STATEWIDE
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
Dimitrios Argianas, Complainant vs. Stephen T. Kulig,
Respondent
Grievance
Complaint #02-0971
DECISION
Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35, the
undersigned, duly-appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance
Committee, conducted a hearing at the Superior Court, 80 Washington Street,
Hartford, Connecticut on August 14, 2003.
The hearing addressed the record of the complaint filed on April 9, 2003, and the
probable cause determination rendered by the Windham Judicial District
Grievance Panel on June 23, 2003, finding that
there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Notice of the hearing was mailed to the
Complainant and to the Respondent on July
8, 2003. The Respondent
appeared at the hearing and gave testimony.
The Complainant appeared at the hearing and testified with the
assistance of a Greek interpreter. Robin
Thompson testified on behalf of the Complainant.
This reviewing committee finds the
following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
On or about June
28, 2002, the Complainant retained the Respondent to represent him
in relation to his purchase of Athens Pizza Restaurant, Inc. The Complainant and the Respondent met that
day and reviewed the documents drafted by the seller’s attorney. The Complainant wanted to close quickly and
the Respondent organized the closing for July
3, 2002.
At the July
3, 2002 closing, the Respondent advised the Complainant that he could
operate the business under the seller’s liquor license, which was set to expire
on November 22, 2002. The Complainant asked the Respondent to file
an application for a liquor license on his behalf. At the closing, the lease signed by the
Complainant provided for a start date of August
1, 2002. The Respondent met
with the Complainant on July 26, 2002 to review
documents in relation to the incorporation of the Complainant’s restaurant and
the application for the liquor license.
The Respondent filed the incorporation papers shortly thereafter and
planned on filing the application for the liquor license after the
incorporation was complete to ensure that the license was obtained in the name
of the corporation. The incorporation
was complete in or about August of 2002.
In mid to late August of 2002, the Respondent completed the application
for the liquor license and placed it in an envelope. The Respondent believed at the time that the
application was placed in the outgoing mail.
In or about October of 2002, the
Respondent inquired of the State of Connecticut, Department of
Consumer Protection, Liquor Control Division
as to the status of the Complainant’s application. The Liquor Control Division informed the
Respondent that it never received the application. On December
2, 2002, the Respondent met with the Complainant to prepare a
second application. At approximately the
same time, the Respondent discovered that the original application had not been
mailed as it had fallen behind the shelf that his office uses for outgoing
mail. The Respondent, thereafter, filed
the original application with the Liquor Control Division. On December
6, 2002, the Liquor Control Division telephoned the Complainant and
informed him that his application was incomplete. The Complainant met with the Respondent on December 9, 2002 regarding the
additional information required by the Liquor Control Division. The Complainant brought with him the items
that he received from the Liquor Control Division, which were a placard for the
window and notices for the newspaper.
The Respondent instructed the Complainant what to do with these
items. The Respondent then contacted the
Liquor Control Division to determine what additional information was needed,
and received two lists – one for a temporary license and one for a full
license. Within several days, the
Respondent had all of the items for the temporary license except one – the
assignment of the lease from the seller.
The Respondent, thereafter, drafted the
assignment of the lease, which was dated December
11, 2002. Initially, the
seller’s wife refused to sign the assignment.
The Complainant and his wife signed the assignment on January 14, 2003. The seller and his wife eventually signed it
on January 28, 2003. The Complainant received the executed
assignment the following day.
During the representation, the Respondent
met with the Complainant on or about twelve occasions. The Respondent preferred to meet with the
Complainant in person rather than have discussions over the telephone given the
Complainant’s heavy Greek accent, which made it difficult for the Respondent to
understand him.
This reviewing committee also considered
the following:
The Complainant maintained that the
Respondent did not obtain a food license on the Complainant’s behalf as he
agreed he would. The Complainant also
maintained that he was unable to reach the Respondent by telephone and instead
was only able to communicate with the Respondent at scheduled meetings. Finally, the Complainant testified that the
Liquor Control Division did not grant him a liquor license until February 25, 2003.
The Respondent testified that the
Complainant never asked him to file an application for a food license. As such, he never filed the application. Rather, the Respondent maintained that the
Complainant told the Respondent that he was experienced in business and that he
would take care of the food license. The
Respondent also testified that he was not aware that an assignment of the lease
needed to be completed until the Liquor Control Division demanded a lease in
the corporation’s name. In relation to
the liquor license, the Respondent admitted that mistakes were made. However, he insisted that once he discovered
the mistake, he prepared a new application. Upon receiving two lists of
necessary items from the Liquor Control Division, the Respondent maintained
that he satisfied these lists almost immediately, except for the assignment
that was delayed beyond his control.
This reviewing committee finds the following
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct by clear and convincing
evidence:
By failing to pursue the Complainant’s
application for a liquor license with reasonable diligence, the Respondent
violated Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Obtaining the liquor license was a critical
issue to the Complainant given that the seller’s license was set to expire on November 22, 2002. The Respondent understood the importance of
obtaining the liquor license as he attempted to file this application in a
timely fashion. Inexplicably, the
Respondent did not follow up with the Liquor Control Division in a diligent
manner to secure a status update on the Complainant’s application. The initial delay caused by the application
falling behind the shelf in August of 2002 was an excusable, unfortunate
mistake. However, the delay in the
Respondent’s discovery of this mistake until October of 2002 was inexcusable
given the importance of the liquor license to the Complainant. Moreover, the Respondent’s delay in meeting
with the Complainant until December of 2002 to complete a second application
for the liquor license was likewise inexcusable. By that time, the seller’s license had
already expired and there was no license under which the Complainant could operate
his restaurant. If the Respondent had
followed up sooner with the Liquor Control Division, then the Complainant may
have been able to secure a liquor license before the seller’s license expired
or at least he would have operated the restaurant without a liquor license for
a much shorter time.
We find that the record lacks clear and
convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The
Respondent was competent to represent the Complainant in this matter and
ultimately accomplished the objectives of the representation. In addition, we find the Respondent’s
testimony credible that he was not retained to apply for a food license. We also find credible the Respondent’s
testimony that he met with the Complainant on or about twelve occasions during
the course of the representation and that such meetings were necessary given
that telephone conferences with the Complainant proved difficult because of the
Complainant’s heavy Greek accent.
We are critical of the Respondent’s
conduct in this matter, and note that the Respondent’s professional
disciplinary history contains one reprimand.
Since this reviewing committee finds that the Respondent violated Rule
1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and in consideration of the
Respondent’s professional disciplinary history, we reprimand the Respondent.
____________________________________
Attorney Vincent M. DeAngelo
____________________________________
Attorney Geoffrey Naab
____________________________________
Ms. Johanna Kimball