The mission of the Connecticut Judicial Branch is to serve the interests of justice and the public by resolving matters brought before it in a fair, timely, efficient and open manner.



Criminal Law Supreme and Appellate Court Opinions

   by Booth, George

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=273

SC19183 - State v. Lester (Sexual assault first degree; sexual assault fourth degree; risk of injury to child; persistent serious sexual offender; "In this case, we are asked to decide whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the victim’s prior sexual assault allegation and the subsequent investigation when it was offered by the defendant, Edward Lester, to show the victim’s lack of credibility and an alternative source of the victim’s advanced sexual knowledge. The defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2), three counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (a), and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2), based on allegations that on multiple occasions he sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s daughter, who was eight years old at the time of the alleged conduct. During the course of the trial, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct, including a prior allegation of sexual abuse made by the victim, when she was five years old, against her father’s then wife. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts and the trial court thereafter rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. See footnote 3 of this opinion. The defendant appeals to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the prior allegation and subsequent investigation. We dismiss the defendant’s appeal as moot because the defendant has not challenged all of the trial court’s bases for its evidentiary ruling.")

AC38567 - State v. Mark (Tampering with evidence; motion for judgment of acquittal; sufficiency of evidence; "The state appeals from the judgment of the trial court setting aside the jury's verdict finding the defendant, Michael Mark, guilty of one count of tampering with evidence in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2010) § 53a-155 (a). The state claims that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty. We agree with the state and reverse the judgment of the trial court. ")

AC38566 - State v. Mark (Murder; felony murder; robbery in first degree; conspiracy to commit robbery in degree; double jeopardy; third party culpability; "The defendant, Michael Mark, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count each of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1), robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (3), and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by excluding evidence that supported his third party culpability defense, and (2) violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

AC36541, AC36543 - State v. Brito (Possession of narcotics with intent to sell; possession of hallucinogenic substance; motion to suppress; "In this consolidated appeal, the defendant, Edwin Brito, appeals from the judgments of conviction rendered by the trial court following his conditional pleas of nolo contendere made pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a. In one case, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a hallucinogenic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (b) and, in the other case, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a narcotic substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a). The defendant entered the pleas after the court denied his two motions to suppress certain evidence that the police discovered following two warrantless searches. These searches were incident to two unrelated traffic stops involving the defendant. As he did before the trial court, the defendant challenges the constitutionality of these searches. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.")

AC37394 - State v. Mitchell (Sale of narcotic substance; sale of narcotic substance within 1500 feet of public school; "The defendant, Yuwell Mitchell, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, on the charges of sale of a narcotic substance in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) and sale of a narcotic substance within 1500 feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court's jury instruction to continue deliberations after the jury reported that it was unable to reach a verdict violated his right to a fair trial by coercing the jurors to reach a unanimous verdict without providing a cautionary reminder of their duties as individual jurors not to agree to a verdict unless they personally agree to it under the court's instructions as applied to the evidence before them. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Tort Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=274

AC38022 - Brown v. Njoku (Battery; "Following a trial to the court, the self-represented defendant, Edwin Njoku, appeals from the judgment rendered by the court in favor of the plaintiff, Suzette Brown. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) erred by failing 'to enter an appearance' for Christus Medical Group, P.C. (business), (2) abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance, (3) improperly found that the plaintiff had sustained her burden of proof, and (4) denied him the right to due process and a fair trial by failing to let him participate in 'trial management' and to oppose a trial to the court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


New OLR Research Reports

   by Zigadto, Janet

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=272

The Office of Legislative Research has issued the following research reports during the second half of December:

Documentary Proof of Citizenship for Voter Registration - 2016-R-0323 - "Does either federal or state law require documentary proof of citizenship (DPOC) for voter registration? Do other states require DPOC?"

Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference - 2016-R-0324 - "This report answers the following questions about the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (CIAC): 1. To whom does CIAC report in the General Assembly? 2. How much autonomy does CIAC have? Who oversees the conference? 3. Is CIAC subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? 4. Who oversees similar state high school athletic conferences in New York and Massachusetts?"

Concealed vs. Open Carrying of Firearms in Connecticut - 2016-R-0330 - "Under Connecticut law, does a person carrying a handgun on his or her person have to carry it in a concealed manner?"

Refugee Resettlement - 2016-R-0320 - "What is the process for vetting, accepting, and placing refugees in Connecticut?"

Identity Theft - 2016-R-0316 - "What are the processes for investigating identity theft and the associated penalties? What steps can an individual take to determine if his or her identity was stolen?"

Lice in Schools - 2016-R-0329 - "Summarize the state’s laws and procedures for how schools handle cases of head lice."

Clean Air Act and Emissions Testing Fees FAQ - 2016-R-0327 - "This report answers some frequently asked questions about the Clean Air Act (CAA) and emissions testing fees."

Gun Storage Requirement - 2016-R-0328 - "What is the law governing safe storage of guns to prevent minors from accessing them?"

Criminal Convictions and Judicial Deportation - 2016-R-0331 - "Criminal convictions that may result in deportation under immigration laws."

Service of Civil Orders of Protection - 2016-R-0332- "Who Is authorized to serve civil orders of protection?"

Treatment Programs for Drug-Involved Offenders - 2016-R-0281- "What programs are available in Connecticut for drug-involved offenders?"

Landlord's Protections Regarding a Tenant's Abandoned Possessions - 2016-R-0333 - "Describe the protections Connecticut law provides to a landlord when a tenant abandons his or her possessions or personal effects."

Judgment of Loss Mitigation - 2016-R-0334 - "Describe 'judgment of loss mitigation,' the judicial alternative to foreclosure created by PA 16-65."

Evenwel v. Abbott - 2016-R-0157- "This report summarizes 578 U.S. ___ (2016). In Evenwel v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether states may base their legislative districts on total population counts."



Connecticut Judicial Branch Biennial Report and Statistics, 2014-2016

   by Zigadto, Janet

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=271

The Connecticut Judicial Branch Biennial Report and Statistics for 2014 - 2016 is subtitled Committed to Public Service Excellence and is available on the Judicial Branch website. The publication highlights new initiatives taken on by the Branch, gives basic information on the structure and function of the courts and administrative divisions and summarizes noteworthy cases handled by the CT Supreme and Appellate Courts during the two year period. The Statistical Overview provides basic facts and numbers on case movement for civil, family, juvenile, criminal, small claims and housing matters.

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  • FYI


Employment Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=269

SC19505 - Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ("In this certified appeal, we consider whether General Statutes § 46a-104 provides for an award of statutory punitive damages as a remedy for discriminatory practices under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The plaintiff, Michael Tomick, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s decision to set aside a jury award of $500,000 in statutory punitive damages against the defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 157 Conn. App. 312, 115 A.3d 1143 (2015) (Tomick II). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly ignored the plain language of § 46a-104 in concluding that the statute does not authorize punitive damages. We disagree with the plaintiff, and conclude that § 46a-104 does not provide for an award of punitive damages. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Family Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Roy, Christopher

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=268

SC19571 - Gabriel v. Gabriel ("The plaintiff, Richard P. Gabriel, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court granting his motion for modification of unallocated alimony and support, and denying the motion for contempt filed against him by the defendant, Diana K. Gabriel. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly reversed the judgment of the trial court. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court improperly: (1) denied the defendant’s motion for contempt, which was based on the plaintiff’s unilateral reduction in the unallocated alimony and child support; and (2) granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification of unallocated alimony and child support. We agree with the plaintiff’s claim regarding the motion for contempt, but disagree with his claim regarding the motion for modification. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Contract Law Supreme Court Opinions

   by Roy, Christopher

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=267

SC19531 - Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor ("The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly found that the defendant, Gary Proctor, manifested assent to enter into an implied in fact contract with the plaintiff, Connecticut Light and Power Company, for the provision of electric services to a third party. We conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that the trial court’s finding that the parties had entered into an implied in fact contract under which the defendant would be responsible for payment for those services was not clearly erroneous. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Proctor, 158 Conn. App. 248, 256, 118 A.3d 702 (2015). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Attorney Discipline Supreme Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=266

SC19535 - Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff ("In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether an attorney who knowingly appropriated client funds, but did not intend to do so wrongly, 'knowingly misappropriated' those funds and is therefore subject to mandatory disbarment pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47A. The plaintiff, Disciplinary Counsel, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court reprimanding the defendant, Laurence Parnoff, rather than disbarring him pursuant to § 2-47A. Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff, 158 Conn. App. 454, 482, 119 A.3d 621 (2015). The plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly interpreted § 2-47A to mandate disbarment only if an attorney appropriates client funds knowingly and with the wrongful intent to steal them. Regardless of the defendant's intent, the plaintiff claims, the defendant’s knowledge that the funds he appropriated were disputed is sufficient to disbar him. We conclude that § 2-47A mandates disbarment only when an attorney misappropriates a client’s funds both knowingly and intentionally—that is, when an attorney steals from his or her client. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.")


Tort Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Mazur, Catherine

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=265

SC19310 - Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc. ("This case is the second of two diversity actions in which the federal courts certified questions for this court's advice regarding the viability of an action under Connecticut's Product Liability Act (act) alleging that a cigarette’s design had increased consumers' risk of cancer. The courts sought advice whether specific theories advanced in those actions are precluded by this court's adoption of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes liability for defective products that are 'unreasonably dangerous,' and more particularly, our adoption of comment (i) to § 402A, which defines that term in relation to consumers' knowledge of the danger. In the first of these actions, this court advised that the strict liability theory advanced was not precluded because it required application of our modified consumer expectation test, under which the obviousness of the danger is only one of many factors that the trier of fact may consider. Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 321 Conn. 172, 177, 136 A.3d 1232 (2016).

In the present action, this court considers three substantive questions: (1) whether, for claims alleging design defects, we should abandon our dual tests based on § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and adopt the standards under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability; (2) if not, whether § 402A and comment (i) provide a single, unitary definition for all theories under which product liability claims may be brought, including negligence; and (3) whether the punitive damages available in the act are limited to litigation costs under our common-law punitive damages rule. This court raised the first question; we accepted certification with respect to the second and third questions, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d), from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. See Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., Docket No. 3:06cv1768 (SRU), 2014 WL 585325 (D. Conn. February 14, 2014).

For the reasons that follow, we decline at this time to adopt the Restatement (Third). Nonetheless, we are persuaded that modest refinements to our product liability tests under the Restatement (Second) will clarify the plaintiff's burden of proof in strict liability cases and provide a better guide to any necessity for adopting the Restatement (Third) or any other substantive change. We further conclude that, although all product liability claims require proof of a 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous' to the user or consumer, unreasonably dangerous is not determined by consumer expectations under comment (i) to § 402A when such a claim may be brought under a theory of negligence. Finally, we conclude that punitive damages under the act are not limited by the common-law rule. Accordingly, we answer both of the certified questions 'No.'"


Environmental Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=264

SC19620 - Connecticut Energy Marketers Assn. v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection (Declaratory judgment; sovereign immunity; "The issue that we must address in this appeal is whether the issuance of a comprehensive energy strategy by the defendant Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department), pursuant to a legislative directive, and the subsequent approval of a plan to expand the use of natural gas in this state by the department and the defendant Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (authority) constituted ' "actions which may significantly affect the environment" ' within the meaning of General Statutes § 22a-1c, thereby triggering the requirement for written evaluation of the expansion plan's environmental impact pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-1b (c). The plaintiff, Connecticut Energy Marketers Association, brought this action against the defendants claiming that they violated the Environmental Policy Act (act), General Statutes § 22a-1 et seq., when the department issued a comprehensive energy strategy that contemplated a significant expansion of the use of natural gas in this state, and when both defendants approved a plan for such expansion, without evaluating the environmental impact of, among other things, an increase in the use of natural gas pursuant to § 22a-1b (c). The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint claiming that only 'individual activities or a sequence of planned activities proposed to be undertaken by state departments, institutions or agencies, or funded in whole or in part by the state, which could have a major impact on the state's' environmental resources; General Statutes § 22a-1c; constitute 'actions which may significantly affect the environment' for purposes of § 22a-1b (c). Because they did not undertake any such activities, the defendants claimed, no environmental impact evaluation was required. The trial court agreed with the defendants and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff claims on appeal to this court that the trial court improperly determined that the defendants' activities did not constitute 'actions which may significantly affect the environment' for purposes of § 22a-1b (c). We disagree with the plaintiff, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.")

  • SC19620 Dissent - Connecticut Energy Marketers Assn. v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection


Criminal Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=263

SC19662 - State v. Holley (Criminal possession of firearm; "EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Jubar T. Holley, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court following his pleas of nolo contendere; see General Statutes § 54-94a; to four counts of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-217 (a). The defendant entered these pleas after the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence discovered following the execution of a search warrant at his house. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence seized as a result of the search warrant that the defendant claims was issued without a showing of probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. We disagree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Administrative Appeal Supreme Court Opinion

   by Booth, George

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=261

SC19567 - Allen v. Commissioner of Revenue Services (Administrative appeal; "The plaintiffs, Jefferson Allen and Evita Allen, appeal from the trial court's award of summary judgment upholding the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue Services, denying their request for a tax refund for the taxable years 2002, 2006, and 2007. In this appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for a refund for the taxable year 2002 on the basis of the three year limitation period to file an income tax refund pursuant to General Statutes § 12-732 (a); (2) § 12-711(b)-18 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies permitted the defendant to tax the plaintiffs' income derived from the exercise of options because the options were granted as compensation for performing services within the state; and (3) it is constitutional to impose a tax on income derived from the exercise of nonqualified stock options by a nonresident who was granted the options as compensation for performing services within the state. We disagree with each of the plaintiffs claims. Because the form of the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim relating to the taxable year 2002 was improper, we reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment with respect to that taxable year and remand the case with direction to render judgment dismissing that claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.")


Property Law Supreme Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=262

SC19668 - Lackman v. McAnulty (Declaratory judgment; quiet title; "In this case, we consider whether a grantor's failure to record a separate document limiting his powers ' "as trustee" ' in accordance with General Statutes § 47-20, when that grantor quitclaimed real property to himself as trustee, has the effect of nullifying the transfer of that property to the trust corpus, thereby allowing that grantor, as an individual, subsequently to devise that property through his will. The plaintiffs . . . appeal from the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, who are beneficiaries of a trust settled by the decedent . . . . On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that the phrase 'otherwise dispose of' within § 47-20 does not include a specific devise in a will. The plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the decedent's failure to record a separate document limiting his powers as trustee when he quitclaimed a certain parcel of real property to himself as trustee subsequently allowed the decedent to devise the property to the plaintiffs in his will. We disagree with the plaintiffs, and conclude that § 47-20 does not apply in this case because it protects only the interests of third parties who obtain property by means of a conveyance from a grantor who had received that property as trustee in the first instance. Because § 47-20 did not nullify the decedent's quitclaim deed to himself as trustee, the property was a trust asset, and the specific devise in the decedent's will adeemed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.")


Habeas Supreme Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=260

SC19521 - Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction (Habeas; "In 2002, a jury found the petitioner, Michael Skakel, guilty of the 1975 murder of his neighbor, Martha Moxley (victim). After previous unsuccessful attempts to overturn his conviction, including two appeals to this court, the petitioner filed the habeas petition that is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, he principally claimed that his criminal trial counsel provided such inadequate representation that he was denied his constitutional right to have effective assistance of counsel for his defense. The habeas court agreed with the petitioner on some of his claims and rendered judgment granting the petition. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, has appealed from the habeas court’s judgment. Because we conclude that the petitioner’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally adequate representation, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case to that court with direction to render judgment denying the petition.")


Habeas Appellate Court Opinion

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=259

AC38016- Marquez v. Commissioner of Correction (Habeas; " On appeal, he claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal, and (2) improperly concluded that the alleged conduct of the prosecutor in the underlying criminal proceeding did not violate the petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial. We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.")


Criminal Law Appellate Court Opinions

   by Townsend, Karen

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=258

AC37200- State v. J.M.F. (“On appeal, the defendant raises the following seven claims: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sanction against him that precluded him from raising an affirmative defense of mental disease or defect, ultimately violating his constitutional rights to present a defense and to due process of law; (2) the trial court erroneously concluded that he unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary waived his right to counsel; (3) the trial court deprived him of his right to due process of law by failing to order, sua sponte, that he undergo a competency evaluation; (4) the state unconstitutionally interfered with his right to counsel; (5) the trial court improperly continued to trial despite the existence of an appellate stay, which rendered the results of the trial void ab initio; (6) the trial court abused its discretion by not appointing a special public defender, ultimately violating his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process of law; and (7) the trial court violated his rights to due process of law and to present a defense when it refused his request to instruct the jury on renunciation and diminished capacity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”)

AC37552- State v. Juan C. ("On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court, Bentivegna, J., improperly (1) refused to grant his request for a continuance of his trial, and (2) denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the first count, sexual assault in the first degree. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse the judgment in part.")


Contract Law Appellate Court Opinion

   by Zigadto, Janet

 http://jud.ct.gov/lawlib/LawLibNews/Posts/Post.aspx?Id=257

AC38198 - Szynkowicz v. Bonauito-O’Hara ("The plaintiff, Peter Szynkowicz, appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Linda Bonauito-O'Hara, doing business as Linda's Team, William Raveis. The underlying dispute arose when the plaintiff and the seller, Edward Development Company, LLC, entered into a dual agency agreement naming Brenda Hanley, a realtor who worked for the same real estate company as the defendant, to act as their dual agent in connection with locating, purchasing and developing the property known as Lot 7 Meadow Brook Drive in East Haddam. After entering into the dual agency agreement, the plaintiff entered into a real estate contract with the seller to develop a single-family home on the property, which was subsequently cancelled when the seller was unable to complete construction. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, whom the plaintiff alleges was also a party to the dual agency agreement, for the return of his deposited moneys advanced to the seller upon the advice of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting (1) the motion to strike count five of his complaint because he adequately had alleged an action for breach of an oral contract against the defendant, and (2) the motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to the defendant's liability under counts one, two, three and four of his complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.")



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