AC45710 - State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton (“On appeal, the defendant raises a number of claims, which we distill to the following: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction over the verified petition filed by Jeremiah Dunn, the chief animal control officer of the plaintiff, to vest temporary custody of the goats with the department, (2) the court improperly denied her motion to suppress, which attacked the process by which the warrant to search her property and seize the goats was issued pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (b), (3) she was ‘‘denied due process when she was not allowed to present [her] motion to suppress for adjudication,’’ (4) she was entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-341, (5) the court improperly determined that the goats were subjected to neglect and cruel treatment, (6) the court improperly determined that the defendant failed to comply with its order to relinquish ownership of the goats by April 16, 2021, or pay a surety or cash bond in the amount of $32,000 by that date, (7) § 22-329a is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case, and (8) the court improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim on the ground that the claims raised in the counterclaim were barred by either sovereign immunity or the prior pending action doctrine. We affirm the judgments of the court.”)

AC46414 - State v. Pringle (Practice Book § 43-22 motion to correct an illegal sentence; assault 1^st degree, promoting prostitution 2^nd degree; possession of narcotics with intent to sell; sale of narcotics; tampering with witness; Alford Doctrine; “On appeal, he makes several arguments supporting his claim that the court improperly denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We dismiss the appeal as moot.”)

AC46657 - State v. Bryan (Practice Book § 43-22 motion to correct an illegal sentence; persistent dangerous felony offender; “The defendant first claims that the court erred in denying his motion because his guilty plea to being a persistent dangerous felony offender pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-402 was defective or, in the alternative, that the court should have dismissed his motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than denying it on the merits. Second, the defendant claims, for the first time on appeal, that the sentencing court improperly failed to specify which portion of his sentence was attributable to the enhancement imposed pursuant to § 53a-40. With respect to the first claim, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s claim and, accordingly, that the court should have dismissed the motion to correct. We further conclude that the defendant is not entitled to review of his unpreserved second claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with direction to dismiss the defendant’s motion to correct.”)