SC21078, SC21079 - In re Andrew C. ("Under General Statutes § 52-212a, courts lack the power to open a judgment unless a
motion to open is filed within four months of the date
that notice of the judgment was issued. One exception
to this rule is when the trial court’s lack of subject
matter jurisdiction was entirely obvious at the time of
the judgment. See, e.g., Schoenhorn v. Moss, 347 Conn.
501, 515, 298 A.3d 236 (2023). The dispositive issue in
these certified appeals is whether the Appellate Court
correctly determined that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to grant a motion by foster parents
for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase
of a neglect proceeding. In 2023, the respondent father,
Chester C. (respondent), filed a motion to open and
vacate a 2021 judgment transferring guardianship of
his minor son, Andrew C. (Andrew), to the intervening
foster parents, Morgan A. and Alberto A. The motion
was filed on the basis of In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App.
507, 299 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d
1166 (2023), in which the Appellate Court held that
General Statutes § 46b-129 (p) prohibits foster parents
from intervening in such proceedings. Id., 525–26. The
trial court granted the respondent’s motion and vacated
the judgment transferring guardianship. The court reasoned that, because the foster parents were statutorily
prohibited from intervening, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant their motion to intervene, and, therefore, the resulting judgment transferring guardianship
of Andrew to them was void ab initio. The Appellate
Court upheld the trial court’s decision on the respondent’s motion; In re Andrew C., 229 Conn. App. 51, 71,
326 A.3d 575 (2024); and we granted Andrew’s and the
foster parents’ separate petitions for certification to
appeal. While their appeals were pending, this court decided In re Jewelyette M., 351 Conn. 511, 332 A3d
207 (2025), which overruled In re Ryan C., concluding
that ‘‘the legislature did not intend § 46b-129 (p) to
prohibit a trial court from granting permissive intervention to a foster parent when appropriate.’’ Id., 515. Our
decision in In re Jewelyette M., which held that § 46b-129 (p) does not limit the trial court’s authority to permit
a foster parent to intervene in accordance with Practice
Book § 35a-4 (c); id., 535; controls the outcome of these
appeals, and, accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court’s
judgment.")
AC47971 - In re J. D. ("The respondent mother, A. T., appeals from
the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
terminating her parental rights and denying her motion
for posttermination visitation rights with respect to her
daughter, J. On appeal, the respondent claims that she
did not receive effective assistance of counsel in opposing the petition to terminate her parental rights because
her trial counsel did not present the testimony of Ralph
Balducci, a psychologist, who had evaluated the respondent in January, 2023. We conclude that the respondent
has not presented an adequate record by which we can review that claim and, accordingly, affirm the judgment
of the court.")