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8.6-6 Inciting Injury to Persons or Property -- § 53a-179a
Revised to December 1, 2007 (modified June 13, 2008)
Note: Because of the dubious constitutionality of the inclusion of the words "justifies" and "praises" in this statute and the judicial gloss given it in State v. Ryan, 48 Conn. App. 148, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 930 (1998); see footnote 1; this instruction does not include those verbs.
The defendant is charged [in count __] with inciting injury to (persons / property). The statute defining this offense reads in pertinent part as follows:
a person is guilty of inciting injury to (persons / property) when, in public or private, orally, in writing, in printing or in any other manner, (he/she) (advocates / encourages / incites / solicits)1 <insert as appropriate:>
the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property.
any assault upon (any organization of the armed forces of the United States or of this state / the police force of this or any other state or any officer or member thereof / the organized police or fire departments of any municipality or any officer or member thereof).
the killing or injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual.
For you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
Element 1 -
Incitement
The first element
is that the
defendant
(advocated /
encouraged /
incited /
solicited) <insert
as appropriate:>
-
the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property.
-
any assault upon (any organization of the armed forces of the United States or of this state / the police force of this or any other state or any officer or member thereof / the organized police or fire departments of any municipality or any officer or member thereof).
-
the killing or injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual.
[<Insert if applicable:> As used in this statute the word "injury" means impairment of physical condition or pain. There is no requirement that the impairment of physical condition or pain continue for any specific length of time. It may be brief or lengthy.]
The words "(advocate / encourage / incite / solicit)" have their ordinary meaning. They pertain to expressions and conduct that are likely to produce imminent action. The word "imminent" means impending or about to occur. It does not have a specific time frame. The action need not immediately follow the expression or conduct if it is otherwise imminent.2
Element 2 - Intent
The second element
is that the
defendant
specifically
intended3 to
cause injury to (a
person /
property). A
person acts "intentionally"
with respect to a
result when
(his/her)
conscious
objective is to
cause such
result. <See
Intent: Specific,
Instruction 2.3-1.>
It is not
necessary that the
(person /
property) was, in
fact, injured.
Conclusion
In summary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 1) <insert specific allegations under the first element>, and 2) (he/she) specifically intended to cause injury to <describe nature of alleged injury>.
If you unanimously
find that the
state has proved
beyond a
reasonable doubt
each of the
elements of
inciting injury to
persons or
property, then you
shall find the
defendant guilty.
On the other hand,
if you unanimously
find that the
state has failed
to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt
any of the
elements, you
shall then find
the defendant not
guilty.
_______________________________________________________
1 See State v. Ryan, 48 Conn. App. 148, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 930, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876, 119 S.Ct. 179, 142 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998), for an explication of this list of verbs. "[W]here the legislature, out of a desire to assure that no artful semanticist will escape the burden of the statute, employs, indiscriminately, seriatim, a number of similar words, some virtually identical, others differing slightly, the better practice would appear to be to let each help to define the other. Accordingly, we read 'justifies' and 'praises' in the sense of 'encourages,' 'advocates,' and 'incites.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 155-56.
2 See State v. Damato, 105 Conn. App. 335, 345-51, cert. denied, 286 Conn. 920 (2008) (discussing the imminence requirement).
3 "[J]udicial gloss makes it clear that the statute requires an intent to cause injury in addition to the proscribed language." State v. Ryan, supra, 48 Conn. App. 152.
Commentary
General Statutes § 53a-179a is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth. State v. Ryan, 48 Conn. App. 148, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 930 (1998); State v. Leary, 41 Conn. Sup. 525 (1989).
See State v. O'Neil, 65 Conn. App. 145 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 295 (2003), for a discussion of the difference between solicitation and attempt.

