AC45845 - Northeast Building Supply, LLC v. Morrill ("The plaintiff, Northeast Building Supply, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying the application for a prejudgment remedy that it filed in accordance with General Statutes § 52-278a et seq. against the defendants, Maureen Morrill, Clifford Jones, Pullman & Comley, LLC, Attorney Irve Goldman, Attorney Bruce Diamond, and the Law Office of Bruce W. Diamond, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying its application for a prejudgment remedy when it concluded that (1) collateral estoppel barred the vexatious litigation claims it sought to bring against the defendants and (2) the attorney and law firm defendants—Pullman & Comley, LLC, Goldman, Diamond, and the Law Office of Bruce W. Diamond, LLC—had adequate insurance to secure any judgment that might be rendered against them.

The defendants argue that the court properly denied the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy. They also, for the first time on appeal, raise a jurisdictional claim. They claim that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the vexatious litigation claims against the defendants because those claims were assigned to the plaintiff from a different entity, Northeast Builders Supply & Home Centers, LLC (Home Centers).The defendants argue that the plaintiff's vexatious litigation claims constitute tort claims that involve alleged personal injuries unique to Home Centers. They further contend that Connecticut law makes clear that such tort claims may not be assigned. Consequently, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue its application for a prejudgment remedy.

For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendants that the plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the application for a prejudgment remedy and, consequently, that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to render judgment dismissing the plaintiff's application.")