The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.

Habeas Supreme Court Opinions

by Townsend, Karen

 

SC20137 - Henning v. Commissioner of Correction (Two habeas petitions; “The second habeas petition, which is the subject of this appeal, alleges, among other things, that the state deprived the petitioner of his due process right to a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which require the state to correct any testimony by a state’s witness when the state knew or should have known that that testimony was materially false or misleading. More specifically, the petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated by virtue of the state’s failure to correct the trial testimony of the then director of the state police forensic laboratory, Henry C. Lee, that a red substance on a towel found in the victim’s home had tested positive for blood when, in fact, no such test had been conducted, and, further, a test of the substance conducted in connection with the present case proved negative for blood. The habeas court, Sferrazza, J., rejected all of the petitioner’s claims, including his claim concerning Lee’s testimony about the towel, and this appeal followed. We agree with the petitioner that, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, he is entitled to a new trial due to the state’s failure to alert the trial court and the petitioner that Lee’s testimony was incorrect, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”) See also, Henning v. State below.

SC20139 - Henning v. State ("On appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, the petitioner claims that the habeas court incorrectly determined that the newly discovered DNA evidence does not warrant a new trial…the petitioner claims that the three year limitation period of § 52-582 (a) simply does not apply to a petition, like the present one, in which there is newly discovered DNA evidence…In a separate opinion issued today, we have concluded, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus granting him a new trial because the state deprived him of a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)... Because our opinion in that case awarding the petitioner a new trial renders moot the petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, we must dismiss the present appeal.”)

SC20136 - Birch v. Commissioner of Correction (“The second petition, which is the subject of this appeal, alleged, among other things, that the state deprived the petitioner of a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which require the state to correct any testimony that it knows or should know is materially false or misleading. More specifically, the petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated because the assistant state’s attorney (prosecutor) failed to correct certain testimony of the then director of the state police forensic laboratory, Henry C. Lee, concerning a red substance on a towel found in the victim’s home that, according to Lee, had tested positive for blood. In fact, no such test had been conducted, and, moreover, a test of the substance that was done for purposes of the present case proved negative for blood. The habeas court, Sferrazza, J., rejected all of the petitioner’s claims, including his claim with respect to Lee’s testimony about the towel, and this appeal followed. Because we agree with the petitioner that, contrary to the conclusion of the habeas court, he is entitled to a new trial due to the state’s failure to alert the trial court and the petitioner that Lee’s testimony was incorrect, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.”) See also, Birch v. State below.

SC20138 - Birch v. State (“On appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, the petitioner claims that the habeas court incorrectly determined that the newly discovered DNA evidence does not warrant a new trial. The petitioner further claims that this court, in determining whether a new trial is likely to result in a different outcome, should consider the original trial evidence together with all exculpatory evidence, even evidence that would not otherwise support a petition for a new trial because it was discovered by the petitioner after the three year limitation period for filing such a petition had expired…In a separate opinion issued today, we have concluded, contrary to the determination of the habeas court, that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus granting him a new trial because the state deprived him of a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)... Because our opinion in that case awarding the petitioner a new trial renders moot the petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his petition for a new trial, we must dismiss the present appeal.”)

SC20179 - Griffin v. Commissioner of Correction (Public Act 15-183; transfer to criminal docket from juvenile docket; Public Act 15-84; eligibility for parole; evolution of ‘standards of decency’ for punishments for children; “The issue presented in this appeal is whether the transfer of a fourteen year old defendant’s case to the regular criminal docket and his subsequent sentence of forty years imprisonment violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment enshrined in the dual due process provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article first, §§ 8 and 9… We agree that recent statutory changes to the juvenile justice system—which significantly limit, but do not entirely prohibit, the transfer of a fourteen year old defendant’s case to the regular criminal docket—do not evidence a change in contemporary standards of decency for purposes of the constitutional claim raised by the petitioner in the present case. We also conclude that, because the petitioner is eligible for parole pursuant to P.A. 15-84, his forty year sentence complies with established constitutional safe-guards. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.”)