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Legal Malpractice & Attorney Discipline Law

Judicial Branch Now Publishing Headnotes for its Supreme & Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=534

The Judicial Branch has announced that it is now publishing a syllabus (headnote) at the top of each Supreme and Appellate Court opinion:

The Judicial Branch is now posting online headnotes for both Supreme and Appellate Court opinions. These headnotes, which accompany individual Supreme and Appellate Court decisions, include a short summary of the ruling and the procedural history of a case. The Reporter of Judicial Decisions prepares the headnotes, which are not part of the opinion. As such, the opinion alone should be relied upon for the reasoning behind the decision [Emphasis added].

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Legal Malpractice Appellate Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=425

AC38181 - Rendahl v. Peluso (Breach of fiduciary duty; legal malpractice; "The plaintiff, Joy M. Rendahl, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased mother, Frances M. Rendahl, brought this action against the defendants, Frank N. Peluso and his law firm, the Law Offices of Frank N. Peluso, P.C. (collectively, the defendant), to recover damages, inter alia, for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and wilful, wanton, and reckless misconduct based upon the defendant's alleged mishandling of his responsibilities as the executor of and the attorney for the estate. Following an eight day trial and two days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on all counts. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed two motions to set aside the verdict, alleging, in the first motion, that the court erred in declining to accept an earlier verdict by the same jury, assertedly awarding her punitive damages on her claim of breach of fiduciary duty, and requiring the jury, under supplemental instructions, to continue its deliberations and make further factual findings before returning its final verdict; and, in the second motion, that the court erred in refusing to admit certain relevant, material evidence at trial. On June 30, 2015, the trial court, Povodator, J., denied both motions. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff reasserts the claims presented in her motions to set aside the verdict, and seeks reversal of the court's judgment based upon the denial of those motions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Attorney Discipline Supreme Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=420

SC19698 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Elder ("The issue that we must decide in this case is whether the six year limitation period set forth in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) constitutes a mandatory bar to grievance complaints brought after that six year limitation period has expired or whether the provision, instead, is discretionary. On April 4, 2014, Wesley S. Spears filed a grievance complaint against the defendant, Attorney Joseph Elder, alleging that the defendant had engaged in professional misconduct in 2004. A reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee conducted a hearing on the grievance complaint and found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had violated certain of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The reviewing committee also directed the plaintiff, the Disciplinary Counsel, to bring this presentment action against the defendant. After the plaintiff brought this action in 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the action was barred by § 2-32 (a) (2) (E). The trial court concluded that the time limitation set forth in § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is not mandatory and denied the motion to dismiss. After a trial to the court, the trial court concluded that the defendant had violated certain of the Rules of Professional Conduct and ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. The defendant then filed this appeal. We conclude that § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) bars grievance complaints that are not brought within the six year limitation period unless one of the exceptions set forth in § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies. Because none of these exceptions applies in the present case, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss.")


Attorney Discipline Appellate Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=323

AC38387 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Sporn ("The respondent, Judith B. Sporn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court suspending her from the practice of law for violating several Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book § 2-27. She claims on appeal that the court abused its discretion by: (1) granting the motion in limine of the petitioner, Disciplinary Counsel, seeking to preclude proposed expert testimony on the subject of immigration law; and (2) imposing a two year suspension. We affirm the judgment of the court.")


Attorney Discipline Supreme Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=266

SC19535 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff ("In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether an attorney who knowingly appropriated client funds, but did not intend to do so wrongly, 'knowingly misappropriated' those funds and is therefore subject to mandatory disbarment pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47A. The plaintiff, Disciplinary Counsel, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court reprimanding the defendant, Laurence Parnoff, rather than disbarring him pursuant to § 2-47A. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff, 158 Conn. App. 454, 482, 119 A.3d 621 (2015). The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly interpreted § 2-47A to mandate disbarment only if an attorney appropriates client funds knowingly and with the wrongful intent to steal them. Regardless of the defendant's intent, the plaintiff claims, the defendant’s knowledge that the funds he appropriated were disputed is sufficient to disbar him. We conclude that § 2-47A mandates disbarment only when an attorney misappropriates a client’s funds both knowingly and intentionally—that is, when an attorney steals from his or her client. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Legal Malpractice Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=118

SC19495 - Bozelko v. Papastavros (Legal malpractice; breach of fiduciary duty; "This case raises the question of whether a plaintiff's failure to produce expert testimony on the issue of causation is fatal to her claims of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney. The plaintiff, Chandra A. Bozelko, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant, Angelica N. Papastavros.The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment after precluding the plaintiff from presenting expert testimony due to her failure to disclose an expert witness by a date previously ordered.The plaintiff contends, inter alia, that summary judgment was improper because expert testimony was unnecessary to prove her claims of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. ")


Legal Malpractice Appellate Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=66

AC37589 - Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C. ("In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs, Straw Pond Associates, LLC, Straw Pond Real Estate, LLC, Straw Pond Holdings, LLC, and CUDA Associates, LLC, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C. (firm), and Edward G. Fitzpatrick, an attorney in the firm. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment by (1) adjudicating, rather than identifying, issues of fact, (2) concluding that their claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) deciding that there were no issues of fact as to the defendants' alleged breach of fiduciary duty. We agree with the plaintiffs' first two claims and, therefore, reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court.")


Legal Malpractice and Attorney Discipline Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=187

October 2008 - July 2016 (reverse chronological order)

AC37589 - Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C. ("In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs, Straw Pond Associates, LLC, Straw Pond Real Estate, LLC, Straw Pond Holdings, LLC, and CUDA Associates, LLC, appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C. (firm), and Edward G. Fitzpatrick, an attorney in the firm. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment by (1) adjudicating, rather than identifying, issues of fact, (2) concluding that their claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) deciding that there were no issues of fact as to the defendants' alleged breach of fiduciary duty. We agree with the plaintiffs' first two claims and, therefore, reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court.")

AC37319 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams ("The defendant attorney...claims in relevant part that his right to due process was denied when the court failed to provide him with proper notice of a disciplinary hearing and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before rendering a judgment suspending him from the practice of law for twenty days. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new hearing.")

AC37509 - Null v. Jacobs ("This is a legal malpractice and breach of contract action. In a previous action, the defendant...rendered legal services to the plaintiff...which allegedly failed to meet the applicable standard of care. The plaintiff then retained a new attorney both to replace the defendant in the underlying action and to pursue the claims in the present case. During a protracted discovery period in the present case where many discovery related motions were filed, the trial court ordered the plaintiff's counsel to be deposed because his testimony was necessary to explore the plaintiff's malpractice claim. When counsel failed to appear for a deposition, the court found that the plaintiff had violated this order and, pursuant to a motion, rendered a judgment of nonsuit as a discovery sanction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) rendered a judgment of nonsuit as a discovery sanction because, contrary to the court's findings, his counsel exercised due diligence to comply with the court's order and the sanction was not proportional to the violation; and (2) denied his postjudgment motion to reargue. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

SC19475 - Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C. ("The plaintiffs, James T. Costello and Dorothy Costello, proceeding as self-represented parties, brought a legal malpractice action against the defendants, Goldstein and Peck, P.C., William J. Kupinse, Jr., and Andrew M. McPherson. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the action after granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the writ of summons (summons) failed to provide either a recognizance by a third party or a certification of the plaintiffs' financial responsibility as required by General Statutes § 52-185 (a) and Practice Book §§ 8-3 (a) and 8-4 (a). The Appellate Court summarily affirmed the judgment of dismissal; Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C., 155 Conn. App. 905, 109 A.3d 552 (2015); and we granted the plaintiffs' petition for certification to appeal to this court. We conclude that the trial court improperly failed to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to file a bond to avoid dismissal of the action. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment.")

SC19436 - Miller v. Appellate Court ("This case is before us on a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error, Josephine Smalls Miller, who claims that the Appellate Court abused its discretion in suspending her from the practice of law before that court for a period of six months, in addition to imposing other sanctions, due to her failure to comply with Appellate Court rules and deadlines, and for filing a frivolous appeal. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the writ of error.")

AC37728 - Rousseau v. Statewide Grievance Committee ("The plaintiff, Robert Rousseau, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his action for lack of standing. The dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff had standing to pursue that action. We conclude that he did not, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.")

AC36489 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Serafinowicz ("In this presentment filed by the plaintiff...alleging misconduct by the defendant...the defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for violating rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct as a result of having made statements of fact known to be false, or with reckless disregard for the truth, concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge and for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it suspended him from the practice of law for a period of 120 days for his admitted conduct; and (2) he was disciplined for protected speech in violation of the first amendment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36575 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans ("In this presentment filed by the plaintiff, disciplinary counsel, alleging misconduct by the defendant...a suspended attorney acting as a self-represented party, the defendant appeals following the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for reinstatement to the practice of law. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motions to vacate an agreement that he had entered into with disciplinary counsel to resolve the presentment, (2) ordered, pursuant to the parties' agreement, that he disclose unredacted documents for an audit of his IOLTA account, (3) suspended him from the practice of law, and (4) denied his motion for reinstatement to the practice of law. We affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC36319 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff (Attorney presentment; "In this attorney presentment proceeding brought pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47, the plaintiff, Disciplinary Counsel, appeals from the judgment of the trial court reprimanding the defendant, Laurence Parnoff, for violating rule 1.15 (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Disciplinary Counsel claims that the court (1) applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that the defendant had not knowingly misappropriated his client's funds and, thus, was not subject to mandatory disbarment in accordance with Practice Book § 2-47A; (2) made several clearly erroneous factual findings; and (3) abused its discretion by deciding not to impose sanctions beyond a reprimand. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36886 - Rozbicki v. Statewide Grievance Committee ("The plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, his appeal from a decision of the defendant, Statewide Grievance Committee. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36463 - Lukas v. McCoy ("The plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court after it denied his motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. The plaintiff filed these motions after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant Jason L. McCoy, doing business as the Law Offices of Jason L. McCoy, on the plaintiff's claim of legal malpractice. The plaintiff brought this legal malpractice action against the defendant, his former attorney, after his chapter 13 bankruptcy petition (petition) was dismissed by the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by denying his motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, (2) erred in submitting the question of confirmability to the jury, and (3) failed to instruct the jury on the applicable bankruptcy statute. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36330 Bozelko v. Papastavros ("In this legal malpractice action, the self-represented plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred when it (1) concluded that the allegations in the complaint did not state a claim falling within the gross negligence exception to the expert witness testimony requirement for legal malpractice claims; (2) concluded that the defendant’s affidavit presented evidence of undisputed material fact; and (3) did not adjudicate the plaintiff’s two requests for adjudication of discovery disputes in a timely manner. In addition, the plaintiff claims that requiring her—an indigent party—to retain an expert witness in order to adjudicate her claim of legal malpractice violated her right to due process. We are not persuaded by these claims and affirm the judgment of the court.")

AC35793 - Smigelski v. Dubois ("The petitioner, Jacek I. Smigelski, an attorney formerly licensed to practice law in the state of Connecticut, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the respondent, Mark A. Dubois, chief disciplinary counsel, on the petitioner's petition for a new trial. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court improperly determined that, as a matter of law, the petitioner was not entitled to a new trial because (1) there was no newly discovered evidence upon which the petitioner could base his claim; (2) the trial court did not render its judgment on the basis of fraud; and (3) the petitioner's right to due process of law had not been violated. The petitioner also argues that should a new trial be ordered, he is entitled to vacatur of several Superior Court and Appellate Court judgments related to this action that previously were rendered against him. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35867 - Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Zelotes ("In this presentment filed by the plaintiff...alleging misconduct by the defendant... the defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court concluding that he violated rules 1.7 (a) (2) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (rule), and ordering that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five months. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court's findings and the record evidence are inadequate to establish a concurrent conflict under rule 1.7 (a) (2); (2) the court erred in finding that he violated rule 8.4 (4); (3) he was denied due process of law because he did not have fair notice that his conduct could be considered professional misconduct; and (4) the court denied him the benefit of his affirmative defenses. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35861 - Song v. Collins ("In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to set aside the verdict in favor of the defendant.... On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied her motion to set aside the verdict. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35820, AC35821 - Baruno v. Slane ("This legal malpractice action was brought by the plaintiffs...against the defendants...for Slane's alleged deficient representation of the plaintiffs in an action against the plaintiffs' neighbors.... The plaintiffs and the defendants now appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found the defendants liable and awarded the plaintiffs $620,817 in damages. In AC 35820, the plaintiffs claim that the court should have awarded civil contempt damages, prejudgment interest, legal fees, and costs as additional damages proximately caused by the defendants' malpractice. In AC 35821, the defendants claim that the court (1) improperly concluded that their conduct was a proximate cause of the damages awarded by the court, (2) improperly awarded damages for both the diminution in value of the plaintiffs' property and the cost to remediate it, and (3) made an improper evidentiary ruling. We conclude that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the damages awarded by the court were proximately caused by the defendants' legal malpractice, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC35633 - Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki ("In this presentment filed by the plaintiff...alleging misconduct by the defendant...the defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court concluding that he violated various rules of professional conduct in the course of his administration of the estate of Kathleen Gisselbrecht (decedent), and ordering, inter alia, that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the Statewide Grievance Committee (grievance committee) failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and thus the plaintiff lacked standing to bring, and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear, this presentment; (2) the court erred in failing to permit him to introduce evidence concerning his claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel (preclusion claims) at trial on the ground that the court had already ruled on those issues on his earlier motion for summary judgment; (3) the court deprived him of his constitutional right to due process when it denied all of his requests for discovery; (4) the trial judge did not have authority, as a judge trial referee, to preside over a presentment; and (5) the court abused its discretion in ordering his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.")

AC35736 Disciplinary Counsel v. Snaider ("The defendant...formerly of the Connecticut bar, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after the court accepted his resignation from the bar and imposed discipline pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47 (d). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court’s acceptance of his resignation constituted a final judgment and therefore the court (a) had no authority to impose discipline on him, and thereby (b) denied him due process of law, and (2) the court imposed discipline that is unfair and unreasonable given his age, namely, seventy-five years old. We disagree with the defendant and, thus, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC19192 - State Grievance Committee v. Ganim ("This case addresses the limits of the deference that should be afforded to a local standing committee of the state bar when that committee recommends that an individual, who recently has been released from prison after serving a lengthy term for multiple federal felonies that he committed while holding public office, should be reinstated to the bar and, therefore, entrusted again with the privilege of practicing law. The defendant...was suspended from the practice of law upon presentment by the plaintiff...as a result of his conviction of sixteen federal felony offenses stemming from actions he took while he was the mayor of Bridgeport, the state's largest city. Soon after his release from prison, he applied for reinstatement to the bar. Although a local standing committee that investigated the defendant's application recommended that he be reinstated, the trial court rejected that recommendation and denied the defendant's application. The defendant appeals from the trial court's judgment, claiming that the court improperly failed to defer to the standing committee's recommendation that he be reinstated and, relatedly, that the court misinterpreted that committee's report, committed legal improprieties when reviewing the report, and wrongfully determined that some of the standing committee's findings were clearly erroneous. We disagree with these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

SC18996 - Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C. ("The principal issue in this appeal is whether allegations that a law firm breached its duty of undivided loyalty to a client and failed to follow the client's instructions regarding the prosecution of a lawsuit sound in breach of contract, to which a six year statute of limitations applies, or in legal malpractice, to which a three year statute of limitations applies. The plaintiff...commenced this action against the defendant...alleging breach of contract on the ground that the defendant, a law firm, pursued the interests of another client in derogation of the plaintiff's interests and did not follow the plaintiff's wishes and instructions when it represented her in a prior lawsuit against other parties. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's breach of contract allegations, the trial court characterized the allegations as sounding in legal malpractice and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the action was barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 134 Conn. App. 785, 793, 41 A.3d 674 (2012). On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's judgment because her claim sounded in breach of contract, and, therefore, it was not barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. The defendant responds that the trial court correctly characterized the plaintiff's claim as sounding in legal malpractice and that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")

AC35167 - Perugini v. Giuliano ("The self-represented plaintiff...appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants...in his action alleging misconduct in the defendants' representation of the plaintiff's wife during the couple's prior divorce proceedings. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1) suspending his February 8, 2012 deposition until the pleadings were closed, (2) denying his February 22, 2012 request for leave to amend his complaint, (3) dismissing his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (4) striking his August 6, 2012 substitute complaint from the docket and rendering judgment for the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC34521 - Cammarota v. Guerrera ("The plaintiff...appeals following the judgment of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.... The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the motion for a directed verdict as to the counts of his complaint alleging (1) professional negligence and (2) breach of fiduciary duty. We agree with his first claim and disagree with his second claim.")

AC33834 - Targonski v. Clebowicz ("In this action for legal malpractice, the plaintiffs...appeal from the summary judgment rendered against them in favor of the defendant...an attorney, on the ground that their action is barred by the general three year tort statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that summary judgment was improper because the evidence before the trial court raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. Because we agree with the plaintiffs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.")

AC33305 - Litvack v. Artusio ("'Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 411, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly held that the plaintiff, suing in her individual capacity, lacked standing to pursue a malpractice action against attorneys who had represented her father before his death.")

AC32692 - Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C. ("The plaintiff. . . appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant. . . . On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the action was commenced beyond the applicable statute of limitations.")

SC18814 - Grimm v. Fox ("On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) granted the defendants’ motion for judgment, determining that the critical statements concerning the defendants made by this court in its opinion in Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 886 A.2d 391 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S. Ct. 2296, 164 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2006), were not sufficient 'evidence of an expert nature' (expert evidence) of the defendants’ malpractice; and (2) heard the defendants’ motion for judgment one day after the motion was filed, and on the same day that trial was scheduled to begin.")

AC32353 - O'Connell, Flaherty & Attmore, LLC v. Richter ("The self-represented defendant... appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding in favor of the plaintiff...on its complaint and on the defendant's counterclaim that alleged legal malpractice. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied her motion for a continuance, (2) precluded the introduction of deposition testimony, and (3) concluded that she had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating legal malpractice.")

AC31919 - Lee v. Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP ("The plaintiff...appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants...on the ground that his action is barred by General Statutes § 52-577. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that summary judgment was improper because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine and the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations.")

AC31841 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Villeneuve ("On appeal, [the defendant] claims that, inter alia, (1) the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the court improperly suspended his license prior to ruling upon his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) the court and the statewide grievance committee (grievance committee) violated his due process rights because (a) the grievance complaint was not executed under 'penalties of false statement,' thus violating Practice Book § 2-32, and (b) he was improperly adjudicated for a violation of rule 8.4 (3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct when the grievance complaint did not allege that rule.")

AC31090 - Marciano v. Kraner ("On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that, in the absence of expert testimony, he could not prevail in his action for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants.")

SC18602 - Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton (Attorney discipline; “The defendant’s disbarment at issue in the present case arose from a letter she wrote in 1995 to the then chief justice of this court accusing three Superior Court judges of judicial misconduct. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) determined that the defendant had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because she asserts that the statements in her letter were true, that she submitted the letter in good faith, and that the contents of the letter were protected speech because the defendant has a duty as an attorney to submit grievances concerning judicial misconduct to the proper authorities; (2) determined that the defendant had violated rules 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct because the court improperly disregarded and distorted the language of the defendant’s letter, impermissibly narrowed the scope of inquiry and failed to articulate accepted standards of judicial conduct; (3) granted the attorney general’s motion to quash certain of the defendant’s subpoenas; (4) displayed prejudice and bias against the defendant; (5) denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s presentment after the plaintiff had rested its case; and (6) determined that the presentment had not subjected the defendant to duplicative discipline in that the pendency of the presentment herein was cited as an aggravating factor supporting the defendant’s prior disbarment for unrelated conduct occurring in 2000.”)

AC31589 - Law Offices of Robert K. Walsh, LLC v. Natarajan (Contracts; claim of legal malpractice; "The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied a claim for legal malpractice unsupported by such expert testimony.")

AC31504 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Smigelski ("The principal issue in this appeal from the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on an attorney is whether, having found initially that a contingent fee agreement was neither unlawful nor unethical, the trial court nonetheless properly sanctioned the attorney for having charged an unreasonable fee and for having disbursed the fee to himself in an unreasonable manner.")

AC30107 - Davies v. Jezek ("On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) failed to set aside the verdict because it (a) permitted the defendant's counsel to make a missing witness argument and (b) improperly instructed the jury on assumption of risk, and (2) failed to grant the plaintiff a new trial.")

AC29837 - Terracino v. Gordon & Hiller ("This case lies at the intersection of two principles of the law of suretyship. One principle permits a guarantor expressly to waive common-law defenses to his liability for the debt of another. Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 544–45, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). The other principle presumes that, between coguarantors for the same debt, each coguarantor is liable only for a contributive share of the total outstanding debt. Restatement (Third), Suretyship and Guaranty §§ 55 through 57 (1996); Collins v. Throckmorton, 425 A.2d 146, 151–52 (Del. 1980); Albrecht v. Walter, 572 N.W.2d 809, 812–13 (N.D. 1997).")

AC31470 - Miniter v. Statewide Grievance Committee ("The plaintiff, Francis A. Miniter, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, the statewide grievance committee (committee). The plaintiff argues that the court improperly granted the committee's motion to dismiss his appeal from an order of presentment for lack of a final judgment.")

AC30758 - Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rapoport ("On appeal, [Rapoport] claims that (1) the court improperly applied an abuse of discretion standard in its consideration of the report and recommendation of the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar for Fairfield County (committee), (2) when the court accepted the committee's recommendation, it improperly disregarded the order suspending him from the practice of law for five years and (3) the court and the committee violated his due process rights in various ways.")

AC30275 - Byrne v. Grasso ("On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment after concluding that his preclusion from calling expert witnesses to support his cause of action for legal malpractice rendered such claim legally insufficient as a matter of law.")

AC28503 - Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C. (“Before us is a case in which the mortgagee that foreclosed the interest in certain Greenwich real estate of the plaintiff…did not honor the agreement it had made, as a part of a foreclosure judgment against Lee, to convey a valuable condominium to him but, instead, sold the condominium to another. Following the breach by the mortgagee, Lee brought an action against his former attorneys, the defendants…sounding in legal malpractice for their alleged failure to record a copy of the foreclosure judgment on the land records. The court…acting on a motion of the defendants, dismissed the action for lack of ripeness because damages were purely hypothetical due to the possibility that Lee could collect a judgment in another pending lawsuit involving the mortgagee and its principals, who had breached the agreement in the foreclosure action.”)

AC29584 Rosenblit v. Laschever (“The defendant…appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following its granting of the motion for judgment filed by the substitute plaintiff…. The plaintiff’s motion asked the court to enter a judgment in the amount of $15,000 in his favor on the basis of a settlement agreement between the parties. The defendant argues on appeal that the court improperly concluded that the agreement entered into by the parties was a binding settlement agreement.”)

AC28868 - Moore v. Crone (“The pro se plaintiff…appeals from the summary judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor of the defendant.... The plaintiff’s two count amended complaint alleged that the defendant was negligent in his legal representation of the plaintiff for purposes of his direct appeal from a criminal conviction and that the defendant breached his contract with the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that an expert is not required for him to prevail on his claims and that the court should have considered his case on the merits.”)

AC29254 - Tuccio v. Garamella ("The plaintiffs...have appealed from the judgment of nonsuit rendered against them and from the denial of their motion to set aside the judgment of nonsuit. The plaintiffs claim that nonsuit as a discovery sanction under the circumstances in this case was unduly harsh and an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.")

AC29290 - Rozbicki v. Statewide Grievance Committee (“On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that he violated rule 3.1.")

AC26161 - Gray v. Weinstein ("The plaintiff claims that the court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude him from litigating the issue of whether Weinstein's failure to move to withdraw the plaintiff's plea of nolo contendere in a prior criminal proceeding caused the plaintiff harm.")

AC28916 - Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committee ("The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) the reviewing committee did not misapply the law when it determined that he had violated rules 8.4 (4) and 3.3 (a) (1), (2) the defendant presented sufficient evidence of violations of rules 3.3 (a) (1) and 8.4 (4), and (3) the reviewing committee did not rely on irrelevant facts in reaching its conclusions.")



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