Id.*, 167. The defendant here did not raise the issue of the variance in dates or claim any prejudice relating thereto. In a similar case of a minor variance between pleading and proof of dates that a claim occurred, the Appellate Court concluded that the variance was immaterial. *Id.*, 169. The court concludes that the variance in this case is not so significant as to defeat the plaintiff's claim entirely.

plaintiff's statement to a health care provider in January, 2021, that he had been bitten by a pit bull mix in Massachusetts is a troubling inconsistency, on balance, it does not outweigh the other evidence. Both statements are understandable as simple mistakes, given the plaintiff's testimony that he did not know the dog's breed and that the defendant lived at the Massachusetts border.

As to whether the plaintiff was teasing, tormenting or abusing Aiden at the time of the incident, the plaintiff testified that Aiden came from behind him and bit him, suggesting that he was unaware of the dog's presence until he was bitten. The position of the puncture wounds on the back of the plaintiff's leg appears to support his testimony that he was attacked from behind. No other witness admitted observing the attack, leaving the plaintiff's testimony uncontradicted.

Gaunt testified that on other occasions the plaintiff had made threatening statements about the dog, saying that he was going to teach the dog a lesson; that he was going to cram his fist down the dog's throat; that he knew how to "discipline" a dog; and that in the past he had hit dogs with baseball bats. Gaunt also testified that he had seen the plaintiff try to provoke Aiden on at least one occasion when Gaunt came to pick the plaintiff up at the defendant's house.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Gaunt described the incident as follows: "We were all in the kitchen. I was picking him up one morning for work and Mr. Morales says, look, Eddie, Aiden's good, he's good now, he's nice, I can go in his face, I can kiss his face and I can pet his back and, ugggghhh, I love Aiden, he's a nice dog, and he's shaking him, he's a nice boy, he won't do anything, he was holding him tight. So yes, that's what I did see. I can't recall the day exactly but it was before he claims he got bit by the dog, so it had to be close to first week he's there." The conduct Gaunt described — that the plaintiff was holding the dog tightly, shaking him, and getting right in the dog's face — could be described as teasing a dog he had already been warned not to provoke. Nevertheless, the dog did not bite the plaintiff on that occasion.

Although Gaunt's description of the plaintiff's aggressive conduct toward the dog on that occasion was credible, the plaintiff was not bitten at that time. There was no evidence to counter the plaintiff's testimony that the dog was behind him when it bit the back of his leg.

The court is not persuaded by the plaintiff's minimal testimony concerning the other two alleged bites. The plaintiff testified, and other witnesses agreed, that the plaintiff stayed on the plaintiff's premises for four or five weeks, mostly in December, 2019, and possibly briefly into January, 2020. According to the plaintiff's statement to the urgent care provider, the first alleged bite occurred three weeks before December 12, which would have been around November 21, before the plaintiff began to stay at the defendant's property. The plaintiff's testimony about that alleged incident was very brief. He said it occurred in the living room, that "she was there," presumably meaning the defendant, and that the dog just "launched" at him and bit him. The defendant denied ever seeing her dog attack the plaintiff. The photograph of the alleged injury depicts a nearly healed scratch. While the injury might have been caused by a dog's teeth, the wound was not distinctive and there is only the plaintiff's testimony to say it was caused by a dog. As to the alleged third bite, said to have occurred on December 11, 2019, the plaintiff provided no details that would allow the court to make any inference about where or how the alleged bite occurred. The plaintiff's evidence does not persuade the court that the plaintiff has proved all the requisite elements under § 22-357 (b) as to bites other than the bite to his left lower leg.

The plaintiff has met his burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he was injured when the defendant's dog bit his leg; that he was not trespassing or committing a tort at the time; and that he was not teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog at the time of the dog's attack. The defendant is liable to the plaintiff under § 22-357 (b).

The final question is what amount will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injury inflicted by the defendant's dog. The plaintiff presented no evidence of economic damages. Although he introduced two medical records, he did not introduce any medical bills or even testify about his medical expenses. No economic damages are awarded.

The plaintiff is entitled to compensation for noneconomic damages such as pain, suffering, and scarring. The court is not persuaded by the plaintiff's testimony that he suffered severe pain in his leg constantly for the first two years and continues to experience pain, although less frequently and less severely, to the present day. The plaintiff did not seek medical care for the bite to his lower leg until some ten days after it happened, and by that time the provider noted that the wounds were healing well. Contrary to the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff did not receive stitches or hospital care. The only treatment recommendation in December, 2019, was to take naproxen tablets twice daily for a week. On his external examination, the provider noted "no edema, ROM intact. Ambulates independently, gait steady."<sup>10</sup> At the January 8, 2021,

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<sup>10</sup> The provider also noted "TTP of the left gastrocnemius and skin overlaying achilles tendon," but no explanation was provided for the abbreviation TTP or its significance. In the absence of information about the significance of the note, the court gives it no weight.

medical visit, the provider noted the presence of scars on the plaintiff's lower left leg but observed "no acute abnormalities." At that visit, the plaintiff had complained of leg pain, foot pain, gait abnormality and swelling, but the provider's notes do not report any observed gait abnormality or swelling. The provider ordered the X-rays the plaintiff requested, but there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever followed through in obtaining the X-rays.

The plaintiff testified that a medical provider in Florida had told him to get treatment for "muscle spasm stuff" in his leg, but he did not do it. The medical record he provided does not contain any mention of muscle spasms. In response to a leading question from his counsel, he agreed that a Florida provider told him he might have some permanent nerve damage. The court gives no weight to that testimony because it was speculative hearsay that was not corroborated by any medical record submitted into evidence.

The plaintiff said that he failed to follow up on medical recommendations because the COVID-19 pandemic had shut everything down. That claim might have been credible if not for the fact that the medical record from January 8, 2021, clearly indicates that the plaintiff had been seeing medical providers for a number of health issues during 2020. Indeed, the plaintiff testified that he had hemorrhoid surgery and other issues going on at the same time. The January 8, 2021, medical record indicates that he was already being evaluated and treated by a neurologist for persistent headaches and memory loss, and he had other conditions that were under diagnostic investigation.

It is noteworthy that both of the medical visits associated with the bite were made in anticipation of this litigation. When asked by his counsel if he recalled the day he went to the urgent care center, the plaintiff replied: "I can't recall it but it was a couple days later, a week or so. I went to see my lawyer first and he told me, you know, honestly, my lawyer told me -- I -- he told me you gotta go to court, then he referred you to me." Similarly, the January 8, 2021, medical record reports: "Patient also notes he would like to get attorneys involved in his case - he would like to press charges on the dog owner." Based on the plaintiff's delay in seeking medical care, his express purpose of taking the defendant to court, and his failure to follow up on medical recommendations, the court infers that the plaintiff was more concerned to make a record for a lawsuit than to obtain medical treatment.

While the bite was likely painful initially, it was healing well ten days later. It did leave scars on the plaintiff's lower leg, but the scars are in an inconspicuous location and are not disfiguring. The court finds that \$2,000 will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the pain he experienced, and \$500 will reasonably compensate him for the scarring. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of \$2,500.00 on the first count of the complaint.

#### Second Count: Negligence

"In a negligence action, the plaintiff must meet all of the essential elements of the tort in order to prevail. These elements are: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Aviles v. Barnhill*, 217 Conn. App. 435, 444, 289 A.3d 224 (2023). “If a plaintiff cannot prove all of those elements, the cause of action fails.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Angiolillo v. Buckmiller*, 102 Conn. App. 697, 711, 927 A.2d 312, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 927, 934 A.2d 243 (2007).

“Under the common law of this state, it has been held that liability for injuries committed by a vicious animal is grounded in negligence. . . . It is the duty of the owner of such an animal, having knowledge of its vicious propensities, to give notice of the propensities or to restrain the animal, and that failure to do so is negligence that makes the owner liable for its consequences.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Mann v. Regan*, 108 Conn. App. 566, 579, 948 A.2d 1075 (2008). “The plaintiff must prove that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner or keeper had knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.*, 579-80.

Under our common law, a “vicious propensity” is “any propensity on the part of a dog that is likely to cause injury under the circumstances.” *Mann v. Regan*, *supra*, 108 Conn. App. 580. A “dangerous” propensity is a characteristic of a dog that demonstrates a tendency or inclination to cause harm to a person. See *id.*

In this case, there was sufficient evidence to establish that Aiden was a dog with a dangerous propensity. Gaunt testified that he had cautioned the plaintiff to stay away from Aiden because Aiden had a tendency to nip at people. Although Gaunt testified that he had never seen

Aiden engage in the kind of attack the plaintiff described, the dog’s tendency to nip carried the potential for injury. The defendant denied knowing that Aiden had a tendency to nip at people, but she admitted that he was “protective” of her and that she would take care to restrain or muzzle him when anyone coming on her property asked her to do so. She testified that when someone came to repair or deliver something, she would either shut Aiden in her room or would put a muzzle on him. This is sufficient evidence to establish that she was aware that Aiden had tendencies that could cause harm to an individual if he were not restrained in certain circumstances.

Where the plaintiff’s negligence case falls short is in the proof of a breach of the plaintiff’s duty. The fact that Aiden was outside on the defendant’s property is not sufficient, standing alone, to prove a breach of the duty. There was no credible evidence that the defendant was aware that the plaintiff was outside on her property — or indeed, that the defendant was even at home — when Aiden bit the plaintiff.<sup>11</sup> Three other adults (the defendant’s daughters and nephew) lived on the property. There was no evidence as to how Aiden got outside. Without such evidence, it is not proven that the defendant breached her duty to the plaintiff. See *DeOlivera v. Galbraith*, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Docket No. TTD-CV22-6024104-S, 2024 WL 164918 (Jan. 11, 2024, *Sheridan, J.*). In *DeOlivera*, the court held that the

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<sup>11</sup> On cross examination by the defendant, the plaintiff testified that the defendant was present when Aiden attacked the plaintiff. The defendant denied it and each party accused the other of lying. The court could not discern which party’s recollection and testimony was true.




defendant, who was found to be liable under § 22-357 for a bite to a child visiting her home, was nevertheless not liable in negligence for the same incident because the evidence was unclear as to who opened the door that allowed the dog to come into contact with the plaintiff. The same principle applies here.

#### Conclusion

For all the reasons stated above, the court finds for the plaintiff and against the defendant on the first count of the plaintiff's complaint. The court finds that \$2,500.00 will fairly compensate the plaintiff for his injury. The court finds for the defendant and against the plaintiff on the second count of the complaint. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of \$2,500.00. No costs shall be taxed to either party.

BY THE COURT,



Sheila A. Huddleston  
Judge Trial Referee

## Checklist for Clerk

**Docket Number:**

HHD CV22-6150602

**Case Name:** Morales v. Goode

**Memorandum of Decision dated:** 6/10/2024

**File Sealed:** Yes No X

**Memo Sealed:** Yes No X

**This Memorandum of Decision may be released to the Reporter of Judicial Decisions for Publication XXXX**

**This Memorandum of Decision may NOT be released to the Reporter of Judicial Decisions for Publication**

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# State of Connecticut Judicial Branch Superior Court Case Look-up



Superior Court Case Look-up  
Civil/Family  
Housing  
Small Claims

[e](#) HHD-CV22-6150602-S

MORALES, MIGUEL v. GOODE, SHARON

Prefix: HD6

Case Type: T61

File Date: 12/21/2021

Return Date: 01/11/2022

[Case Detail](#) | [Notices](#) | [History](#) | [Scheduled Court Dates](#) | [E-Services Login](#) | [Screen Section Help](#) | [Exhibits](#)

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Attorney/Firm Juris Number Look-up

Case Look-up

By Party Name

By Docket Number

By Attorney/Firm Juris Number

By Property Address

Information Updated as of: 06/10/2024

### Case Information

Case Type: T61 - Torts - Animals - Dog

Court Location: HARTFORD JD

List Type: No List Type

Trial List Claim:

Last Action Date: 02/21/2024 (The "last action date" is the date the information was entered in the system)

Short Calendar Look-up

By Court Location

By Attorney/Firm Juris Number

Motion to Seal or Close

Calendar Notices

Court Events Look-up

By Date

By Docket Number

By Attorney/Firm Juris Number

### Disposition Information

Disposition Date:

Disposition:

Judge or Magistrate:

Legal Notices

Pending Foreclosure Sales

Understanding

Display of Case Information

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### Party & Appearance Information

Party

No Fee Party

Category

P-01 MIGUEL MORALES

Attorney: [e](#) LAWYER A TWILLIE II (436395)  
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SUITE 302  
BLOOMFIELD, CT 06002

File Date: 12/21/2021

Plaintiff

D-01 SHARON GOODE

Self-Rep: 1837 MAPLETON AVE  
SUFFIELD, CT 06078

File Date: 01/10/2022

Defendant



Comments

### Viewing Documents on Civil, Housing and Small Claims Cases:

If there is an [e](#) in front of the docket number at the top of this page, then the file is electronic (paperless).

- Documents, court orders and judicial notices in electronic (paperless) civil, housing and small claims cases with a return date on or after January 1, 2014 are available publicly over the internet.\* For more information on what you can view in all cases, view the [Electronic Access to Court Documents Quick Card](#).
- For civil cases filed prior to 2014, court orders and judicial notices that are electronic are available publicly over the internet. Orders can be viewed by selecting the link to the order from the list below. Notices can be viewed by clicking the **Notices** tab above and selecting the link.\*
- Documents, court orders and judicial notices in an electronic (paperless) file can be viewed at any judicial district courthouse during normal business hours.
- Pleadings or other documents that are not electronic (paperless) can be viewed only during normal business hours at the Clerk's Office in the Judicial District where the case is located.\*
- An Affidavit of Debt is not available publicly over the internet on small claims cases filed before October 16, 2017.\*

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