The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.

Criminal Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

by Booth, George


SC19526 - State v. Swebilius (Possession of child pornography first degree; plea of nolo contendere; certification from Appellate Court; "In State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987), this court held that a criminal statute of limitations will be tolled by the issuance of an arrest warrant within the statutory limitation period, as long as the warrant is executed "without unreasonable delay." Id., 451. The defendant, Jon Swebilius, was charged with possession of child pornography in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-196d (a) and was arrested thirty-two days after the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and thirteen days after the expiration of the applicable five year statute of limitations for that offense. The defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations because, he claimed, the delay in the execution of the warrant was unreasonable. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the delay was reasonable as a matter of law under Crawford and its progeny. State v. Swebilius, 158 Conn. App. 418, 423–28, 119 A.3d 601 (2015). We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following question: "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's decision denying the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to . . . Crawford . . . ?" (Citation omitted.) State v. Swebilius, 318 Conn. 907, 122 A.3d 635 (2015). We conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that a thirty-two day delay in the execution of an arrest warrant, where the warrant was executed after the expiration of the limitation period, is reasonable as a matter of law such that the state was under no obligation to present evidence demonstrating that the delay was not objectively unreasonable and, therefore, excusable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court with direction to remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on whether the delay in the execution of the warrant was reasonable under the circumstances.")

AC37808 - State v. Joseph R. B. (Risk of injury to child; "The defendant, Joseph R. B., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53-21 (a) (1). The defendant claims that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction and (2) certain comments made by the prosecutor violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")