Criminal Jury Instructions Home

6.1 Introduction to Assault

Revised to December 1, 2007

"Under our penal code . . . assault is classified as first, second or third degree, the category depending upon the intent of the actor, the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, and the severity of the resultant injuries.  General Statutes § 53a-59 through 53a-61."  State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 268 (1976).  Since Ruiz, more ways of committing assault have been added to the statutes and an additional factor of the status of the victim has been added.

DEGREE / SUBSECTION	INTENT	RESULT	ADDITIONAL FACTOR
First degree § 53a-59 (a) (1)	Specific: to cause serious physical injury	Serious physical injury	With deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
First degree § 53a-59 (a) (2)	Specific: to disfigure, or destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of body.	Disfigurement, etc.
First degree § 53a-59 (a) (3)	Extreme indifference recklessness	Serious physical injury
First degree § 53a-59 (a) (4)	Specific: to cause serious physical injury	Serious physical injury	Aided by 2 or more persons
First degree § 53a-59 (a) (5)	Specific: to cause physical injury	Physical injury	By discharge of firearm
First degree § 53a-59a	As specified in § 53a-59 (a) (2), § 53a-59 (a) (3), or § 53a-59 (5)		Elderly, blind, disabled, mentally retarded, or pregnant
First degree § 53a-59b	As specified in any subsection of § 53a-59		DOC employee acting in performance of duties
First degree § 53a-59c	As specified in § 53a-59 (a) (1)		Pregnant woman; resulting in termination of pregnancy
Second degree § 53a-60 (a) (1)	Specific: to cause serious physical injury	Serious physical injury
Second degree § 53a-60 (a) (2)	Specific: to cause physical injury	Physical injury	With deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, other than discharge of firearm
Second degree § 53a-60 (a) (3)	Recklessness	Serious physical injury	With deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
Second degree § 53a-60 (a) (4)	Specific: to cause stupefaction by administration of drug; no medical or therapeutic purpose	Stupefaction	With drug capable of causing stupor; without consent
Second degree § 53a-60 (a) (5)	Specific: to cause physical injury	Physical injury	Defendant parolee; victim parole officer or member of board of parole
Second degree § 53a-60a (a)	As specified in any subsection of § 53a-60		With firearm
Second degree § 53a-60b	As specified in any subsection of § 53a-60 or § 53a-123 (a) (3)		Elderly, blind, disabled, mentally retarded, or pregnant
Second degree § 53a-60c	As specified in any subsection of § 53a-60a		Elderly, blind, disabled, mentally retarded, or pregnant; with firearm
Second degree § 53a-60d	General intent	Serious physical injury	With a motor vehicle while intoxicated
Third degree § 53a-61 (a) (1)	Specific: to cause physical injury	Physical injury
Third degree § 53a-61 (a) (2)	Recklessness	Serious physical injury
Third degree § 53a-61 (a) (3)	Criminal negligence	Physical injury	With deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or electronic defense weapon
Third degree § 53a-61a	As specified in any subsection of § 53a-61		Elderly, blind, disabled, mentally retarded, or pregnant

 

Separate offenses/ Lesser included offenses
As the above chart shows, there are various ways to commit each degree of assault.  When the question has been raised, the appellate courts have found the various ways within each degree to be separate offenses, and not lesser included offenses of one another.  State v. Moore, 98 Conn. App. 85, 92, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 944 (2006), and cert. denied, 281 Conn. 906 (2007) (§ 53a-59 (a) (1) and (a) (5) are different offenses); State v. Morgan, 86 Conn. App. 196, 217 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 902 (2005) (§ 53a-59 (a) (1) and (a) (3) are different offenses); State v. Barnett, 53 Conn. App. 581, 602, cert. denied, 250 Conn. 918 (1999) (§ 53a-59 (a) (1) and (a) (4) are separate offenses); see also State v. Denson, 67 Conn. App. 803, 809, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 915 (2002) (§ 53a-59 (a) (2) is not a lesser included offense of § 53a-59 (a) (1)).

The lesser degrees of assault may be lesser included offenses of assault in the first and second degrees depending on the factual allegations of the information.  See, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 272 (1976) (state's evidence limited to intentional conduct, so reckless assault could not be lesser included offense); see also State v. Bunker, 27 Conn. App. 322, 329-32 (1992) (discussing methodology of instructing on several assault charges, each with several lesser included offenses).

Intent
The assault statute provides for intent to be transferred.  State v. Carter, 84 Conn. App. 263, 269, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1066, 125 S.Ct. 2529, 161 L.Ed.2d 1120 (2005).  The defendant need not be aware of the presence of the victim.  Id.

A defendant may simultaneously intend to cause death and intend to cause serious physical injury, justifying convictions of both attempted murder and intentional assault for the same act against the same victim.  State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 481-83 (2000); State v. Williams, 237 Conn. 748, 754-55 (1996).

Multiple assaults
It is double jeopardy to be convicted of two counts of assault for a single continuous assault that resulted in two stab wounds to a single victim.  State v. Nixon, 92 Conn. App. 586, 592-97 (2005).